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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, Nicaragua has been a lightning rod
for intense political and legal debate in the United States. The
1979 revolutionary victory and subsequent governmental control
by the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN or
"Sandinistas") preceded Ronald Reagan's election as President of
the United States by just over a year. During the Reagan years,
Nicaragua was a key component of that administration's campaign
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against what it saw as a pure Marxist regime.'
When the United States provided funding, at first covertly, to
create an armed counterrevolutionary force (the "contras"), both
the U.S. Congress and legal scholars questioned the legality of this
intervention in Central America.2 Nicaragua received further at-
tention in the U.S. legal community when it brought suit against
1. Politically, Nicaragua has assumed less importance, at least overtly, during the ad-
ministration of U.S. President George Bush. Interest by non-legal academics in the changes
affected by the Sandinista revolution has produced an immense literature on post-revolu-
tionary Nicaragua which is remarkably devoid of discussion of law and legal institutions. I
have found a number of books particularly helpful in deepening my own understanding of
Nicaragua's historical, political, and social developments.
For the best analyses of U.S. foreign policy regarding Nicaragua's relationship to the
United States, see ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONDEMNED TO REPETITION: THE UNITED STATES AND
NICARAGUA (1987); see also KARL BERMANN, UNDER THE BIG STICK: NICARAGUA AND THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1848 (1986)(a distinctly progressive account of history, revolution, and
U.S.-Nicaragua relations); GEORGE BLACK, THE GOOD NEIGHBOR: How THE UNITED STATES
WROTE THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1988)(a penetrating and en-
tertaining expos6 of the sordid history of U.S. policy in Central America); SHIRLEY CHRIS-
TIAN, NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION IN THE FAMILY (1986)(a thorough, though essentially conserva-
tive, account of Nicaragua's historic and contemporary experience); RoY GUTMAN, BANANA
DIPLOMACY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA, 1981-1987 (1988).
My personal favorites in politics and society, however, are the powerful personal stories
of the experience of Nicaragua's revolutionary transformation. See OMAR CABEZAS, FIRE
FROM THE MOUNTAIN: THE MAKING OF A SANDINISTA (1985)(an account of a Sandinista guer-
rilla who later became involved in the government); see also DORIS TIJERINO, INSIDE THE
NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION (As TOLD TO M. RANDALL) (1978)(the personal account of the wo-
man who eventually was to head the Sandinista police, the first woman ever to head a na-
tional police force in the hemisphere). For accounts from foreign visitors, see PETER DAVIS,
WHERE Is NICARAGUA? (1987); SALMON RUSHDIE, THE JAGUAR SMILE (1987).
2. For a myriad of treatments of the legality of recent U.S. intervention in Central
America, see ARMS CONTROL AND FOREIGN POLICY CAUCUS, U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
AGAINST THE LAW? (Sept. 11, 1984); MARK V. TUSHNET, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE LAW: THE
CONSTITUTION, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE COURTS (1988); Christopher C. Joyner & Michael A.
Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contempo-
rary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621 (1985); Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Is United
States Military Intervention in Central America Illegal?, 12 HUM. RTS. 22 (1984); Jules
Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986); John N. Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Fu-
ture of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1986); John N. Moore, The Secret War in Cen-
tral America-A Response to James P. Rowles, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 273 (1987); Panel Discus-
sion: Options for a Law-Abiding U.S. Policy in Central America, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J.
215 (1990); John M. Rogers, Domestic Legal Challenges to U.S. Policy in Nicaragua, 6 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 77 (1987); James P. Rowles, "Secret Wars," Self-Defense and the
Charter-A Reply to Professor Moore, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 568 (1986); Daniel C. Harms, Note,
The Legality of the United States Trade Embargo Against Nicaragua: The Unfettered
Exercise of Presidential Emergency Power in Peacetime, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 171
(1986); John Mabie, Note, The Legitimacy of United States Intervention in Nicaragua, 6
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135 (1984); Keith T. Schulz, Note, The Legal Implications of
United States Policy Toward Nicaragua: A Machiavellian Dilemma, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
895 (1985).
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the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleg-
ing U.S. responsibility for contra crimes and other improper inter-
ventions in its domestic affairs. The United States withdrew from
the ICJ's jurisdiction, and a decision was rendered in favor of Nic-
aragua in 1986.3 Domestic U.S. legal actions also sought govern-
ment accountability for contra wrongdoing. 4 There were, of course,
extensive Congressional hearings and ongoing prosecutions of U.S.
government officials and private individuals for their illegal activi-
ties in the Iran-Contra arms transfers and for their participation in
illicit payments to the contras.'
3. The ruling of the International Court is reported as Military and Paramilitary Activ-
ities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 4. That
case, from which the United States withdrew jurisdiction prior to a ruling on the merits,
held that the United States had violated international law by training, arming, equipping,
financing, and supplying contra forces that engaged in military and paramilitary activities
against Nicaragua. The I.C.J. also condemned U.S. armed attacks on Nicaraguan territory,
unauthorized overflights, mining of Nicaraguan harbors, and encouragement of illegal acts
by the publication of a manual for psychological warfare. See THE CIA's NICARAGUA MAN-
UAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE (1985). For a discussion of the Nic-
araguan case, see TERRY GILL, LITIGATION STRATEGY AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A CASE
STUDY OF THE NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES DISPUTE (1989); David Bernstein, International
Court of Justice-Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. - (Judgment on Merits of June 27,
1986), 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 146 (1987); Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the
World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985); Farooq Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the
United States' Attempted Withdrawal from the Jurisdiction of the World Court in the
Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295 (1985); John N. Moore et al.,
Debate-The ICJ Case on the Merits: Legal and Moral Implications of U.S. Aid to the
Contras, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 85 (1987); World Court Sides with Justice, 5 ENVfO 22
(July 1986); Keith Highet, Note, Litigation Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from the
Nicaragua Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 992 (1985). One interesting political consequence of the
case has been the U.S. request for Nicaragua's new government to forgive the money judg-
ment ordered by the ICJ, now estimated at as much as $17 billion, as a condition for receipt
of much-needed U.S. economic assistance. See Mark A. Uhlig, U.S. Urges Nicaragua to
Forgive Legal Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A18.
4. Domestic litigation based on wrongdoings by contra forces or leaders has generally
been unsuccessful, but raises significant legal and political questions. See, e.g., Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988); discussed in Mark Gibney, Suing for Death, Suffering and Peace, 12 HUM. RTS. Q.
415 (1990); see also Linder v. Portocarrero, No. 90-5862 (11th Cir. 1990) (Initial Brief of
Appellants on file with author)(complaint dismissed by the Southern District of Florida in
an unreported decision).
5. On the Congressional hearings, see, e.g., COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, STAFF REPORT: STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN-
VOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR (Sept. 7, 1988);
THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT (1987); L. COCKBURN, OUT OF CONTROL: THE STORY OF THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SECRET WAR IN NICARAGUA, THE ILLEGAL ARMS PIPELINE, AND THE
CONTRA DRUG CONNECTION (1987); David J. Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 696 (1987); Gary J. Schmitt, The Rule of Law and "Perfect Secrecy", 11
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Close attention and hope for peace in the region recurred
when the Central American presidents, including Nicaragua's
Daniel Ortega, signed the Central American Peace Plan in 1987,
and this virtually without participation by the United States.' The
peace plan pressured both the Sandinistas and the U.S. to end the
contra war. It is in this environment that the Nicaraguan people
prepared for the 1990 national elections, one of the most heavily
observed campaigns in history.7 The surprising victory, in Febru-
ary 1990, of the National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition over
the Sandinista slate in both Presidential and National Assembly
elections brought new attention to the country, not only in the
United States but throughout the world.8
The victory of the UNO coalition was widely associated with
what is seen as a world-wide "democratization" movement. More
open elections have taken place in many Central and South Ameri-
can Countries,9 but democratization's most profound and tumultu-
Hous. J. INT'L L. 255 (1988). For a good summary of the focus of the prosecutions and the
several defendants, see Fred Strasser, Iran - Contra Scorecard, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1991, at
1; George Lardner, Jr., Abrams Pleads Guilty in Iran - Contra Affair, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
1991, at Al.
6. Guatemalan Agreement for Peace in Central America, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Oct. 1987, at
56. On the inability of the U.S. to influence decision-making in the region, see Stephen
Kinzer, Two Latin Nations Rebuff U.S. Effort Against Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1988, at Al. The Central American leaders met again in 1989 to update the Peace Accords.
See Richard Boudreaux, 5 Latin Leaders Agree on Disbanding Contras, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1989, at 1; Text of Agreement by Central American Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1989,
at A14.
7. Mark A. Uhlig, Nicaragua Approaches an Election That May Rise or Fall on Its
Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1990, at A3.
8. The UNO coalition, heavily supported by U.S. funding and organization, was made
up of 14 separate parties ranging from the far right-wing Popular Conservative Alliance
Party (PAPC) to the Communist Party of Nicaragua. See KENT NORSWORTHY, NICARAGUA: A
COUNTRY GUIDE 10-15 (1989)[hereinafter COUNTRY GUIDE]; UNO's Balance of Power-On a
Tight Rope, 9 ENvfO 26 (June 1990). Within the first month of the new administration, the
coalition had begun to splinter, deeply divided over the issue of leadership in the National
Assembly. See The New Players, 9 ENVIo 24-25 .(May 1990).
On the election generally, see Richard Boudreaux, Requiem for a Revolution?, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1990, at H1; William Branigin, Election Shattered Many Sandinista Myths,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1990, at A26; Mark A. Uhlig, Nicaraguan Opposition Routs Sandinis-
tas: U.S. Pledges Aid, Tied to Orderly Turnover, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1990, at Al; Whither
Central America? Coopted Negotiation or Participatory Democracy, 9 ENVIO 10, 14-15
(May 1990). The U.S. administration reacted with an historically typical account: "In the
Western Hemisphere, the election and inauguration of a democratic government in Nicara-
gua left the repressive dictatorship of Fidel Castro the only Marxist-Leninist regime in the
region." DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990
IX (Feb. 1991).
9. I have briefly summarized the fragile transformation of twelve Latin American and
Caribbean governments-Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
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ous impact took place in the Soviet Union 0 and in those countries
of Eastern Europe which were part of the Soviet bloc." That im-
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay-which, since
1979, have democratically elected civilian presidents after military or caudillo governments.
See Richard J. Wilson, Testing a New Constitution, 16 HuM. RTS. 44, 49 (1989).
Chile and Haiti have held open elections since 1989. See A Medio Camino: The Road
Toward Democracy, A Report on the 1989 Chilean Elections, INT'L HUM. RTS. L. GRP. (Mar.
1990); Howard W. French, Haitians Overwhelmingly Elect Populist Priest to the Presi-
dency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al. See also Robert Barros, The Left -and Democracy:
Recent Debates in Latin America, 68 TELOS 49 (1986); Tom J. Farer, Elections, Democracy,
and Human Rights: Toward Union, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 504 (1989); Eduardo Viola & Scott
Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s, 38 J. INT'L AFF.
193 (Winter 1985); James Brooke, Latin Armies Are Looking for Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 1991, § 4, at 2; Doyle McManus, Central America Turns to Democracy: Can It Work?,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1990, at 1; A.S. Ross, New Era for Latin Democracy, S.F. EXAMINER,
Sept. 17, 1989, at 1.
Cuba continues to resist change from pure socialism, primarily due to the strong leader-
ship of Fidel Castro. See, e.g., Don Podesta, Cuba's Buffalo-and-Bicycle Approach to Life
in a Post-Communist World, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1991, at A12; Don Podesta, As Castro
Grays, So Does Revolution, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1991, at A18.
10. The events in Eastern.Europe, the Soviet Union and newly-reunified Germany are
far too extensive and ongoing to even begin to document here. They were extensively yet
concisely summarized in late 1990 in a four-part series in The New York Times: Evolution
in Europe: One Year Later, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9-12, 1990 (Serge Schmemann, For Eastern
Europe Now, A New Disillusion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at Al; Steven Greenhouse, East-
ern Europe Finds Pain on Journey to Capitalism, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 10, 1990, at Al; Stephen
Engelberg, Poland Faces Choices on Economic Austerity and the Character of the State,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1990, § 1, at 16; Celestine Bohlen, Ethnic Rivalries Revive in Eastern
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at Al). For another theoretical discussion of the democ-
ratization process in Europe, see Andrew Arato, Some Perspectives of Democratization in
East Central Europe, 38 J. INT'L. AFF. 321 (1985). For compelling literary perspectives, see
William McPherson, In Romania, 33 GRANTA 9 (Summer 1990); The State of Europe:
Christmas Eve, 1989, 30 GRANTA 125 (Winter 1990)(materials by a number of prominent
authors). The impact on legal systems is well-documented in the materials cited infra note
12.
11. As a recent report on human rights stated:
The year 1989 may very well go down in history books as a watershed year re-
garding the worldwide cause of human rights. The revolutionary changes in Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Romania left Alba-
nia as the only totalitarian regime left intact in Europe by year's end .... The
Soviet Union's acceptance of these changes was undoubtedly a significant factor
in the peaceful character of the transition, as was the orderly and democratic
spirit of the popular movements themselves.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989 2 (Feb.
1990).
Literature on the legal changes in Eastern Europe is sparse, due primarily to the spot-
light on events in Russia and the Soviet Union. See, e.g., Inga Markovits, Law and Glasnost:
Some Thoughts About the Future of Judicial Review Under Socialism, 23 LAW & Soc. REV.
399 (1989)(canvassing developments during the 1980s in Poland, Hungary, and East Ger-
many); Sophia Kaminski, The Polish Legal System-Continuity and Change, 33 THE AD-
vOC.: IDAHO ST. BAR 16 (Oct. 1990); The Criminal Justice Reform: Possible Solutions, Guar-
antees and Prospects, 2 BULLETIN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE IN THE PEOPLE'S
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pact has reached deeply into the established socialist legal tradi-
tion; democratization has led to a profound reexamination of the
premises, institutions, and processes of criminal justice. 2 The pre-
mise of Soviet legality, without oversimplification, has shifted from
"everything which is not permitted by law is prohibited" to "every-
thing not prohibited by law is permitted. ' 13
Notwithstanding the vast literature, scholars have given little
attention to the development of law and legal institutions in Nica-
ragua, before or after the Sandinista revolution.1 This Article is a
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA 14 (June 1989); Czechoslovakian Constitutional Act on Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms (unpublished draft on file with the author).
12. There is a developing literature on the changes to legal systems brought on by the
advent of perestroika, a Russian term originally coined to refer to reform of the Soviet
economy, but coming to mean broad social reconstruction. See, eg., WALTER LAQUEUR, THE
LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM: RUSSIA AND GLASNOST, 163-179 (1989); Anne-Marie Burley, Revolu-
tion of the Spirit, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1990); W. E. Butler, Towards a Rule of Law?, in
CHRONICLE OF A REVOLUTION 72 (Abraham Brumberg ed., 1990)[hereinafter CHRONICLE];
Doriane Lambelet, The Contradiction Between Soviet and American Human Rights Doc-
trine: Reconciliation Through Perestroika and Pragmatism, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 61 (1989);
John Quigley, The New Soviet Law on Appeals: Glasnost in the Soviet Courts, 37 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 172 (1988); John Quigley, Will the Inquisitorial System Wither Away? Per-
estroika in the Soviet Lockup, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 121 (1989)[hereinafter Quigley,
Soviet Lock-Up]; Albert J. Schmidt, Law and Perestroika, 9 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 295
(1988); David M. Simmons, Recognition of Illegalities, Proposals for Reform, and Imple-
mented Reforms in the Soviet Criminal Justice System Under Gorbachev, Glasnost, and
Perestroika, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L LAW & POL'Y 921 (1990); Gordon B. Smith, The Procuracy,
Citizen's Rights and Legal Reform, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 77 (1990); Vaksberg, Legal
Reforms and Basic Principles, in CHRONICLE, supra at 188. See also infra notes 475-79 and
accompanying text; Allan Norrie, Locating the Socialist Rechtsstaat: Underdevelopment
and Criminal Justice in the Soviet Union, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 343 (1990); Valerii Savitskii,
Selected Problems of Judicial Reform, Criminal Justice and the Protection of Individual
Rights in the USSR, 2 CRIM. L.F. 269 (1991).
13. Butler, supra note 12, at 80. The Russian articulation is found in V.K. Zabigailo,
Perestroika, Glasnost and Law Reform in the Soviet Union Today, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 165,
171 (1989).
14. For the single scholarly study in English on criminal justice in post-revolutionary
Nicaragua, see Beth Stephens, A Developing Legal System Grapples with an Ancient Prob-
lem: Rape in Nicaragua, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 69 (1990) [hereinafter Stephens, Rape in
Nicaragua]. For Ms. Stephens' account of the development of family law see Beth Stephens,
Changes in the Laws Governing the Parent-Child Relationship in Post-Revolutionary Nic-
aragua, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137 (1988). A number of authors have briefly
written on the development of law in post-revolutionary Nicaragua, touching on issues of
criminal law and procedure. See, e.g., Nancy Blodgett, Nicaragua: The Trials of Post-Revo-
lutionary Justice, 12 STUDENT LAW. 10 (1984); Beverly M. Carl, How Marxist Is Nicaragua?
A Look at the Laws, 21-22 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 116 (1984); John T. Philipsborn, Nicaragua:
A Legal System Developing in Difficult Times, 71 JUDICATURE 211 (Dec.-Jan. 1988); Jerry
Pyle, The Law in Nicaragua-Seeing Justice Done, 7 ENViO 8 (Oct. 1988).
A translation of a speech given by former Nicaraguan Supreme Court Vice-President
Vilma N(Ifiez de Escorcia is the most extensive, informative and insightful treatment on the
subject. Vilma Nidfiez de Escorcia, Justice and the Control of Crime in the Sandinista Pop-
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study of the criminal justice system in Nicaragua. It begins with
the institutional roots of criminal justice structures and processes
in the late nineteenth century and ends with the newest post-elec-
tion developments of 1990. Post-revolutionary developments in
criminal justice took place in the context of a vast shift in the legal
culture from the traditional civil law model to a largely socialist
model. While the focus is on Nicaragua, a close examination of the
development of the criminal justice system in that country has
much to offer in the general understanding of legal systems and
culture outside of the common law.
The Central and South American countries generally are part
of the Roman or civil law tradition which flows from colonial domi-
nance of the region by Spain and Portugal; this tradition is shared
by most of contemporary Western Europe.1 5 In the area of criminal
law and procedure, the civil law was highly influential in the legal
development of the socialist criminal process in Eastern Europe.'"
ular Revolution, 23 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 5 (1983). See also Interview with Dra. Vilma NCftez
de Escorcia, Justice in Nicaragua, 8 CAN. CRIMINOLOGY F. 53 (1986). Finally, there have
been three studies which focus almost exclusively on the extraordinary (and now abolished)
procedures of the Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunales (TPA), which will not be discussed in
depth here. For a discussion of the studies, see Robert S. Steinberg, Judicial Independence
in States of Emergency: Lessons from Nicaragua's Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals, 18
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359 (1987); LAWYERS COMMITREE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, NICARAGUA: REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE (April 1985) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY JUS-
TICE]; INT'L LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE NICARAGUA REPORT: POPU-
LAR ANTI-SOMOCISTA TRIBUNAL (1986).
One of the most important developing sources for information on the operation of the
criminal justice systems of Central America is the reports prepared by international non-
governmental human rights groups such as Americas Watch, the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, and Amnesty International. These reports will be referred to throughout
this Article. It has been noted, however, that reporting on human rights in Nicaragua is not
without its own shortcomings, political interests, and institutional and cultural biases. See
Tom J. Farer, Looking at Nicaragua: The Problematique of Impartiality in Human Rights
Inquiries, 10 HUM. RTS. Q.'141 (1988); The Politics of Human Rights Reporting in Nicara-
gua, 5 ENVfO 14 (June 1986).
15. The civil law tradition is covered extensively but succinctly in John Henry Mer-
ryman's classic, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985); see also RENt DAVID & JOHN E. C.
BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (1968); LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SYS-
TEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK (Alan N. Katz ed., 1986). On the civil law in Latin
America, see generally HENRY P. DE VRIES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE AMERI-
CAS: AN OUTLINE OF LATIN AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY (1980); PHANOR J. EDER, A COMPARA-
TIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN LAW (1950); KENNETH L. KARST,
LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY (Jane R. Trapnell
ed., 1966); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA: A CASEBOOK STUDY (1975); JOSEF L. KUNZ, LATIN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1950); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE
LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978).
16. Mirjan Damaska, in his extensive and insightful study of comparative criminal pro-
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Nicaragua's legal system thus shares much in common with its
Central and South American neighbors, as well as with most of
Western Europe. It has been influenced also by socialist legal mod-
els which dominate in Cuba and, until recently, in the Soviet
Union.
A second focus of this Article is a close examination of the
premises, ideology, and historical development of Nicaraguan crim-
inal procedure. History puts current changes into appropriate con-
text and may, in a broader context, give a sense of future direc-
tions. The sharp break in political and legal philosophy after the
1979 revolution meant profound institutional and societal change
during the subsequent decade. A similarly dramatic shift occurred
with the unexpected UNO victory in the 1990 Presidential elec-
tions. An understanding of the distinct premises of the civil and
socialist criminal justice systems in Nicaragua provides a context
from which to correctly interpret the strengths and weaknesses of
the Nicaraguan system, separate and apart from the mud-slinging
of the political arena.
Civil and socialist law premises initially may feel strange, in-
congruent, or even inimical to those who share our common law
tradition. Even more subtly and seductively, the experience may
seem absolutely congruent when, in fact, it is not, because of lan-
guage, culture, or custom and practice. Analysis of the ideologies
which came into conflict during these sharp breaks illuminates not
only the Nicaraguan experience, but also that of the other civil law
countries of Latin America. It permits speculation on the effects of
similar sharp breaks from traditional socialist law structures in the
many countries now in that process.
The operative code governing criminal procedure today in Nic-
aragua is more than a century old. 17 By the time of the 1979 Nica-
cedure, states that, "many important aspects of [European socialist] legal process, when
compared to puzzling common-law arrangements and institutions, appeared to exhibit a
strong resemblance to conventional Continental systems. The essential structure of trials
was similar, and so were the basic outlines of the preliminary and the appellate process,
modes of proof, and a great number of more specific arrangements." MIRJAN R. DAMASKA,
THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PRO-
CESS 7 (1986) [hereinafter THE FACES OF JUSTICE]. See also W. E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 351
(2d ed. 1988); Soviet Lock-Up, supra note 12, at 121.
17. The most complete version of the Code of Criminal Instruction of 1879, and the
most used for reference in Nicaragua, is the version annotated by Professor Manuel Esco-
bar, produced in 1956. MANUEL ESCOBAR, C6DIGO DE INSTRUCCION CRIMINAL DE NICARAGUA:
CON TODAS LAS REFORMAS, (Edicion Oficial 1956). The most current and accurate version,
however, is an edition produced by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court in 1988 for use as a desk
278 [Vol. 23:2
1991-92] NICARAGUAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 279
raguan revolution, criminal procedure in most of Central and
South America had achieved a significant measure of reform and
modernization.' 8 With some minor changes, Nicaragua's criminal
procedure was, in 1979, similar to that established one century ear-
lier. Changes in criminal procedure and, more generally, in crimi-
nal justice policy and administration in revolutionary Nicaragua,
were. not nearly as profound nor as ideologically based as those
which occurred following the Cuban revolution of 1959.'" Now,
twelve years later, at the end of the first year of the Chamorro
government, some amendments have occurred, but no new codes of
criminal law or procedure are planned for Nicaragua in the near
copy by judges. CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, C6DIGO DE INSTRUCCI6N CRIMINAL [C6D. INST.
CRIM.] (Managua, Nicaragua, 1988). This edition incorporates post-revolutionary amend-
ments. All references to specific code provisions will be to the 1988 edition, unless otherwise
noted.
18. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, at 7. Despite movement toward what is generally perceived
as salutary reform, Western Europe and Latin America have vacillated on certain central
issues. These include orality, consolidation of proof-taking, the use of jury trials, and restric-
tions on the judge's inquisitorial powers. Cf. MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 128. Both Spain
and Argentina, for example, have gone through several versions of oral versus written trial
proceedings. ALEJANDRO D. CARRIO, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ARGENTINA: AN OVER-
VIEW FOR AMERICAN READERS 12-14 (1987).
19. During the first decade after the 1959 revolution, the Cuban system was modeled
after the Soviet system. A Fundamental Statute granted almost total power to the Execu-
tive, or party ruling structure, and almost none to the Judiciary. Both distrust in the rulings
of the bourgeois courts of the Batista era, and strong intervention in judicial processes
through specific decrees or executive interventions, assured the "revolutionary correctness"
of judicial rulings. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1962) [hereinafter CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW]. By 1966, Cuban courts were extensively
injected with lay, or "popular," participation in the style of the Soviet Comrades' Courts.
Jesse Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1969); Harold S.
Berman & James W. Spindler, Soviet Comrades' Courts, 38 WASH. L. REV. 842 (1963). But
for the brief duration and limited jurisdiction of Nicaragua's Popular Anti-Somocista Tribu-
nals, there has been no popular participation in the courts, although the 1987 Constitution
calls for "popular participation" in the administration of justice. NICAR. CONST. art. 166.
Typical of executive intervention in judicial processes in Cuba was the trial, begun in
1959, of air force pilots who had supported the Batista regime in its final days. The pilots,
accused of genocide, were initially acquitted by a military tribunal, but were later sentenced
to 30 years imprisonment by a higher court appointed by Fidel Castro (after his public
expression of dissatisfaction with the lower court verdict). CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW,
supra at 181-90; Fransisco Jos6 Moreno, The Cuban Revolution v. Batista's Pilots, in Po-
LITIcAL TRIALS 94 (Theodor L. Becker ed., 1971).
Moreover, since 1973, the legal profession in Cuba, unlike Nicaragua's, was entirely so-
cialized, in the style of the Soviet model. In the Cuban system, the private practice of law
was abolished. Luis Salas, The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary Cuba, 8 NOVA L.J. 43,
52 (1983). In the Soviet system, state supervision of the advokatura, or colleges of lawyers,
means severely limited independence, although the private practice of law is not technically
abolished. BUTLER, supra note 16, at 80-95; DINA KAMINSKAYA, FINAL JUDGMENT: My LIFE AS
A SOVIET DEFENSE ATTORNEY 24 (Michael Glenny trans., 1982).
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future.20
There were, to be sure, dramatic developments during, the
Sandinista government in such diverse areas as land reform, liter-
acy and education, health care, and women's rights.21 Significant
time was also devoted to the elections of 1984 and to the 1988 re-
form of the electoral laws.22 Perhaps the biggest single change in
the conception of revolutionary law came with the adoption of a
new Constitution in January of 1987.23
The Nicaraguan experience with criminal justice provides an
opportunity to examine how closely revolutionary reality was able
to approximate revolutionary aspirations. As the analysis here sug-
gests, changes in legal institutions reflected adherence to socialist
ideals, while changes in criminal procedure after the revolution
largely reflect a tendency toward what is seen as modernization
under the civil law model rather than wholesale conversion to the
socialist model.
Nicaragua has moved from traditional Latin American caudil-
lismo under the Somoza family, which had ruled from the late
1930s with heavy U.S. intervention, 24 through the socialist-demo-
cratic model embodied in the policies of the Sandinista govern-
ment, and now to the new policies of the UNO government. These
abrupt transitions in Nicaraguan society give the legal compara-
tivist the opportunity to examine the influence in Nicaragua of all
of the dominant legal traditions: common law, civil law, and social-
ist law. At bottom, criminal procedures are an accurate reflection
of a society's commitment to due process and equal protection of
20. Interview with Manuel Cano, attorney and advisor to the National Assembly on
criminal legislation, in Managua, Nicaragua (Jan. 5, 1989); interviews with Lino Herndndez,
Executive Director of the non-governmental Nicaraguan Permanent Human Rights Com-
mission, in Managua (June 7, 1990) and Victor Ord6fiez, Vice-Dean and Professor of Crimi-
nal Law and Procedure, Central American University Faculty of Law, in Managua (June 6,
1990).
21. See generally NICARAGUA: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (Thomas W. Walker ed., 1985);
and JOSEPH COLLINS, WHAT DIFFERENCE COULD A REVOLUTION MAKE? FOOD AND FARMING IN
THE NEW NICARAGUA (1986). See also GEORGE BLACK, TRIUMPH OF THE PEOPLE: THE
SANDINISTA REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA 223-330 (1981).
22. JOHN A. BOOTH, THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 215-24
(2d ed. 1985). Nicaragua Writes a New Election Law, 7 CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE, No. 30
(Sept. 21, 1988).
23. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE NICARAGUA [NICAR. CONST.] (Managua: Editorial El
Amanecer, 1987).
24. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, NICARAGUA: A COUNTRY STUDY 27-43 (Area Handbook
Series, James D. Rudolph ed., 1982) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY]; BERMANN, supra note 1,
at 219-74; CHRISTIAN, supra note 1, at 27-39.
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the law, the protection of the rights of the individual, and the ven-
geance or compassion of that society toward those whose conduct
is considered criminally aberrant. Each of the three dominant
Western legal traditions offers a different vision of these notions.
Part II of the Article puts the code of criminal procedure, and
other aspects of Nicaraguan criminal justice, into appropriate his-
torical perspective, explaining their origins in order to better un-
derstand their jurisprudential premises, as well as the influence of
these premises on current practice. Part III provides a picture of
practical aspects of criminal justice in Nicaragua on the eve of the
1979 revolution. Part IV identifies, in some depth, the most impor-
tant post-revolutionary changes in criminal justice institutions or
procedures, while Part V analyzes the ways in which these changes
conflict with the original operational premises of criminal practice
and procedure. Part VI suggests that Nicaragua's experience, when
combined with the experiences of modernization in Western Eu-
rope and the Soviet Union, is part of a general trend toward a
more adversarial model in Western societies, a trend which may be
unhealthy for criminal process. A concluding section focuses on the
new Nicaraguan government's ideas for the administration of crim-
inal justice.
II. ANTIQUES INHERITED BY THE REVOLUTION: NINETEENTH
CENTURY JUDICIAL STRUCTURES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The study of the civil law is the study of codes. No other
source of law-judicial decisions, treatises, regulations, custom, or.
practice-carries the central significance of the code as the correct,
organized, coordinated, unified expression of governing principles.
Despite the continuing emergence of new schools of legal philoso-
phy in Latin America, no system of thinking has achieved the cen-
trality and staying power of state positivism, with its ideology ex-
pressed through codification. 5 In its efforts to achieve certainty
25. State positivism asserts that law is the expression of the will of organized govern-
ment through people acting in history. Positivism searches for unifying principles, and be-
lieves that these principles can be expressed through a coherent scheme which, when com-
plete in the form of the code, creates a new legal order. MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 19-33;
cf. KUNZ, supra note 15, at 8-9. The Critical Legal Studies movement has identified the
dominant ideological objective of the civil law, indeed of all law, as the installation of a new
order of hierarchy-capitalism, free will and market-place autonomy. David Fraser, The
Day the Music Died: The Civil Law Tradition from a Critical Legal Studies Perspective, 32
Loy. L. REv. 861. 866-68 (1987).
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and predictability, the civil law purports to render the judge a bit
player while giving the legislature, as drafter of the code, the lead
role. The judge, in this ideology, need only find and apply the right
solution, as contained in the code.
Precedent plays little role whatsoever in the civil law. In Nica-
ragua, for example, the common custom is that three decisions by
the Supreme Court which reach the same conclusion on a legal is-
sue should be seen to have some influence, though non-binding, on
the subsequent deliberations of the lower courts.2 6 This was as true
in the last century as it is now.
During a brief historic period in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, Nicaragua adopted three comprehensive codes
which delineated police and court structures and criminal proce-
dure; with some amendments, these are the codes in operation to-
day. The most important for our purposes is the C6digo de In-
strucci6n Criminal, the Code of Criminal Instruction, adopted in
1879. Also of significance are the Ley Orgdnica de Tribunales, or
Organic Law of Courts,27 and the Reglamento de Policia, or Police
Regulations,2" adopted in 1894 and 1880, respectively.
A. Politics and Jurisprudence in Late Nineteenth-Century
Nicaragua
The period from 1869-1900, during which the current codes
dealing with criminal justice were drafted, does not stand
26. Interview with Umberto Obreg6n, Magistrate of the Court of Appeals for Region III
(Managua), in Managua (Jan. 4, 1989). Similar use of previous decisions on the same point
of law is found in Argentina, CARRI6, supra note 18, at 1-2, and is recognized in the civil law
tradition generally. See MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 47. The war-time economy in post-
revolutionary Nicaragua has made it almost impossible to use case decisions by higher
courts for any purpose. This is attributable to the inability to reproduce, due to the lack of
paper, sufficient copies of the decisions of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. During three
months of work in Nicaraguan courts, libraries and law offices, I never saw a lawyer or a
judge refer to a decision except upon my specific request, and even then, only by reference
to a "slip-sheet" copy of the opinion. At the time of my 1990 visit, the Boletin Judicial,
official organ for decisions of the Supreme Court, was about to complete work on its volume
of 1985 decisions.
27. Ley Orgdnica de Tribunales de 1894, Concordada por Dr. Modesto Valle (1928)
[hereinafter Ley de Tribunales].
28. Reglamento de Policia de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua de 1880 (1919) [hereinafter
Reglamento de Policia]. During my visit in 1988, I noted that the Nicaraguan Criminal
Code, although last adopted in 1974 and amended several times prior to that, is essentially a
product of the late 19th century, having taken its shape and direction from the Criminal
Code of 1897. Interview with Victor Ord6fiez, Vice-Dean, Central American Law School,
Managua, Nicaragua (July 27, 1988).
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out in Nicaraguan history.2 9 The drafting and adoption of the
codes largely occurred during a prolonged period of political domi-
nation by the Conservative party. The adoption of both the code of
criminal procedure and of the police code were sandwiched, histor-
ically, between the war for domination of the country by Tennes-
see filibuster, William Walker, in the 1850s,10 and the failure, in
1885, of the U.S. Senate to adopt the Freylinghuysen-Zavala
Treaty. This Treaty would have committed the United States to
the construction of a trans-oceanic canal in Nicaragua. 1 Joaquin
Zavala, whose public career is undistinguished except for his nego-
tiation of the canal treaty, was President at the time that the codes
of procedure and police were adopted."2
Zavala was followed, fourteen years later, by the Liberal leader
and national hero, Jos6 Santos Zelaya. After assuming power,
Zelaya reformed the constitution to include provisions abolishing
the death penalty, limiting foreigners' rights to diplomatic immu-
nity and incorporating anticlerical provisions. The codes of the
courts and of criminal law were adopted during the Zelaya era,
which lasted until 1909.33
Little is known of the jurisprudential influences on these codes
because a fire destroyed the Nicaraguan National Archive during
the earthquake of 1931, leaving the country virtually without any
written legal history before that date.3 ' A more recent commenta-
tor to the Code of Criminal Instruction identifies influences from
both revolutionary France and Spain, and describes the current
system as "mixed," with elements of both the "inquisitory" system
of the civil law tradition and the "accusatory" system of the com-
mon law. s5
29. Richard Millett notes that there is no general history of Nicaragua, and that the
period from 1860-1910 "remains a relatively neglected area of Nicaraguan history." Richard
Millett, Historical Setting, in COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 24, at 59.
30. Walker was the subject of a recent movie carrying his name. Both he and the movie
are doomed to historic obscurity in this country. Walker was arrested and executed in Hon-
duras in 1860. Id. at 13. Walker, however, is well known to Nicaraguans, and is seen as a
prominent historic example of repeated U.S. aggression, intervention, and imperialism.
31. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 115.
32. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, at 5.
33. Millett, supra note 29, at 15-16.
34. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, at 8.
35. Id. at 25. Criminal process in the civil law generally is described as "mixed." MER-
RYMAN, supra note 15, at 128-29. I find that these terms have distracting pejorative connota-
tions, particularly among U.S. practitioners. I prefer, and will use throughout this Article,
the terms "adversarial" and "non-adversarial." There has been enough cross-breeding in the
systems that modern criminal procedure in Europe and North America hardly resembles the
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Contemporary Nicaraguan criminal procedure is a solid, his-
torical product of the mainstream civil law tradition of the Euro-
pean continent, and has largely continued in that direction even
after the revolution. While some Germanic influence can be found,
the Code of Criminal Instruction, as originally adopted, virtually
copies the structure of the Code d'Instruction Criminelle, adopted
by the Napoleonic Commission for the Codification of Criminal
Procedure in France in 1808.36 The code appears to have traveled
intact from France to Spain, during and after the Napoleonic con-
quests, and hence to most of Central and South America through
the Spanish motherland.
B. The Historical Structure of the Police: El Reglamento de
Policia de 1880
The 1880 Police Regulations,37 adopted contemporaneously to
the procedural code, organized the police into various administra-
tive units and included the creation of Police Instructional Judges
(Jueces de Instruccibn Policial), an institution which survives to-
day. Police judges were an adjunct to the judicial branch for the
speedy resolution of certain minor offenses (infracciones)3 The
caricatures represented by the use of the terms so often relied upon to describe them. Other
authors have attempted to avoid this terminology by substituting other terms or by thinking
of other ways to define criminal processes. DAMASKA, supra note 16, at 16-46 ("hierarchical"
and "coordinate" models, which are most recognizable to the Continental criminal courts,
including some socialist regimes, and the Anglo-American system, respectively); John Grif-
fiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE
L.J. 359 (1970) ("battle" and "family" models); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Crim-
inal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) ("due process" and "crime control" models). I do
not think it necessary to resolve the issue here, but I will seek to avoid the use of terms
which only further distort cultural misperceptions.
36. The writings of Alejandro Serrano Caldera, former President of the Nicaraguan Su-
preme Court, U.N. Ambassador, and now Rector of the National Autonomous University of
Nicaragua, suggest that the Code was inspired by la Novisima Recopilaci6n Espahlola de
1805 [the Newest Spanish Law Compilation of 1805]. Alejandro Serrano Caldera, The Rule
of Law in the Nicaraguan Revolution, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 341, 462 (1990). My
own exploration of that source reveals little to support this view, while other scholars seem
to support my position. See Morris Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal
Procedures in Europe and America, 48 HARV. L. REV. 433, 462-64 (1935); Edward A. Tom-
linson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131 (1983); MER-
RYMAN, supra note 15, at 32-33. The French scholar, Adhermar Esmein, asserts that no good
history of Spanish law existed as of 1913, the time at which he summarized and synthesized
Continental criminal procedure. ADHERMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE xi (1913).
37. Reglamento de Policia, supra note 28.
38. Id. art. 5. See also infra text accompanying notes 371-80 (discussing instructing
police chiefs).
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use of police judges for the administrative adjudication of minor
offenses is also a descendant of Continental criminal procedure,
and such courts are still found there and in other Latin American
countries.39
The original police code gave wide authority to the police to
impose minor penalties for lesser violations ranging from minor
criminal conduct to violations of public health laws.40 The objec-
tive of the code was "the preservation of public order, the security
and welfare of the inhabitants and the control of its customs,"' 1
and the procedures in such cases were summary and administra-
tive. The judges in such cases were the local chiefs of police, who
need not have been trained in the law, but only have an "under-
standing" of it. The judge had power to sentence to terms of im-
prisonment of up to 180 days, or could replace the sentence by a
fine. The proceedings were "hearings and rulings without the form
or figure of a trial" and the decision of the judge could be based on
"any means of proof established by the laws."42
In cases involving the arrest of the offender in flagrante
delicto, the normal summary proceedings were even more abbrevi-
ated and simplified. The judge could render a decision without the
need to swear an oath or support the charges with witnesses. Police
court judges were to be solely responsible for their rulings, and
were "prohibited from consulting a lawyer." By law, the prisoner
was entitled to contact a lawyer prior to a hearing in these pro-
ceedings, and to present a defense. Appeals from adverse rulings
39. Esmein sets the time for the original creation of police courts as "Year IX" of the
French Revolution. During this period, new laws vested jurisdiction in both a Court of Cor-
rectional Police and a municipal police court. In the former, jurisdiction could be invoked by
the accused, the public accuser or the civil party and was limited to hearing only "correc-
tional" offenses. Municipal courts were for very minor offenses, from which there was no
appeal. ESMEIN, supra note 36, at 435. According to this author, police courts had been used
in London and other cities of England during the 1800s. Id. at 349.
Such courts still exist in France as tribunaux de police, which may impose sentences of
up to two months and fines of 6,000 francs or less. Tomlinson, supra note 36, at 142-43. One
North American observer of the police courts of Nicaragua has aptly analogized their use to
the kind of swift and administratively simple "safety valve" of plea bargaining in the United
States, at least in high-volume, low-penalty cases. Pyle, supra note 14, at 15-16.
Police courts are also found in Argentina, where they have been described as a "filter"
for minor criminal charges which would otherwise congest the criminal justice system. CAR-
R16, supra note 18, at 24-25, 36.
40. See generally Reglamento de Policia, supra note 28.
41. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN





went first to the Political Chief (Jefe Politico) in the department
in question, and subsequently to the Supreme Court.43
C. The Historical Structure of the Courts: La Ley Orgdnica
de Tribunales de 1894
The Organic Law of Courts of 1894 was adopted shortly after
the police and procedural reforms as a way to go beyond the broad
constitutional parameters in detailing the selection, attributes, and
powers of the Nicaraguan judiciary." Again, the essential structure
of the 1894 code has been maintained in contemporary Nicaragua.
At the level of general trial court jurisdiction, two courts exer-
cise primary jurisdiction. The district judge (ju~z de distrito) exer-
cises jurisdiction over serious felony matters at the trial stage, and
may impose the most serious sentences. Such judges, then as now,
are selected by the Supreme Court.45 They serve a two-year term
and are not required to be lawyers.
The second court is that of the local judges (jueces locales)
which have two primary responsibilities. First, they exercise ple-
nary jurisdiction in a range of minor offenses to impose sentence in
expedited or summary proceedings. Appeals from their rulings lie
to the district judge through trial de novo. Second, they are given
primary responsibility of the investigative stage of more serious of-
fenses, unless the district judge assumed the investigation himself.
Local judges, under the original law, were popularly elected in
their municipalities to one-year terms, and were required only to
be literate, lay citizens.4"
The Organic Law provided for two levels of appellate review,
generally called second and third instance (segunda y tercera in-
43. This composite of the powers and procedures in the police courts is taken from 1978
OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 61-62; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA
19-20 (May 10-15, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 AMNESTY REPORT]. The extraordinary powers
vested in police and the courts by virtue of the in flagrante capture of the defendant are
also a practice which dates to the earliest origins of the civil law. An individual caught in the
act of committing certain serious offenses during the reign of Charlemagne (800-814 A.D.)
could be executed on the spot. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 441.
44. Ley de Tribunales, supra note 27. The prologue to the Organic Law states that its
primary influence was the Chilean scheme of court structure.
45. Ley de Tribunales, supra note 27, art. 117; NICAR. CONST. art. 164(5).
46. Ley de Tribunales, supra note 27, arts. 28, 30. While the Ley de Tribunales con-
tained some other classifications of judges, such as the jueces de mesta, the local and dis-
trict courts were and are the most important trial courts in criminal matters. See infra note
209 and accompanying text.
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stancia). Appeals from the district court were taken to the Court
of Appeals (Tribunal de Apelaciones), where the judges were
named by the Supreme Court to terms of four years, and were re-
quired to be attorneys.47 Such appeals were of right, and were open
to both factual and legal review. Appeals to the Supreme Court lay
only at the discretion of the reviewing court on limited jurisdic-
tional grounds."8
D. The Design of Criminal Process: El C6digo de Instruc-
ci6n Criminal de 1879
Summary proceedings (juicio sumario) are prescribed for
those minor offenses (faltas) which carry a maximum sentence of
one year imprisonment. The process for their resolution has re-
mained virtually unchanged."9 Because the consequences of the of-
fense are minimal, the offenses are heard on an expedited schedule
by local or municipal court judges (jueces locales) who need not be
attorneys. In lesser offenses, the proceedings are conducted orally
and are designed to take no more than ten days. These proceedings
do not include a statutory right to counsel.5 0 Unfavorable decisions
by the local judge are appealable to the district court. After hear-
ing evidence, if necessary, the district judge renders a final, nonap-
pealable decision in the matter. 1
A number of courts with criminal jurisdiction existed both
before and after the revolution, most importantly the instructing
police courts and the military courts. The district courts, however,
heard the most cases involving criminal conduct, and their pro-
ceedings are typical not only of the other courts, but of courts
throughout Latin America. Thus, the remainder of this section fo-
cuses in some detail on their operation and animating premises.
For serious offenses the criminal process originally was divided
into three distinct phases: The investigative or instructive phase
47. Ley de Tribunales supra note 27, arts. 54, 74, 76, 117.
48. Id.
49. Faltas are found in Libro III [de la faltas y sus penas] of the Criminal Code and
are too numerous to list here. They include such offenses as minor assaults, threats, petty
theft, receiving stolen or forged money, disturbing the peace, etc. One interesting falta is the
interpretation of dreams, or the making of predictions for money. C6DIGO PENAL Y LEGISLA-
C16N COMPLEMENTARIA [COD. PEN.] art. 555(9) (1988) (Nicar.). The juicio sumario is set forth
in the C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 330 et seq. The maximum penalty for faltas is set at one year.
C6D. PEN. arts. 115, 118.
50. COD. INST. CRIM. art. 335.
51. Id. arts. 340-41, 345-49.
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(la instrucci6n), the examining or plenary phase (el plenario), and
the jury trial (el jurado)2 All phases of the criminal process were
conducted in written pleadings or through statements made before
the judge, except for the jury trial.
1. The Instruction
The initial, investigatory phase of any criminal proceeding (la
instrucci6n) was written and secret, even from the defendant.53 It
permitted the judge to undertake a factual investigation with mini-
mal interference while protecting the privacy of both the victim
and the accused. The municipal court judge ('u&z local) presided
at the investigatory stage unless the district judge chose to assume
jurisdiction."
a. Starting the Process: The Key Role of the Court
The criminal process could be commenced in one of three
ways: ex oficio, by denuncia, or by querella. Most often, the judge
commenced ex oficio, based on either a private complaint (queja)
or any extrajudicial information, even hearsay or rumor, provided
to the judge. 55 This procedure, while consistent with the then-prev-
alent notion of absolute judicial control, contributed to serious
abuse by politically motivated judges because there were no re-
straints on, and no review of judicial overreaching in the unilateral
decision to proceed with criminal charges. Criticism on these
grounds led to elimination of the ex oficio commencement of pro-
cess after the revolution."
52. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, arts. 3, 4, 22.
53. Id. art 25. As early as 1914, the code was amended to permit a role for the defend-
ant in this phase, which continues in the current system. Id. One commentator notes that,
in France, development of the same right took 50 years after adoption of the code on which
Nicaragua's was based. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 462.
54. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, art. 6.
55. C6D. INST. CRiM. arts. 30, 31.
56. Ley No. 37, 79 LA GACETA, art. 13 (Apr. 13, 1988). LA GACETA is the official publica-
tion of Nicaraguan laws. At times, however, the shortages of paper and demand for certain
editions made the official laws unavailable. The most frequently used local source for post-
revolutionary laws is the multiple-volume work of two Managua lawyers. The first eleven
volumes are called DECRETOS-LEYES PARA GOBIERNO DE UN PAISA TRAVES DE UNA JUNTA DE
GOBIERNO DE RECONSTRuccI6N NACIONAL (Dr. Ronaldo D. Lacayo & Martha Lacayo de
Arauz eds., 1979); the subsequent volumes are called D.CRETOS-LEYRs Y LEYES DE LA




The denuncia and the querella are still used. The denuncia
begins the process by the conveyance to the judge of a charge of
the commission of a crime, without a requirement that the com-
plainant name the defendant or come forward with proof.5 7 The
code did not specify, at least before the revolution, who would con-
vey that complaint to the judge, but this might have been done
either by the police or by direct intervention of citizens. Once the
complaint is filed, the judge takes over the investigation and other
proof-taking; the complainant has no further required role in the
proceedings. 8 The querella (or acusaci6n, as it is also referred to
in the code) is distinguished from the denuncia primarily by the
requirement that the complainant, in making the charge, commits
to prove the offense. Thus, the denuncia is a public action while
the querella is private.
Police were empowered to arrest when they had notice based
on the declaration of a witness or a strong presumption (presun-
ci6n vehemente) of the commission of an offense for which pro-
ceedings de oficio were, permitted.59 Presentment to a competent
judicial authority was governed both by the Constitution, which
permitted no more than twenty-four hours in 1974,0 and the code,
which permitted only twelve hours. 1 The charging decision, then,
is based on information from the police, the prosecutor, or a citizen
and resulted in the judicial decision known as the cuerpo del de-
lito; that is, what offense has been committed and whether to in-
vestigate the matter.62
'The key to charging in the Nicaraguan system was the judge.
All decisions as to what charges would be made and investigated,
as well as who would be charged, lay in the hands of the in-
structing judge, whose decision to proceed would set into operation
57. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 32.
58. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, at 50.
59. Id. art. 83. Exceptions were made for homicide, theft, robbery, arson, and perjury,
for which any presumption was sufficient if the accused was unknown or without roots in
the community.
60. NICAR. CONST. of 1974, art. 41, quoted in 1976 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 43, at
21. The 1987 Constitution permits up to 72 hours. NICAR. CONST. art. 33, par. 2.2. See infra
note 374.
61. COD. INST. CRIM. art. 83. Presumably, the constitutional limit was a ceiling and the
more explicit language of the code would be followed in those circumstances in which it
applied. A later article subjects the official to possible charges of illegal detention for failure
to present the accused within the time limits prescribed by the code. Id. art. 87.
62. The cuerpo del delito is discussed more fully under the section on burdens of proof.
See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
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the investigation under judicial supervision. While the police obvi-
ously would continue to play a role in the detention of defendants
in cases committed in the presence of the officer, or other varia-
tions of in flagrante conduct, the role of the police in arrest and
detention of the accused was all triggered by judicial action.
b. The Role of the Defendant-The Right to Counsel, Bail,
Confession, Search and Seizure, and Identification
Under the code's original conception, the defendant could not
take part in the investigation stage, even through counsel, and was
frequently held in custody and incommunicado. The right to coun-
sel evolved very slowly over the life of the code. Even now, code
provisions for the right to counsel do not appear in the code until
the sections regarding the plenary stage, strongly suggesting that
the code conceived of no right to counsel before that stage.13 While
this notion is inimical to common law defense attorneys who know
the importance of early client contact,"' the role of defense counsel
has never been given as much importance in the non-adversarial
system. There, the judge was expected to balance and protect the
rights of all parties to the criminal process.
The accused went unrepresented by counsel unless able to af-
ford a privately retained lawyer. This was true until the code was
amended to create a system of appointed counsel (defensores de
oficio) who were assigned by the court from a list, on the request of
any accused who wished to be represented. Poverty is not a crite-
rion for assignment, as it always has been in the United States.
These appointed counsel could be "lawyers, notaries, judicial
procurators or law students."65 The appointed lawyers, as well as
63. The chapter of the code dealing with "Defense of Prisoners" (Chapter IV) immedi-
ately follows the chapter on "The Plenary" (Chapter III). Despite this seemingly limited
role for counsel, it should be born in mind that well into the 1800s on the Continent, lawyers
were not merely unmentioned but were actually prohibited from representing the accused;
the original Nicaraguan code immediately followed that era. John H. Langbein, The Crimi-
nal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 282 (1978).
64. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EARLY REPRESENTA-
TION TEST DESIGN (1981) (empirical study of benefits of intervention by public defenders in
criminal process immediately after arrest, primarily in the early disposition of cases by ne-
gotiated pleas of guilty).
65. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, art. 235. A 1950 revision of this law was more explicit in
allowing representation by all of the above, but further provided that the law student must
be in at least the third year of study (of five), or that the accused could be represented by




their private counterparts, were also given greater access to the re-
sults of the investigation as a result of amendments to the code
some time after its enactment.
Today, as at the time of the code's conception, once the deci-
sion is made .that an offense has been committed and that there is
sufficient nexus between the accused and the offense, the act of
imprisonment (auto de prisi6n) is issued. The auto de prisibn is
one of the points in the process where the rights of the defendant
come into conflict with the long-standing traditions of the civil law.
This-continues to contribute strongly to the perception, not only in
Nicaragua but throughout the civil law world, that there is no pre-
sumption of innocence in an "inquisitorial" system. By definition,
the issuance of the auto results in immediate custody for the de-
fendant.6 Custody is likely to continue until trial. This is made
clear by the severe limitations on pre-trial bail.
Bail provisions, which remain unchanged, provide that bond
can be posted by the defendant himself (cauci6n juratoria) or
through a bondsman (fianza de la hdz), who may be a personal
acquaintance or a professional.8e Both statutory and practical as-
pects make the likelihood of bail virtually nonexistent. First, the
code provides that bail is prohibited in all cases where a term of
imprisonment of more than one year could be imposed.68 This ef-
fectively eliminates from consideration all but the least serious
crimes. 9 Moreover, the level of poverty in Nicaragua makes it vir-
tually impossible that the great majority of criminal accused will
have either the personal assets or collateral to make bail at all, or
to make them secure financial risks for bail bondsmen. More fun-
damental, however, is a notion pervading the civil law tradition in
Latin America that once the evidence is sufficient to justify issu-
ance of the auto de prisi6n, there is no further need to justify pre-
trial incarceration; justification is given by law.
If in custody, the defendant appeared before the judge at the
66. C6D. INST. CRIM. arts. 92-94.
67. Id. arts. 105-06. In practice, the professional bail bondsman is a common occur-
rence. Interview with Ramon Rojas Mndez, Fourth District Criminal Judge for Managua,
in Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 17, 1988).
68. COD. INST. CrM. art. 108.
69. One appellate court judge stated that the interpretation of these narrow provisions
has been to make the defendant eligible if the possible penalty can be one year or more,
which includes a fairly wide range of offenses in which the actual penalty could be substan-
tially more. Interview with Umberto Obregbn, Judge of the Court of Appeals for Region III
(Managua), in Managua, Nicaragua (Jan. 4, 1989).
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commencement of the investigation to give a declaraci6n inda-
gatoria, or investigative declaration."0 The closest common law
counterpart to the indagatoria is the arraignment. The Nicaraguan
defendant, even today, is brought before the judge immediately af-
ter the judge obtains jurisdiction over the matter and is questioned
by the examining judge without requirement of oath. The oath is
omitted in order to encourage the defendant to speak with candor
and without fear of reprisals through subsequent prosecution for
71perjury. Questions asked must include at least the following:
Whether the defendant is aware of the cause and source of the
complaint, where and with whom the defendant was at the time of
the offense, and, if the defendant admits the offense, an inquiry
into motive and accomplices. 2
There is no "entry of a plea of guilty or not guilty" at this
stage, as at common law. The defendant's confession cannot be ac-
cepted as the basis for the entry of a plea of guilty; there is no plea
bargaining and the proceedings go forward regardless of a full ad-
mission of guilt. Nor does the defendant have a right to silence in
this context, since it is assumed that the questions asked here do
not raise the risk of inculpation, and that the lack of an oath would
protect the defendant from any risk of later perjury charges. 73 It is
not hard to imagine the psychological pressures on the unrepre-
sented defendant at this stage of the proceedings, particularly
when the indagatoria may follow a prolonged period of police cus-
tody and interrogation.
70. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 171.
71. The pre-trial absence of oath is explicit in the code. Id. art. 172. At trial it is im-
plicit; it is mentioned for all other new witnesses, but not for the defendant. Id. arts. 294-95,
297. In the United States, no such protection exists. The defendant, who always testifies in
court under oath, is subject not only to subsequent prosecution for perjury, but to enhanced
sentence due to the judge's negative assessment of credibility during the defendant's trial
testimony. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978). The U.S. Supreme Court has also
taken a strong view in favor of the ethical obligation of defense counsel to reveal to the
court the lawyer's belief that the defendant would commit perjury if permitted to testify.
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). These decisions undermine the attorney-client rela-
tionship and the premises of the adversarial system. Monroe Freedman, The Aftermath of
Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora's Box, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 25 (1987); see
generally MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
72. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 171. The next article clarifies that the sole purpose of the
indagatoria is to "clarify the facts and verify the truth." The judge is not to use "threats or
promises" and is not permitted to use "suggestive or leading" questions. Id. art. 172.
73. Professor Langbein notes that a similar procedure was used, based on similar prem-
ises, in the Old Bailey sessions during the 17th and 18th centuries, prior to the appearance
of lawyers and the development of the adversarial trial. Langbein, supra note 63, at 281.
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Behind this system was a strong need for state control of
crime, with heavy trust in the state to fully, fairly, and objectively
prove the offense, even with a confession. The code nonetheless
places a high reliance on confessions as the principal source of that
proof; confessions were and continue to be "queen of proofs," ulti-
mately sufficient by themselves to convict.
7 4
Extensive rules still surround the quality, type, and admission
of confessions. These rules grow out of the perceived importance of
the confession as a basis for guilt. All extrajudicial confessions are
implicitly insufficient evidence of guilt. Full proof occurs only
when the confession is given "freely and spontaneously. . . in the
presence of the judge. '7 5 Confessions given involuntarily can there-
fore be admissible if repeated in court, but the use of coercion,
promises of leniency, or threats can be admitted to destroy the
confession's quality as full proof.7 6 This provision seems to put a
premium on obtaining a confession, even if it is the product of de-
grading physical circumstances or torture, because there is a heavy
burden on the accused to rebut the illegal confession by full proof
of the absence of coercion.
This striking of the evidentiary balance on the state's side is
more understandable in the historical context of the early nine-
teenth century, when the French drafted the code upon which the
Nicaraguan code was based. Even at that time, the use of torture
was considered legitimate in some circumstances or had only re-
cently been formally eliminated from codes of criminal procedure
on the Continent.71 One must question, even with the possible re-
buttal of a coerced confession, the message which was conveyed to
the custodial authorities: they knew that a coerced confession, even
74. A discussion of burdens of proof and tests for admissibility is found infra notes 158-
69 and accompanying text. Whole and partial proof are explained there. In pre-revolution-
ary France, the existence of partial proof other than a confession permitted the use of tor-
ture to obtain a confession as a means of elevating the quality of the evidence to a level of
sufficient reliability for conviction. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 458 n.68. Professor Langbein
has written persuasively about the ideology of torture and its modern parallels in the United
States system of plea bargaining. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U.
CHi. L. REv. 3 (1978).
75. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 253.
76. Id. art. 255.
77. Langbein suggests that the phenomenon receded into history during the middle of
the eighteenth century. Langbein, supra note 74, at 3. The recent demise of formal provi-
sions permitting torture should not be so shocking to us in the United States. It was not
until late 1990 that the U.S. joined 51 other countries in ratification of or accession to the
U.N. Convention on Torture. 136 CONG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
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one extracted through torture, was admissible as evidence if the
defendant could be intimidated into repeating it in open court.
The original scheme for the analysis of confessions continues
today. Confessions can be "simple" (a complete admission of the
truth), "explained" (given with a recognition of the truth of the
facts, but with circumstances which modify or restrict the use of
the confession's probative force) or "divided" (the facts are admit-
ted and other circumstances surrounding its taking are unrelated,
or divisible, from the voluntary giving of the statement).7 8 When
the confession is offered to establish a defense or is in some other
fashion favorable to the accused, the judge can admit that part
which favors the defendant after an examination of the accused's
and the accuser's sex, age, social position, prior conduct, and prior
relationships.7 9 It is not hard to imagine how the wealthy or promi-
nent accuser might fare against the impoverished defendant in a
system where these factors were explicitly permitted to be
considered.
One further aspect of the use of confessions is noteworthy:
that of the confesibn con cargos, literally the "confession with
charges," which is required to occur within seventy-two hours after
the auto de prisi6n, the imposition of formal charges. Accused are
brought before the judge, questioned as to their identity, and the
investigating declaration is read back, as are all charges. After this
reading, which is conducted only in the presence of the accused,
the judge, and the secretary, the accused is given an opportunity to
respond to the allegations.8 0 Silence at this point creates a pre-
sumption against the accused, and there is no statutory require-
ment that the defendant be advised of this fact. 1 Statements given
are included in the file after being read to the defendant and
signed in the presence of the judge.2
The code also provides detailed rules for search and seizure of
both the defendant and his or her personal effects or correspon-
dence, although the extent of these rules is not nearly as broad as
those governing the use of confessions. As to the arrest of the de-
fendant, a search of his dwelling or that of another is permitted
78. C6D. INST. CRIM. arts. 256-57.
79. Id. art. 258.
80. Id. arts. 193, 196.
81. Id. art. 194. German criminal procedure in the 18th century had similar features.
Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 463.
82. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 196.
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when the defendant is hidden in the home and there exists at least
partial proof of his or her commission of an offense.8 3 With an or-
der from the judge and the presence of two witnesses, the prosecu-
tor is permitted to enter to effect an arrest. If the door is closed
and no one answers after three knocks, forced entry is permitted.
4
Personal possessions of the defendant can be seized either as
evidence"5 or in order to satisfy monetary obligations which arise
from the criminal proceedings.8 6 Personal papers or correspon-
dence are "inviolable" unless they rise to the level of partial proof
by virtue of content which constitutes evidence, data, or presump-
tions.8 7 In such case, the judge may take steps to secure the mate-
rial, including removal from the mail. 8 The code is not more ex-
plicit in the use or limits on the use of inculpatory physical
evidence in the defendant's possession. This seems anomalous
when it is considered that the judge, who was to be the servant of
the code, had no discretion in the admission of physical evidence
or the value to be given to it in the system of formal legal proofs.
One final issue is that of pre-trial identification of the defend-
ant. While there is no formal provision defining the identification
procedure, a practice developed which allows for the complaining
witness, usually at the first appearance, to make a visual identifica-
tion of the defendant from a lineup. This procedure took place in
the absence of counsel, and was informal enough that no rules now
surround its use.89
It is easy to see that code structures themselves do not favor
the uncounseled defendant in preliminary proceedings, either in
83. Id. arts. 136, 137.
84. Id. arts. 139, 141.
85. Id. arts. 64-66 (proceeds); art. 69 (arms or instrumentalities); arts. 77-82 (personal
papers or correspondence). In the former two classes of evidence, the statute provides that
such objects may become the basis for proof of the corpus delicti without giving explicit
rules as to how the objects are to come within the knowledge of the judge.
86. Id. arts. 100-04.
87. Id. art. 77.
88. Id. art. 79.
89. I observed a few of these lineups at the Managua District Courts during my visits.
About six or seven prisoners, dressed alike in prison clothing and of roughly equal size,
would stand in line in the courtyard while the alleged victim would stand inside of the
building, looking out through a window ordinarily obscured from outside observation by
curtains or other informal shields. The judge observed the identification process and docu-
mented the conclusions of the witness; all proceedings were conducted ex parte. Lawyers
and judges there indicated that such procedures had been in use for many years. In some
Latin American countries, provision for pre-trial identification is made a formal part of the
code. See, e.g., CARRI6, supra note 18, at 63 (Argen.).
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the last century or today. The most serious problem is the strong
potential for abuse of the defendant's rights in the use of both ju-
dicial and extrajudicial confessions given without access to or ad-
vise from counsel.
c. The Role of the Victim: The Private Action
Under the code's design, the victim or accuser-the citizen
making a criminal complaint-had a right to personal representa-
tion in the criminal process, both to advance the criminal prosecu-
tion and to pursue civil damages against the accused. However, the
victim was unrepresented in the process until the conclusion of the
first stage, and even then, under the code's initial conception, was
represented by retained private counsel, a kind of private
prosecutor.
Counsel for the victim pursued the private criminal action.
There are two primary distinctions between the public and private
action. In the private action, only the victim may commence the
proceedings. No action by any public official, despite public knowl-
edge of the commission of an offense, can set the criminal process
in motion. Similarly, the private complainant can terminate the ac-
tion at any point prior to judgment for or against the accused. This
can be accomplished by forgiveness or "pardon" of the offender by
the complainant, which results in the mandatory dismissal of
charges by the judge. In the case of sexual offenses, a contract of
marriage between the victim and the offender is sufficient at law to
demonstrate forgiveness.90 A common ground for dismissal is mar-
riage by a male to the underage female with whom he has had in-
tercourse, thus triggering a willingness by the female's family to
desist from charges of estupro, a form of statutory rape, or rapto,
kidnapping for purposes of carnal knowledge. Because of this
level of party control, the private criminal action is like a combina-
90. C6D. PEN. art. 208.
91. Interview with Reynaldo Vega, private criminal lawyer, Managua, Nicaragua (Aug.
1, 1988); interview with Victor Ord6fiez, Vice-Dean of the Central American University Law
School, in Managua, Nicaragua (July 27, 1988).
Estupro involves "carnal knowledge of a virgin obtained through fraud or misrepresen-
tation;" fraud is presumed when the virgin is between 12 and 18 years of age. C6D. PEN. art.
197, para. 1. Rapto involves kidnapping for carnal knowledge; if the victim is under 12 years
old, her consent is irrelevant. If the victim is a woman of "good fame," the punishment is
between two to four years imprisonment. Penalties for rapto with intent to marry are signif-
icantly lower than those without that intent. Id. art. 197, para. 2. See Stephens, Rape in
Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 75-76.
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tion of the contemporary civil tort claim at common law and the
public criminal prosecution.
The private action is further subdivided between actions in
which the complainant is merely required to make the accusation
for the process of judicial investigation to start, and those in which
the complainant is required to carry the burden of proving the
charge, usually through the services of a privately retained attor-
ney. The former is known as instancia privada while the latter is
the acci6n privada. The instancia privada was limited to a small
group of offenses: Violaci6n (rape), estupro (a type of statutory
rape), and rapto (kidnapping with intent to have carnal knowl-
edge). 2 The acci6n privada was also very limited, applying only to
adulterio (adultery), amencebamiento (the keeping of a mistress),
offenses against freedom of religion (libertad de culto), and in-
jurias y calumnias (criminal libel and slander)."
The unifying premise for this disparate treatment of sexual of-
fenses appears to be the highly personal and private nature of the
alleged wrongdoing and susceptibility of exposure of the victim or
the accuser to pubic embarrassment or ridicule. There are also
none too subtle notions of paternalism and sexism in the protec-
tion of women from the sullying of their reputations due to any
supposedly illicit sexual activity. This is most blatantly demon-
strated by the limited protection of the law to women of "good
reputation." The net effect of making these offenses private, how-
ever, was to preclude them from consideration as crimes against
society as a whole, and to render them both marginal in impor-
tance and invisible to the public.
Moreover, literal enforcement of the law ran the serious risk of
discrimination against women. Amancebamiento, for example, is
the criminal offense of keeping of a mistress. It is gender-specific
by virtue to- its statutory definition: the keeping of a manceba, a
"mistress or prostitute." The penalty, however, is diminished by
half if the affair is "scandalously public, '9 4 thereby encouraging
men to publicly display their extramarital partners, undoubtedly
92. COD. PEN. arts. 195-97, 207.
93. Id. art. 212. This section refers only to adultery. The requirements of private action
for the remainder of the offenses listed are not codified, but were generally agreed to by a
number of persons interviewed. Their substantive provisions are found in COD. PEN. arts.
216, 251-54, and 169-94. Again, these distinctions in procedure and the limited number of
offenses to which they apply continue today, with the exception of rape, which is explicitly
treated in the most recent reform of Nicaraguan procedural law. See infra note 382.
94. C6D. PEN. art. 216.
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at risk of the women's own reputations. By law, an openly kept
woman is not as risky for society as the secret partner. Another
example is adultery, which permits, as a complete defense, aban-
donment of the illicit partner or "procurement of the corruption of
the woman."9 5 This defense assumes both a male offender and the
very real incentive to ruin the allegedly adulterous woman's repu-
tation in order to establish the defense. No suggestion is made that
similar consequences may be attendant upon the man's participa-
tion in the offense, nor is there any suggestion of the potential
"corruption" of the male adulterer.
The treatment of slander and libel as private actions could be
due either to the protection against further spread of untruths
about reputation or character or the recognition that these accusa-
tions were likely to be of such a personal and emotional nature
that the state wanted no role in even a preliminary decision as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged defamation or slander.9
There are further limitations on the right to commence a pri-
vate action. Except when the action is personal, the most impor-
tant limits are that complainants cannot be women, minors, crimi-
nal accused, or totally destitute persons.9 7 Thus, the private action
is effectively allowed, at least on the books,9" only to males with
property, or at least to those who can afford the cost of retention
of an attorney or are willing to proceed with their complaint pro
se. The double standard is also maintained here.
d. The Passive Role of the Prosecutor
The notion of a public official playing the role of society's rep-
resentative in criminal proceedings emerged with the creation of
95. Id. art. 213, para. 2. This is true even though adultery itself is clearly capable of
commission by either spouse. Id. art. 211.
96. The latter seems more probable, given the fact that the code criminalizes broad
categories of speech and permits retraction to terminate the proceedings. C6D. PEN. arts.
169-93. Attorneys whom I interviewed stated that innumerable petty political squabbles and
accusations were the basis for the filing of charges under these sections of the code. Inter-
view with Reynaldo Vega, private criminal practitioner, Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 1, 1988).
97. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 38.
98. The several provisions discussed here in text may be good examples of laws to
which the Sandinistas appropriately applied the concept of "revolutionary interpretation."
See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text. When I read the gender-based limitations of
the right to private actions and those regarding adultery and the keeping of mistresses to a
number of lawyers and judges, they laughed and said they would never be enforced as writ-
ten, and asserted that these were mere pre-revolutionary artifacts.
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the office of Public Ministry (Ministerio Psblico), acting through
the fiscal, or prosecutor, the representative of public vindication
(representante de vindicta pblica).99 Municipal trustees (sindicos
municipales), were designated to carry out the function of prosecu-
tor, and need not have been attorneys. The prosecutor's role was
almost entirely passive from its conception, due in large part to the
strong powers of the investigating judge in controlling the direction
and duration of the investigation. As with defense counsel, the
prosecutor is not mentioned in those code provisions dealing with
the investigation stage.
2. The Plenary
At the close of the investigative stage the judge is given three
choices: the issuance of the auto de prisidn, which causes the case
to continue to trial, or provisional or definitive dismissal
(sobreseimiento).'00 Provisional dismissal leaves the case open for a
specified period of time for the receipt of additional proofs, while
definitive dismissal closes the case.
101
The trial, or plenary stage (juicio plenario), originally was
partially written and partially oral; the plenary concluded in a
public jury trial. Unless the investigation was conducted by the
district judge, the local judge who conducted the investigation
handed over the results to the district court. After additional writ-
ten proof-taking, if requested by the parties, the district judge pre-
sided at the determination of guilt by a jury. The code does not
prohibit a district court judge from assuming jurisdiction over both
the investigation and the trial stages because the actual determina-
tion of guilt was made by the jury, thus preventing the judge from
undue influence in the determination of criminal culpability.' ' At
this stage the parties (originally the complainant and defendant
themselves, and later their representatives) are finally permitted to
intervene to review the evidence acquired by the judge during the
99. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 244. It is impossible to determine if these offices existed at the
time of the original adoption of the code. They probably did not, since a 1901 law created
the Municipal Trustees. EsCOBAR, supra note 17, at 137. Public prosecutors, however, were
long in existence as a concept, having been introduced in Spain as early as 1387 to assure
the representation of the interests of the victim. CARRIO, supra note 18, at 19 n. 33.
100. C6D. INST. CRIM. arts. 189, 191.
101. Id.
102. With the abolition of juries after the revolution, this has become one of the prob-





At the outset of the plenary, after the formal naming of de-
fense counsel and the first appearance of the representative of the
Public Ministry, or prosecutor, these parties were given four days
to examine the files after the issuance of the auto de prision. 1
3
After this examination, the parties were given the opportunity to
offer additional proofs prior to trial and to publicly and formally
"depose" witnesses.10' The accused, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and
the accuser, if there was one, were to be present at all of these
public sessions."0 ' Witnesses were to be examined out of the pres-
ence of one another, and the questioning by the defendant or his
counsel could include anything thought to be necessary to the de-
fense. 106 Questions put by the prosecutor, the accuser, or witnesses
against the accused could not be suggestive or deceitful, nor could
countercharges be made which were "subtle or beyond the capac-
ity" of the witness. 10 7 A form of impeachment through flaws
(tachas) in a witness's statement could be proven within three
days after the witness's testimony.10 8 If this process could be ac-
complished without the commission of an error which raised a nul-
lity (nulidad) in the proceedings,"0 9 the case proceeded to trial by
jury.
The qualification of witnesses, whether giving testimony
before the investigating judge, the trial judge, or the jury, is gener-
ally governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. 10 Under the Civil
Code, a witness is qualified to testify if that person was "capable of
responding freely and with knowledge of the facts about which the
questioning occurs.""' Other limits on witnesses include age".2 and
physical impediments." 3 Some witnesses are declared incompetent
103. CO1. INST. CRIM. art. 203.
104. Id. art. 209.
105. Id. art. 211.
106. Id. art. 215.
107. Id. art. 218.
108. Id. art. 226.
109. Id. arts. 228-29.-This is not the only point in the proceedings where the nullity is
relevant. It forms the primary basis for appealable grounds by either party at the conclusion
of the trial court proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 146-47.
110. C61. INST. CRIM. art. 260.
111. C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL DE LA REPOBLICA DE NICARAGUA [C6D. PROC. CIv.]
art. 1308 (1980).
112. The witness must be 16 or "declared an adult." Id. art. 1311. Those under 12 are
per se incompetent. Id. art. 1312.
113. Id. art. 1309. Those excluded are the blind, the deaf-mute, or those with "habitual
sickness impeding reason." Id. art. 1313.
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for lack of integrity: the fraudulent bankrupt, the vagrant, the ha-
bitual drunk, the forger, and one who has borne false witness, per-
jured, or suborned perjury.11 4 Because "vagrant" is defined as one
who is either unemployed or without means of self-support, clas-
sism emerges in the plain language of the code.
Under the code, the use of the rules of measured proof played
a strong part in the value of witness testimony. "Legal truth," and
thus full proof, occurred when two qualified witnesses testified to
the same fact.'1 5 Hearsay was explicitly permitted if the witness
named the person from whom the fact in question was heard, so
long as the person testifying was of good reputation and financial
credit."1 6
Special witnesses rules in criminal proceedings allow the testi-
mony of witnesses found to be biased (testigos inhdbiles por falta
de imparcialidad) when their testimony would be favorable to the
party against whom their declarations were originally offered.
1 1 7
They also allow attachment of a "family privilege" which prohibits
the declaration of any individual against his or her spouse or com-
panion, ascendant, descendants, or siblings. '8 In special instances
the code permits the use of witnesses who would ordinarily be
challengeable (tachable) when the offense is committed in custody
or involves gaming, offenses committed in stores with government
monopolies (estancos), or by habitual drunkards or vagrants.",
Challengeable witnesses can also appear in cases of rape, estupro
or rapto, when no other witnesses are available.12 0
Another notable limitation on the defendant's pre-trial rights
is that of confrontation of witnesses; the accused is explicitly for-
bidden to question witnesses until the plenary stage and even then
is barred if the witness previously has been examined in the de-
fendant's presence.' 2 ' After the parties offered any additional wit-
nesses, new evidence, or procedural challenges, the case moved on
to trial by jury.
114. Id. art. 1316.
115. Id. arts. 1354, 1359. For a discussion of the rules of measured proof, see infra text
accompanying notes 158-69.
116. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 1355.
117. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 261.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 262.
120. Id. For a discussion of these private offenses, see supra text accompanying note 92.
121. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 168.
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3. Jury Trial
Trial was before a jury of seven in serious cases. Each side was
given two peremptory challenges during jury selection, and the
judge could recuse additional jurors for cause.122 The use of jury
trials should not surprise the common law attorney. While most of
Latin America and Europe have rejected the use of lay juries, at
least as they are commonly composed in the United States, the
jury is not unknown in these countries and is still used in both El
Salvador and Panama.
123
Jury trials were required to be public."2 4 With all parties pre-
sent and the jury properly selected, including a president and sec-
retary, the trial commenced with the reading of all prior proceed-
ings and documents in the file to the jury, followed by oral
testimony from the accused, the witnesses, and the experts, in that
122. Id. arts. 274, 277.
123. The French Procedural Code of 1808 adopted the jury as one of the useful innova-
tions of the much-admired English system, and today uses a form of jury proceeding in the
mixed panel of three professional and nine lay judges who participate in the cour d'assises.
Tomlinson, supra note 36, at 143. Professor Merryman notes the tenacious mythology of the
non-existence of juries in the civil law. MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 131-32. See also Hans-
Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with Ameri-
can Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 243-51 (1970). Langbein, however, notes the use of lay judges in
Germany. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 63 (1977). Spain
moved to an oral non-jury trial in 1872. ESCOBAR, supra note 17, at 26, and juries were used
there extensively before the Franco era. Michael G. Burros, Note, The Spanish Jury: 1888-
1923, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177 (1982). Though abolished by Franco, the Spanish
Constitution of 1978 calls for a jury in criminal cases. MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 131;
Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 461-63.
A recent study of criminal justice in El Salvador notes, without any description, the use
of juries and calls for reform of thie system. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DIAGN6S-
TICO SOBRE EL ORGANO JUDICIAL EN EL SALVADOR 70-71 (1987). In 1986, jurors failed to re-
port for duty in 47% of all cases. Id. This should not be surprising in light of the disruptions
of stability caused by the protracted civil war there. In Panama, a 1943 law requires the use
of juries in a limited number of serious offenses unless waived by the accused. FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, LA ADMINISTRACI6N DE JUSTICIA EN PANAMA (INFORME FINAL)
239-40 (1986). The study states that the vote is by majority rule through a standard of
"conscience" but does not indicate the size of the jury. Id. There are no juries in Argentina.
CARRIe, supra note 18, at 7.
Even in the United States, the commitment to the use of juries sometimes falters when
they are accused of bending to emotional appeals based on race, as in the recent trial of
Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, who was largely exonerated of drug and perjury
charges in a jury trial.'Micheal Kinsley, Trial by Jury: There's Got to Be a Better Way,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1990, at A23. This phenomenon, called "jury nullification," is a well-
recognized aspect of jury use in the United States. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 913 (Student ed. 1985).
124. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 292.
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order.'23 The president of the jury, as well as other members of the
jury, could ask such questions as would assist them in ascertaining
the truth, and other parties could also put questions if directed
through the president of the jury.' 6 The parties could, through the
president, make objections to or observations on witness testimony
as long as they were made "with due moderation and without in-
terruption of the deponent in the act of testifying.' '1 7 Strict proce-
dural rules controlling the questioning of witnesses in the common
law process were absent in these jury trials in the interest of hear-
ing the most open and unhindered version of the evidence.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the prosecutor and the ac-
cuser made their allegations and arguments, followed by the de-
fense. A brief rejoinder could be offered, if necessary.2 8 The jury
then retired for its secret deliberations. The written form in which
the verdict was rendered was rigid and formalistic, and required an
explicit finding of guilt or innocence. 
12
The law theoretically permitted jury trials to consume no
more than eight hours in total,1 0 after which arguments were
presented by the parties and the jury retired for deliberations. 13 A
simple majority of four votes, taken in secret from the public but
not from each other, was sufficient to convict, and the jury's func-
tion was limited to the determination of guilt.
Unlike in the United States, where a verdict of not guilty is
non-appealable, the absolving verdict of a jury in Nicaragua is re-
viewable at the appellate level. This is true throughout the civil
law. 32 In Nicaragua, however, appeal originally required the em-
125. Id. arts. 291, 294.
126. Id. arts. 295, 296. The practice of active jury questioning of witnesses, while very
rare in U.S., was also a regular feature of juries in England in centuries past. Langbein,
supra note 63, at 288.
127. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 298.
128. Id. art. 301.
129. Id. art. 309.
130. Id. art. 301.
131. The code contains strict language governing deliberations, stating that the jurors
were to be kept under lock and key, and that no food, only water, could be kept in the room
with them. Id. art. 304. Several attorneys and judges whom I interviewed said this was not
observed in practice in either pre-revolutionary or post-revolutionary Nicaragua, and that
the more common (though obviously improper) procedure was for the judge to openly join
in the jury's deliberations.
132. The review of all criminal verdicts is conceived as a routine adjunct to the trial
process, and is also comprehensive as to fact, law, and logic. DAMASKA, supra note 16, at 48-
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paneling at that level of a reviewing jury, or jurado de revisin.133
4. Sentencing
Within eight days after a jury's determination of guilt, the
judge was required to deliver a highly formal and stylized written
document which summarized the proceedings and imposed a: sen-
tence of a fixed number of years within the range set by the crimi-
nal code.
1 3 4
The written sentence of the trial judge is still required to con-
tain both an expository text and a formal sentence. The former
requires an explanation of the jury's deliberations, the aggravating
or extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense, and the le-
gal questions required to be resolved by the judge.'35 The resolu-
tion of the case originally could fall into one of several degrees of
severity: death, imprisonment (called presidio for sentences from
three to thirty years and prisi6n for those from one to twelve
years), 3 1 various levels of loss of rights,13 7 internal exile (con-
finamiento), as security measures (medidas de seguridad),"' pro-
bation (condena condicional) of two to five years where the pen-
133. Ley de Jurado de Revisi~n de 17 de mayo de 1917, cited in ESCOBAR, supra note
17, at 174-76. Under the operation of the reviewing jury, composed of 20 lay citizens chosen
much like a trial jury, the defendant was not freed pending appeal if acquittal was for an
offense with a punishment of greater than two years. Id. The reviewing jury went out of
existence with the general abolition of juries in 1988. See infra text accompanying note 387.
Further prosecution of a case in which the jury acquits has been barred by constitu-
tional concepts of double jeopardy in the United States since as early as Ball v. United
States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
134. COD. INST. CRIM. art. 322.
135. Id. art. 323.
136. C6D. PEN. art. 56. All penalties except death are still available. There was a great
deal of confusion about the operative sentencing law at the time of my visits. I asked ques-
tions on the operation of the penalties to virtually all lawyers and judges, and received as
many answers in return. Many responses differed from the code structure described here.
This may be an example of "revolutionary interpretation," or a resistance on the part of
post-revolutionary judges to be bound by pre-revolutionary concepts of punishment, which
frequently conflicted with revolutionary views of criminality, whether harsher or more leni-
ent. See infra text accompanying notes 226-34.
137. These included house arrest (arresto) and absolute or special disabilities (in-
habilitaci6n absoluta o especial). House arrest required the condemned to choose some type
of work, while disabilities carried penalties of loss of employment or other privileges. COD.
PEN. arts. 59, 65, 66.
138. Id. art. 67.
139. Id. arts. 96-102. This penalty was reserved for the physically or mentally ill, the
alcoholic or drug addict, persons over 70, or minors, and consisted of close supervision in an
institutional setting. Id.
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alty for the offense did not exceed three years,14 monetary fines,
and civil judgments of damages when the complainant raised a
civil claim."' Simple formulae existed for calculation of the pun-
ishment of accessories, concealers and those who attempted but
did not complete offenses.'4 The judge maintains jurisdiction over
the matter during the time of incarceration and makes all decisions
as to parole (libertad condicional) after service of a certain portion
of the sentence, assuming all conditions are met. '"
5. Appeals and Extraordinary Writs
Direct appeal, referred to as second instance (1a segunda in-
stancia) flows automatically from the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, and is available to the convicted defendant, the accuser or
the prosecutor. Review is both factual and legal, and might result
in the taking of new evidence. Appeals can result in a new outcome
of conviction or acquittal which is not further appealable."" In
cases of acquittal of the defendant in the trial court, the dictation
of the auto de prisi6n, the dismissal of charges or the seizure of
the defendant's assets, appeal lies, and reversal results in remand
for new proceedings in the trial court in accordance with the
judgment. ' 6
Either the trial or appellate court is able to declare the pro-
ceedings void as the result of the commission of certain listed sub-
stantial nullities (nulidades sustanciales)."' These include techni-
cal but very common sense issues such as the failure to prove the
corpus delicti or the refusal to accept evidence without legal cause.
"Accidental" nullities do not void the proceedings." 7 Errors not
listed among statutory nullities are not appealable.
Cases currently can be appealed from second to third instance
in the Supreme Court by petition (saplica) and by cassation (casa-
140. Id. art. 103.
141. Id. arts. 34-52.
142. Id. arts. 77-83.
143. Id. arts. 108-13.
144. Id. arts. 459-71.
145. Id. art. 449. In 1988, the law was amended to eliminate appeal following the auto
de prisi6n, following a Supreme Court decision to that effect. Ley No. 37, 79 LA GACETA art.
15 (Apr. 13, 1988).
146. C6D. INST. CRIM. art 443.
147. Id. art. 445. This anomalous concept is not further explained in the code. It ap-
pears to be something akin to the U.S. concept of "harmless error." Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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ci6n). 14 8 Petition lies only in extremely narrow circumstances14
and cassation is the functional equivalent of the U.S. writ of certio-
rari.1"' Review at the Supreme Court level is extremely unusual;
the case is over for all intents and purposes after review in the
Court of Appeals.
Human rights instruments uniformly call for a "simple and
brief" procedure for citizen access to the courts to challenge official
acts which violate fundamental constitutional rights. 1 ' This would
normally encompass both the traditional writ of habeas corpus and
the writ of amparo, a well-established historical writ in Latin
America which encompasses both illegal administrative acts and
relief from illegal detention. 152
Both habeas corpus and amparo existed in Nicaragua before
the revolution. They can be found as an annex to the Constitution
of 1974.153 Little is known, however, about the extent of their pre-
revolutionary use.
6. Time Limits
The one-day statutory limit on the conduct of a jury trial was
typical of short code time limits which encouraged speed and effi-
ciency. Because of judicial control and the non-adversarial nature
148. A third remedy, revisi6n, existed in the 1974 Constitution, but was inadvertently
omitted from the available remedies in the 1987 Constitution. Unlike the other remedies,
revision permits the court to receive newly discovered evidence. The remedy was declared
unavailable in a 1987 Supreme Court ruling, and legislation to remedy the oversight is in the
process of submission from the Supreme Court to the Assembly. Interviews with Rafael
Chamorro Mora, Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Managua, Nicaragua (Sept.
5, 1988 and June 5, 1990).
149. C6D. INST. CRIM. arts. 472-81.
150. Ley de Tribunales, supra note 27.
151. See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XVIII, in
HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 545, 548 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987).
152. See generally RICHARD BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE
AMPARO SUIT (1971); Pedro P. Camargo, The Right to Judicial Protection: "Amparo" and
Other Latin American Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights, 3 LAW. AM. 191
(1971); Diana S. Donaldson, The Costa Rican Amparo in the Period 1950-1962, 8 LAW. AM.
371 (1976); Hector Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 306 (1979); Hector Fix Zamudio, The Writ of Amparo in Latin America,
13 LAW. AM. 361 (1981). See also H.H.A. Cooper, Habeas Corpus in Peru: Myth and Real-
ity, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603 (1971).
153. The earliest amparo law in Nicaragua was enacted in 1894. Fix Zamudio, supra
note 152, at 377. Habeas corpus provisions can be found in NICAR. CONST. OF 1974, art. 42.
The amparo provisions were adopted in a separate law accompanying the constitution. Id.
1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 26 n.2.
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of the proceedings, many of the time-consuming aspects of discov-
ery and of the courtroom questioning of witnesses, which charac-
terize the common law, did not occur. Proof-taking was very
streamlined and discovery was completely open, since the parties
had little control over the reception of proof or the value to be
accorded to the evidence, as will be demonstrated.
Each stage in the process was statutorily limited to a fixed
number of days. The instruction was limited to between eight and
twenty days, depending on the presence or absence of the defend-
ant.1 " The parties were then given four days to examine the entire
accumulated evidence, after which the proofs were opened in the
plenary stage for a period ranging from sixteen to thirty days.155
The one-day trial was followed by an eight day period during
which the judge prepared to formally enter sentence.'5" The whole
process, from start to finish, was thus statutorily limited to a maxi-
mum period of just over two months, with the exception of possi-
ble interlocutory appeals, particularly after the decision as to the
auto de prisi6n.
7. Evidence and Burdens of Proof
The standards governing the receipt of evidence in the course
of the trial, as well as the amount of such evidence which would
satisfy a legal burden of proof, were governed by highly formal and
rigid legal standards. These "objective" measures were, in part, in-
fluenced by the German scientific school of criminal law, which
sought, as others have before and since, to remove the judge from
the vagaries of subjectivity, or worse, the influence of emotion.' 7
The judge was to apply the law, not interpret or make it.
154. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 177. The longer period applied when the accused was not
detained. "Not in detention," as the code defined this concept, meant that the defendant
was either not in custody or beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, trials in absentia
were, and still are, not uncommon. Interview with Victor Ord~fiez, Vice-Dean of the Univer-
sity of Central America Law School, in Managua, Nicaragua (July 27, 1988). This common
practice, which I also found in my consultations with defense attorneys in Costa Rica in
1988, is another example of the excessive rigidity and formality of the criminal processes of
the region.
155. COD. INST. CRIM. arts. 203, 204.
156. Id. art. 322.
157. MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 61-67.
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a. Measured Proof
The taking of proof was controlled by the measured proof, or
prueba tasada, standard. 1 8 The system of measured proof was
what the name implies; all evidence was given a quantitative value,
and only a certain quantum of proof was sufficient to carry a bur-
den. The following evidence was admissible to prove a crime, in
order of preference: The confession of the accused; testimony of
witnesses; instruments or fruits of the crime; personal eye-witness
inspection of the crime scene by the judge; reports from experts;
and presumptions. 1 9 The most interesting aspects of this hierar-
chy are the great weight afforded to the defendant's confession and
the distrust accorded to expert testimony.
The confession of the defendant was considered to be the
"queen of proofs;" this is no less true today than in 1879.160 While
many modern proceduralists would question the validity of heavy
reliance on the use of confessions as the primary or exclusive
means of proof,16 reliance on that means in 1879 is not surprising.
First, the Church still heavily influenced legal matters, and the
idea of the expiation of sin through confession had a powerful im-
pact on the criminal law. Second, the technology of criminal inves-
tigation was primitive. Because modern means of crime detection
and apprehension, and the judicial apparatus to support them,
were non-existent then (or now) in Nicaragua, use of the defendant
158. On the Continent, and throughout the civil law system, this standard is more nor-
mally referred to as the system of "legal proof." Id. at 117-19; ESMEIN, supra note 36, at
620-30. The word "measured" better captures the sentiment of the term in Spanish, and it
will be used throughout this Article.
159. C6D. INST. CraIM. art. 251. The meaning of "presumption" in Nicaragua includes
not only a fact which is assumed to be true, but extends to what we would normally call
circumstantial evidence: a fact or circumstance from which another fact may be deduced,
e.g., bloodstains, finger or footprints, etc. Interview with Francisco Fletes, private criminal
practitioner, in Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 8, 1988).
160. Interview with Reynaldo Vega, private criminal lawyer, in Managua, Nicaragua
(Aug. 1, 1988). This heavy reliance on confessions was a hallmark of the early development
of criminal procedure in France and Germany. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 450-51, 463. See
the fuller discussion of confessions, supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
161. For example, in the United States, the premises underlying procedural protection
of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to silence and Sixth Amendment right to counsel
assume that the confession should not be the primary source of evidence against the ac-
cused, as it tends to corrupt the system by encouraging interrogational abuses. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-491 (1964)("[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes
to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation."). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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as the principal source of proof was a simple, pragmatic necessity.
This same notion of the distrust or non-existence of scientific evi-
dence probably accorded the expert witness low status on the to-
tem pole of measured proof. Third, and most important, is the civil
law tradition itself, in which the rights of the accused to silence
and against self-incrimination were not nearly as developed as they
subsequently became in the common law. As early as the thir-
teenth century, the secret examination of the accused, accompa-
nied by torture if necessary, was a hallmark of the normal inquisi-
torial process. 162  Even today, the civil law attaches great
importance to the interrogation of the accused, on the premise that
criminal procedure is "a judicial inquiry which should neglect no
source of information on the facts surrounding the commission of a
crime . . . . [The accused] is the man who knows most about the
issues, the truth or falsity of the charges.9
1 6 3
Proof sufficient to meet a burden was either whole (prueba
plena) or partial (semi-plena prueba). Each type of evidence was
given a specific value, and only a certain quantum of each type is
sufficient to constitute partial or total proof. It was as though each
"piece" of evidence or proof was given a tangible and strictly de-
limited spacial quality, like a brick. So many bricks could con-
struct a wall of proof. For example, the "free and spontaneous"
confession given before a judge was total proof, 64 while the extra-
judicial confession, sworn to by two witnesses, constituted partial
proof. '6 Two or more presumptions constituted full proof, while
only one constituted partial proof, '66 and so on. One commentator
has acidicly characterized this as the "adding and subtracting" of
evidence, rather than the weighing of it.167
The system attempted to be rational, but left many of the
same gray areas which exist in systems vesting extensive discretion
in the judge, as is the case in the U.S. system. There is nothing in
the code, for example, to guide the judge's inevitable application of
discretion in deciding which of the various types of "presump-
162. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 447-48.
163. Id. at 434. This statement, of course, is only true if the accused is the person who
committed the offense. One who is falsely accused has no more reason than anyone else to
know "most about the issues," and may know nothing whatsoever about the offense or the
offender.
164. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 253.
165. Id. art. 272.
166. Id. arts. 271, 272.
167. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 452.
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tions" to apply, or what quantum of testimony from a witness is to
be considered sufficient to constitute "proof by testimony," or
whether a person meets the statutory definition of "unchallenge-
able witness."
There is, in short, no objective system of proof. Despite the
proliferation of codes of evidence in the United States, all purport-
ing to protect supposedly suggestible jurors from prejudicial evi-
dence by providing them with "objective" evidence, the court, at
bottom, is vested with wide discretion in admission of relevant, re-
liable or even hearsay evidence. 168 The same is true in the civil law.
All proof-taking is, in significant measure, subjective, and requires
extensive exercise of human judgment, not only in the admission
or evaluation of evidence, but also in the more basic concept of
what constitutes a "fact."' 69 The idea that such an objective sys-
tem existed, however, was a strong premise of the measured proof
system, and underlies much of the criticism of the more discretion-
ary system adopted in the post-revolutionary period.
b. Burdens of Proof: the Cuerpo del Delito, the Auto de Pri-
si6n, and the Determination of Guilt or Innocence
There were three critical determinations in the criminal pro-
cess, as originally conceived. These were, and continue to be: (1)
whether the defendant should be charged; (2) whether the evi-
dence was sufficient to proceed from the investigative to the trial
stage; and (3) whether the defendant should be found guilty. Each
of these determinations was governed by explicit burdens of proof.
Evidence of the commission of a crime, the first crucial deter-
mination in the criminal process, was governed by the presence of
full or partial proof. The initial decision to proceed with the case
lay solely in the hands of the judge, based on the existence of the
cuerpo del delito, or its Latin cognate, the corpus delicti. The
168. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, provide that no error occurs in the
erroneous admission of evidence unless "a substantial right of the party is affected" and
appropriate objections are interposed. FED. R. Evw. 103(a) (1989).
169. The question of what constitutes a historical fact is itself subjective. If that is true,
then both the perceptive abilities and the credibility of witnesses to events must be inter-
preted through the prism of discretion. John D. Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in
Criminal Procedure: An Evolutionary Approach, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 475 (1988) ("It is
therefore impossible to know the whole truth about anything and one central tenet of the
classical scientific method-that we must gather all the information we can about a mat-
ter-appears to be impracticable. Another tenet, the value of detachment, also becomes un-
tenable.") Id. at 515.
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term is used here in its classic sense of "the body of a crime. '1 70
The cuerpo del delito is the foundation of the criminal trial, and
the investigative stage, or instruction, cannot begin without it.'7 , It
is tautologically defined as "the existence of a crime," as measured
by the elements delineated in the statute and as elaborated upon
for certain offenses in the sections on corpus delicti.' M Thus, the
judge need only find the existence of a crime in order to proceed to
the prosecution of a specific defendant. There is no requirement of
a judicial determination of the equivalent of probable cause to con-
nect the defendant to the cuerpo del delito until the close of the
investigative stage. While there was a provision which permitted
the private citizen to arrest the defendant when caught in
flagrante,'75 procedure was no different in terms of the require-
ments of proof.
At the close of the investigation, the judge was required either
to dismiss the charges or dictate the auto de pris6n, literally the
act of imprisonment. This was the second critical decision in the
process. The act resulted in issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
the defendant or an order for his continued detention.'17 This de-
termination is the closest equivalent to the determination in the
United States of probable cause to bind the defendant over for
trial following a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceedings. For
this determination to be made, the judge must conclude that the
corpus delicti is totally proven (plenamente comprobado) and that
there exists at least partial proof or a strong presumption (semi-
plena prueba o presunci6n grave) that the accused has committed
the offense.'75 Normally, this determination will result in the de-
170. COD. INST. CRIM. art. 54. This is the appropriate technical meaning of the term, not
the popular misconception of reference to the body of the victim in a homicide.
171. Id. art. 55.
172. Id. art. 54 et seq. One Nicaraguan theoretician asserted that the task of defining
the cuerpo del delito was "totally enraging," and then proceeded to discuss the subject for
several pages without significant illumination. EsCOBAR, supra note 17, at 69-78.
173. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 85. The notion of capture in the act was broad; it could in-
clude capture of the defendant with "arms, instruments, effects or papers," which made one
presume him to be the perpetrator, so long as this was done within 24 hours of the offense.
Id. Ploscowe notes a similarly extended meaning of capture "in the act" in France as early
as the 13th century. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 443-44.
174. COD. INST. CRIM. arts. 94, 184.
175. Id. art. 184. Since this was the last point in the proceedings at which an evaluation
of the legal sufficiency of proof was made by the judge, it had great importance, and would
take on even more significance in the post-revolutionary context, after the elimination of
juries and the adoption of the sana critica standard of proof. See infra notes 389-97 and
accompanying text. In one interview in Nicaragua, it was said that this determination re-
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tention of the accused until the completion of the trial, the
equivalent of preventive detention, a relatively recent though in-
creasingly common practice in the United States.
176
The determination of guilt by the jury was the third critical
juncture in a trial. The governing standard was that of intima con-
vicci6n, or inner conviction, of the members of the jury.177 The dis-
tinction was made between the judge's obligation to rigorously ap-
ply the legal standards of proof discussed above, while the jurors'
duty was moral; they were asked to apply the "impression in their
soul."'1 78 The charge to the jury was concluded by the statement,
"the law does not tell you that you must take as the truth a certain
fact sworn to by a certain number of witnesses; it requires only
that you ask yourself a single question, which summarizes all of
your duties: 'Do you have an inner conviction?' "17 This was not
an appeal to rationality but to communal wisdom, to common
sense, to the "gut reaction." The shift in consciousness from the
taking of proof to the finding of guilt, then, was a radical swing
from the totally rational and mechanical application of rules in de-
ciding the admissibility of evidence to the intensely emotional and
subjective decision by the jury as to guilt or innocence.
quired that the judge find either the certainty of the fact (Ia certeza del hecho) or a level
"higher than simple human presumption" (mas albi de la simple presunci6n humana) in
order to meet the legal burden of proof required for a criminal case at this point in the
proceedings. Interview with Reynaldo Vega, private criminal practitioner, in Managua, Nic-
aragua (Aug. 1, 1988).
176. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 94. The use of preventive detention has come into increasing
use in the United States since its approval by the U.S. Supreme Court for juveniles in Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) and later for adults in United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct.
2095 (1987)(upholding the constitutionality of the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984). See
also Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An Empirical
Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1989) (concluding that detention, after bail reform, is
being ordered on a "large scale" with "a corresponding increase in facilities, personnel and
expense"). Id. at 30.
177. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 305. This articulation of the jury's duties is virtually identical
to that articulated in contemporary France. See George W. Pugh, Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1 (1962). However, it differs
dramatically from the pre-revolutionary standard in France, which called on the jury to be
"thoroughly convinced," a test which more closely approximates the U.S. requirement of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ESMEIN, supra note 36, at 628.
178. C6D. INST. CRIM. art. 273. This may be one of the factors which contributed to the
ultimate demise of the jury system, although it has not been articulated in this fashion; the
jury was simply perceived as too lenient. Interview with William Frech, private criminal
practitioner, in Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 2, 1988). A similar attack was mounted in France
after the Revolution of 1789, where the jury was initially seen as an instrument of popular
power and participation. ESMEIN, supra note 36, at 467-70.
179. COD. INST. CRIM. art. 305.
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This, then, was the original structure and concept of the crimi-
nal process for serious offenses. The process was relatively brief,
controlled by the judge, mostly secret, largely written, gave few
rights to the prosecution or defense, and balanced concepts of law
and common sense in the determination of guilt. While the code
may not be familiar territory for the common law practitioner, the
animating principles were understandable, and the document was
entirely rational in its historical context.
E. The Ideological Premises of the Historical Civil Law
Criminal Process
Judicial role was central to the conception of the criminal pro-
cess as it existed before the revolution. As the above summary sug-
gests, the court is vested with broad control and power in the di-
rection of the proceedings, but the primary conception of the
judicial role in civil law ideology was that of servant, or secondary
player, to the primary role of the legislature as law-giver and vessel
of the popular will. The judge was, under this ideology, not to use
discretion, but simply to apply, rigidly and formally, the rules for
the existence of sufficient proof to charge, for the. submission of
evidence, or for imposition of sentence, as set forth by the legisla-
ture. Discretion in charging, proof-taking, and sentencing, at least
conceptually, did not exist.
In practice, the ,court, particularly in the investigative stage,
was given the sole power to charge, to seek out proof, to receive,
screen, and admit all evidence so long as it met the legal standards
for measured proof and appeared to be relevant. These powers, de-
spite the supposed primacy of the legislature in law-giving, con-
verted the judge, at least in the context of each individual adjudi-
cation, from passive vessel through which legislative judgments
passed into a high priest of procedure.18 0 This power was tempered
only by the injection into the otherwise "sterile" process of proof-
taking of the highly subjective and emotional jury deliberation,
180. Cf. CARRI6, supra note 18, at 5. The term "priest" here connotes the strong con-
nection between the origins of the powers of the judge in the criminal proceeding and the
early European venue for criminal proceedings, the ecclesiastical courts. Ploscowe, supra
note 36, at 446. Images of the Grand Inquisitor and the Star Chamber here are not coinci-
dental. This powerful shift in the conception of the judicial role is acknowledged implicitly
in MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 124-32, and in CARR6, supra note 18, at 4-5. For other
critics, the power and role of judges in interpreting text is central, whether or not in the
criminal process. Fraser, supra note 25, at 872-76.
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before which jurors were exhorted to rely on their hearts rather
than their minds, on moral wisdom rather than dry fact.
The roles of judge and jury in the civil law, at least concep-
tually, were thus quite different than those in the common law. In
the United States, the parties, not the judge, determine before trial
what evidence will be offered and in what order. The jury is ad-
jured not to let emotions influence their deliberations, which are,
because of preliminary screening of legal issues by the judge and
rulings excluding irrelevant or immaterial facts from their consid-
eration, limited to the rational determination of the facts of the
case at hand. 181
Other premises arise from the role of the defendant in the
criminal process. The assumption in the civil law, still operative
today, is that the defendant is a legitimate source of informa-
tion.182 He or she is more important than other witnesses, includ-
ing the victim, if one measures importance by the procedural detail
which surrounds the taking of statements from defendants and
other witnesses during the critical first stage of the case. That
stage was highly secretive and directed by the investigating judge,
whose duties as a representative of the state required the protec-
tion of the interests of all the actors in the process: victim, witness,
and defendant.
At least five important consequences of the defendant's role
can be identified in the conception of civil law criminal procedure.
First, the defendant was not protected through the advise of coun-
sel because counsel was deemed systematically unnecessary.18 3 Sec-
ond, the defendant's confession was a key component of the pro-
cess, but was not sufficient, in itself, to stop the process from full
investigation, since there is no plea bargaining and it is not pre-
sumed that the confession is valid and true in all circumstances.
Third, as a formal matter of process in the "confession with
charges," the defendant was formally presented before the judge
181. The clear exception, which may destroy the rule, is jury nullification. That con-
cept, as old as the jury itself, permits the jury to ignore the facts as applied to the law and
rule by collective will to acquit without risk that their verdict can be questioned as to its
integrity. This is because the jury verdict of not guilty is not subject to any review. Ironi-
cally, the weight of authority is that the jury should not be told that it has this power.
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
182. See also CARM6, supra note 18, at 5-6.
183. It is noteworthy that a common and related feature of many civil law codes, that
which permits the incommunicado detention of the defendant during the investigation, is
not found in the Nicaraguan code. Id. at 54-55.
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with the right to hear the charges and respond. The defendant's
response carried adverse consequences if he or she did not speak.
Silence inferred guilt. Fourth, neither at this stage nor later at trial
was the defendant required to testify under oath, thus providing
protection against possible perjury charges. Finally, as is noted
above, the defendant testified first at trial, indicating the centrality
of the defendant to the proceedings.' " Each of these consequences
would be addressed and affected, though hardly resolved, by the
post-revolutionary conception of the criminal process.
The role of the defendant makes sense, at least conceptually,
when one looks at the overall goals of civil law criminal process.
The philosophical scheme of the civil law criminal process, the cen-
tral function of the process itself and of the judicial role, is the
determination of truth-the finding of guilt or innocence. This no-
tion is rooted not only in the law but in the ancient and profound
connections of state and church which continue to influence policy-
making in Central and South America.
Even the term "guilty," as it is used in that system, takes on a
different meaning than in the U.S. adversarial system, where the
jury's task is a determination of "guilty" or "not guilty," not
"guilty" or "innocent." The prosecutor's burden is to prove the ex-
istence of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and failure to do so
should result in acquittal. The defendant's factual innocence is
theoretically irrelevant in the U.S. system. In this system, the
state, at least in theory, is put to this test in order to honor the
concept of a burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" and to
give meaning to the presumption of innocence. In short, it is
designed to even the odds of vast state power against
individuals.1
5
184. See supra text accompanying note 125.
185. Many of the strongest critics of the adversarial system are quick to note that its
failure to elevate truth-seeking to the ultimate goal inevitably leads, through the clash of
parties who control evidence production, to the intentional hiding of truth. See, e.g., Ken-
neth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of the Truth, 1978 DuKE L.J. 921;
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). Ironically, the
United States Supreme Court's conservative trend is conceptually grounded in a characteri-
zation of the criminal process as a "search for truth," rather than a process with normatively
effective rules of burdens of proof and presumptions of innocence, thereby shifting the para-
digm of the Court to one more congruent with the civil law conception of criminal process.
Professor Grano writes an introduction to a series of articles on the subject of the U.S.
Justice Department's "Truth in Criminal Justice Series" which best typifies the trend: Jo-
seph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Crimi-
nal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy, 22
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The adversarial conception of guilty-not guilty stands at
odds with the determination of the "truth" of guilt or innocence.
In both the civil law and socialist law conceptions of state power,
the court, as the state's sole representative, charges and investi-
gates crimes. The state, through the court, is seen as protector of
the rights of society and of the individual, capable of mechanically
applying rules to sort truth from falsity and guilt from inno-
cence. 186 The judge's role, in these systems, is not neutral or sym-
bolic but central to the definition of state power. The differences in
the systems are not semantic but conceptual.
The central role of the court in truth-finding, particularly dur-
ing the investigative stages, leads to different conceptions of the
role and rights of the accused in the process. These conceptions
intrinsically put a lesser value on the risk of overbearing state in-
tervention and rights of privacy, and even dignity, in the service of
the greater goal of the search for truth. It is in this area that the
greatest clashes of values were to emerge in the post-revolutionary
context.
Two noteworthy points must be made about the historical
context of the French procedural code on which the Nicaraguan
code was based. First, the French code, like the Nicaraguan code,
stood the test of time. French criminal procedure endured few sig-
nificant structural changes in the 150 years since its adoption in
1808 until its abandonment in 1958, and even then the new code
maintained the organization of offenses and courts. 187 Nicaragua,
and most of Latin America, modeled itself on a code of criminal
procedure which showed endurance and flexibility in its country of
origin.
Second, and perhaps more importantly in light of the ideology
of truth-seeking, the French code was adopted in reaction to the
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395 (1989); see also Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of
Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537 (1990) ("Grano
bemoans the fact that the Warren Court seemed to forget that the search for truth is the
primary goal of American criminal procedure. I would put it somewhat differently-the
Warren Court remembered that the ascertainment of truth is not the only goal of American
criminal procedure.")(emphasis in original) Id. at 541-42.
186. Damaska seeks, from the start of his comprehensive classification scheme of crimi-
nal process, to eliminate socioeconomic organization of the state from the relevant factors
which should be considered in arriving at an effective analytical tool. DAMASKA, supra note
16, at 6-8. He ultimately includes both the civil and socialist legal systems within his "hier-
archical" system of criminal process. Id. at 12.
187. Tomlinson, supra note 36, at 142.
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liberalization of French criminal procedure immediately after the
French Revolution. Broad reforms completed in 1791 were per-
ceived to be too favorable to the accused, and in the wake of the
revolution "liberty became of less importance than social secur-
ity."' 8 The newer code of 1808, while initially retaining the jury
trial as a salutary influence of English criminal procedure, was es-
sentially a vehicle for crime control which provided few procedural
rights for the accused, particularly in the critical preliminary
stages.'"" The balance of procedural rights for the accused and the
maintenance of "social security" in post-revolutionary Nicaragua is
as much an issue now as it was at the opening of the nineteenth
century.
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN PRACTICE IN THE YEARS PRIOR TO THE
1979 REVOLUTION
This Article's discussion of criminal justice in Nicaragua
before the revolution has been thus far largely theoretical. Refer-
ence has been made to the codes themselves, and not to their daily
application in the criminal courts. There are some documented
criminal justice practices in the later years of the Somoza era.
Many of these practices, such as political assassination, disappear-
ances, and torture, fell outside acknowledged rules but nonetheless
occurred with alarming frequency prior to and during the revolu-
tion. The "gap" between criminal justice in the codes and its appli-
cation in the Nicaraguan cities and countryside are the subject of
this section.190
As with Nicaraguan jurisprudence, there is remarkably little
188. Ploscowe, supra note 36, at 461-62 n.75.
189. Id.
190. I do not subscribe to the notion that the "gap" renders the study of the legal
system in Nicaragua less valuable or even unreliable. I conclude, as others have before me,
that the gap is the beginning of the analysis, not the end. It is as real here as in any country,
and models for how the system works must be developed with the reality of the gap in mind.
See Elliot M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of
"Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492, 511-12 (1977). Alternatively, the
gap can be seen as typical of the Latin American development process, not as an aberration.
As such, the ideal model is not the appropriate focus for study, but rather the "crazy-quilt
patterns" of the gaps and lags. See Howard J. Wiarda, Law and Political Development in
Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 434, 460-63 (1971).
The reality in Nicaragua, both before and after the revolution, subjects itself more to
"political" interpretation and attack than theory. Theory, however, remains at least as im-
portant as it is in any other society, since statutes are idealized, while law as it is practiced
is more dynamically linked to the reality of the legal culture.
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written about criminal justice in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, par-
ticularly during the decades of control by the Somoza family.
Given the widespread reputation of the Somozas for brutality and
corruption, this is not surprising, as it can be assumed that abuses
would not be ballyhooed by the regime itself or by the press of its
strongest ally, the United States. The object of repression is to pre-
vent the dissemination of accurate information, making abuses of
individual liberties extremely difficult to document. Another factor
which might contribute to the absence of extensive or accurate
data is that the area in question, criminal procedure, is formal and
legal; general levels of understanding and interest are limited un-
less lawyers take the time to explain the abuses of process, a highly
unlikely prospect when the bar in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was
generally part of the privileged bourgeois and not the object of
abuses."" The abused were the poor and the politically active. The
former never had a political voice, and the latter were largely
marginalized "subversives" in the eyes of the privileged, a nasty
interruption to the routine of daily life.
Existing information on criminal practice during the closing
years of the Somoza regime primarily comes from human rights
organizations. These included some information on the operation
of the criminal courts in their reports on political freedom in Nica-
ragua.' 92 International human rights accords incorporate extensive
provisions on the fundamental guarantees of the criminal pro-
191. This was not true for all of the revolutionary leaders. Both Carlos Fonseca and
Tomks Borge, founders of the FSLN, were trained in law. Fonseca, one of the powerful
thinkers and writers of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, studied law during the early
days of his political activism. Rfus, CARLOS PARA TODos 36-38 (1987). He was imprisoned
several times and was ultimately killed in combat on Nov. 8, 1976. Id. at 106. Borge began
his student activism during his tenure as a law student. CHRISTIANITY AND REVOLUTION: To-
MAs BORGE'S THEOLOGY OF LIFE 7 (Andrew Reding ed., 1987).
192. The country reports of non-governmental human rights organizations have become
an indispensable source for a broad range of information on the operation of the criminal
courts. The systematic collection of data on operation of legal and extra-legal criminal pro-
cedures was nascent during the pre-revolutionary era in Nicaragua. Thus, only the years
immediately prior to the fall of the Somoza regime provide any documentation, and that
information is limited in its detail. See 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41; 1976 AMNESTY
REPORT, supra note 43; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NICARAGUA, YESTERDAY AND TODAY (July 1980) [hereinafter 1980 ICJ REPORT].
There are a few accounts of political life in Nicaragua prior to the revolution, but while
these histories are replete with accounts of the effects of the judicial system through jailing
and imprisonment of political dissidents, they are virtually devoid of detail as to the actual
operation of judicial machinery. See, e.g., TIJERINO, supra note 1; RICHARD MILLET, THE
GUARDIANS OF THE DYNASTY (1977); NEILL MACAULAY, THE SANDINO AFFAIR (1985).
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cess.'95 The failures of the regime thus were extensively docu-
mented and tested against international norms.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, sponsored
by the Organization of American States, wrote to the Nicaraguan
government in February, 1978, following the January assassination
of the well-known journalist and political figure, Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, and asked for a report on the present status of human
rights in Nicaragua. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
Julio C. Quintana, promptly replied:
I am pleased to state to you that the Nicaraguan people enjoy
full freedom and the exercise of the rights guaranteed by our
Constitution and other law of the Republic, which incorporate
and enforce human rights law as part of our juridical tradition,
in accordance with the Nicaraguan political reality based on a
representative democracy. These guarantees and rights have not
been suspended, in spite of violent events and subversive actions
of extremist groups which threaten the peace of the Republic.'
Despite the assurances of Minister Quintana, the subsequent
visit by the Commission in October, following a major military of-
fensive by the Sandinistas, revealed deeply alarming violations of
human rights by the Nicaraguan government. The Commission
found that the Government had repressed the September insurrec-
tions "in an excessive and disproportionate manner," including the
indiscriminate aerial bombing of civilian populations; that the
Government was responsible for the death, torture, and arbitrary
and prolonged detention of peasant groups and the young, particu-
larly "any male youth between 14 and 21 years of age"; and that
the police and military courts had utilized their powers, estab-
193. The International Bill of Rights, the oldest of the multi-lateral human rights ac-
cords among the modern nations, contains several guarantees relating to criminal procedure.
One of the Bill of Rights documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was
adopted in 1948 and contains the following protections: art. 3 (right to life, liberty, and
security of person); art. 5 (protection against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment); art. 9 (protection against arbitrary arrest and detention); art. 10
(right to full and public hearing by independent and impartial tribunal on criminal charges);
art. 11 (presumption of innocence and protection against ex post facto laws or punish-
ments); art. 12 (protection against arbitrary interference in privacy, family, home, or corre-
spondence). U.N DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS in HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REv.3, U.N. SALES No. E.88.XIV.1 (1988)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS COMPILATION]. Other later declarations, conventions, protocols,
and treaties elaborate and expand on these rights. See also ILANUD, LAS GARANTIAS
PENALES Y PROCESALES EN EL DERECHO DE LOS DERECHos HUMANOS (1988).
194. 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 4.
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lished in emergency circumstances, in such a manner as to arbi-
trarily deny due process and the right to an adequate defense.'95
Article 197 of the Nicaraguan Constitution of 1974 permitted,
in certain circumstances, the suspension of certain constitutional
guarantees and the declaration of a state of siege and martial law
by presidential decree.' 6 As early as December of that year, the
suspension of constitutional guarantees was decreed and the state
of siege declared.' 9 This would be the case for three and a half of
the last four and a half years of the presidency of Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, who was "re-elected" in late 1974.198 Despite con-
stitutional limitations, the continuous suspension of rights gave
virtually unlimited power to military and police courts over both
ordinary and political crimes.' 99
The military courts, which under martial law subsumed the
jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts, were of two types: the
Permanent Military Court of Investigation (Corte Militar de In-
vestigaci6n Permanente) and the Extraordinary Council of War
(Consejo de Guerra Extraordinario). The former conducted inves-
tigations in order to bring charges while the latter passed judgment
on the convicted. Operation of the courts was governed by a com-
plex set of executive orders whose validity was tested and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court.20 0 For the most part, and altogether
apocryphally, these regulations were direct translations of the U.S.
Navy codes of the 1920s, applied during one of several U.S. occu-
pations of Nicaraguan territory. " ' The codes were alien to the Nic-
araguan legal tradition.
Abuses under martial law were legion. A document prepared
by a group of Nicaraguan lawyers at the time described the situa-
tion in the following terms:
195. Id. at 77-78.
196. 1976 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
197. Id. This action was taken after the dramatic assault by FSLN troops on the home
of a Nicaraguan government minister hosting a party for the U.S. ambassador, who never
arrived. High ranking government officials were held as hostages until 14 political prisoners
were freed, a ransom was paid, and a plane provided to fly to Cuba. Id. The success of the
embassy party operation brought the FSLN international attention as well as financial and
moral support.
198. 1980 ICJ REPORT, supra note 192, at 21. The report notes that the elections of
1974, which kept Anastasio Somoza in power, were "rigged." Id. at 13.
199. See 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 29.
200. See 1976 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 43, at 8-12.
201. 1980 ICJ REPORT, supra note 192, at 22; 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 9.
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Martial law and the state of siege have been used by Somoza to
suppress any citizen dissent in the political, business, cultural,
and social fields. Repression is widespread, characterized by in-
discriminate persecution and imprisonment, censorship of the
mass media, banning of political and labor organizations, sur-
veillance of the mail, raiding of homes, torture, illegal trials and
sentences, and the razing of small farms, compelling an exodus
of peasants to the mountains.
202
The military courts and their close companion, the police
courts, colluded to systematically deny citizens basic procedural
rights. Detention without trial, torture while in custody, and
wholesale "disappearances" were the rule.20 3 Many citizens were
charged with offenses against the internal security of the state, of-
fenses which carried such vague names as "illegal association" (a
form of conspiracy), "attempted destruction of the constitution" or
"incitement to non-observance of the constitution."'0 The police
courts, using their summary powers, were staffed by members of
the National Guard. The National Guard acted as both police force
and army in Nicaragua and was strictly controlled through the of-
fice of Anastasio Somoza himself.
Amnesty International found that the Guard used its police
court powers in "a pattern of harassment or political reprisal."20 5
While law provided for access to counsel prior to sentencing and
the opportunity to present a defense, Amnesty found that most
prisoners sentenced by the police courts were incommunicado and
never physically appeared before a judge.2 6 One of the most hei-
nous practices uncovered by Amnesty involved the reported prac-
tice by prosecutors of adding charges of perjury to those defend-
ants who alleged that they were tortured instead of first requesting
an investigation of the allegations.20  Review of illegal detention or
improper convictions was provided by law, but the Supreme Court
"did not exercise this power. It took no action in relation to many
trials in which there had been errors of law or fact."' 08
Judges and police under Somoza were notorious for their ex-
202. Quoted without attribution in 1980 ICJ REPORT, supra note 192, at 13.
203. See 1976 OAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 15, 23-30; 1978 AMNESTY REPORT, supra
note 41, at 55-64.
204. 1976 OAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 16-17.
205. Id., at 19.
206. Id. at 20; see also 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 61.
207. 1976 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 43, at 14.
208. 1980 ICJ REPORT, supra note 192, at 22.
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trajudicial activities, including assassination, disappearances, and
torture. The now-abolished jueces de mesta were the sole judicial
authority in the rural comarca (the smallest administrative divi-
sions). They were given jurisdiction over theft of livestock and fire-
arms. Their qualifications and functions were roughly equal to that
of a U.S. justice of the peace. They were accused by peasants of
resorting to murder and other abuses, acting in association with
the National Guard.209 In 1977, a report published by Capuchin
priests accused a National Guard patrol, accompanied by seven
jueces de mesta, of the assassination of forty-four men, women,
and children in the village of Varilla2 10
During what it called "mopping up" operations, the Guard it-
self was charged with the systematic massacre of anyone between
the ages of fourteen and twenty in certain areas. In Le6n, the
country's second largest city, for example, the mission of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists met residents in one street 300 me-
ters long where thirty children had been executed.2 1 ' The atrocities
of the Guard, committed in the company of the Somoza judges,
were grotesque. A survivor of a "mop up" operation gave the fol-
lowing account:
On August 30, [1978] at approximately 11:30 in the morning
in Matagalpa, some thirty soldiers shot their way into my house,
known as Hotel Soza, and said they belong to the EEBI [School
of Basic Infantry Training], and ordered all of us in the house
towards the back, with our hands in the air, in the direction of
the principal room in the house. In the house there was my eld-
erly mother, Tina Arauz de Soza, my brother-in-law Harold Mi-
randa, the maid Nubia Montegro, and a guest, Alfredo Lacayo
Amador, and the undersigned. As they were coming out they
were also being machine-gunned. I was behind my mother and I
jumped to the neighboring house and I was able to hide in the
trash bin, hidden by the body of my mother.
I spent the whole day hidden in the trash bin, that is 24
hours, hiding behind some rotten beams a few feet from the
soldiers who continued shooting to break down the doors. I
209. Id. at 11 n.1.
210. Id. at 13. This account was reported by Time magazine, which also noted that
after the death of Carlos Fonseca in battle, an "unpublicized trial" in Managua resulted in
sentences ranging from 18 months to 129 years in prison for 36 captured guerrillas and 74 of
their compatriots tried in absentia Somoza's Reign of Terror, TIME, Mar. 14, 1977, at 29,
30.
211. 1980 ICJ REPORT, supra note 192, at 15.
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could hear them shouting "there were five, where is the other
one?" And I could see how my mother was butchered after they
machine-gunned her, opening her abdomen with a bayonet. My
brother-in-law had his genitals cut off and put in his mouth." '
IV. POST-REVOLUTIONARY REFORMS
This, then, was the inheritance of the new government in Nic-
aragua when it assumed power in July of 1979: a "justice system"
which provided neither. Criminal justice was, like every social in-
stitution, scrutinized by a post-revolutionary government which
had taken power by force. The abrupt change in governments left
a vacuum of public policy; criminal justice policy was defined by
theoretical debate and by the emerging reality of political events.
The new government faced the immense task reinventing the
criminal justice system. It had to recreate public order in a country
in which most of the men carried guns and had fought a war which
taught that sometimes violence was the only solution to social
problems. Atrocities by General Somoza's National Guard were a
grizzly precedent, one which was absolutely rejected by the new
regime. The criminal justice structures in neighboring Honduras,
El Salvador and Guatemala certainly provided no sound models
for implementation at home. Hostility to many North American
ideas and institutions, combined with a totally distinct legal his-
tory, made the conversion to an adversarial model of justice un-
212. 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 41, at 44. For a reference to "EEBI," see id. at 39.
These stories of cruelty and degradation, repeated at length and in detail in the style of
human rights reporting, achieve a curious numbing quality after prolonged reading. This is
not to deny their brutal reality but to acknowledge that our minds are all too capable of
becoming conditioned to accept even the most cruel of human behavior analytically and
rationally, even with boredom. If this is true in the reading of such accounts, it must be
commonplace for those who struggle to cope with the brutal everyday reality in countries
where such oppression occurs. The struggle for human rights is an effort to focus our collec-
tive consciousness to resist this numbing quality of human brutality, to fight our subcon-
scious desire to forget. The Polish poet, Zbigniew Herbert, has poignantly captured the need
to remember:
And yet in these matters
Acuracy is essential
We must not be wrong
Even by a single one
We are despite everything
The guardians of our brothers
Ignorance about those who have disappeared
Undermines the reality of the world.
Quoted in L. WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 191 (1990).
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likely. Reform was also slowed by the limited financial and human
resources and the natural inertia of law and legal institutions.
The new regime adopted two basic documents governing the
structure and principles under which Nicaraguan government
would operate until the adoption of a formal constitution in 1987.
These documents were the first public statement of the vision of a
post-revolutionary society. The first was The Fundamental Statute
(Estatuto Fundamental), adopted the day after the revolutionary
victory. It abolished the 1974 Constitution and set out the struc-
ture of government." ' The second was The Statute of Rights and
Guarantees of the Nicaraguan People (Estatuto sobre Derechos y
Garantias de los Nicaragiienses), adopted in August of 1979.214
The Statute added a basic bill of rights for the Nicaraguan
nation.2"'
The structure of government, which held until the 1984 elec-
tions, was tripartite: a governing Junta made up the executive
branch, the legislative branch was a Council of State, and the third
branch was the Courts of Justice.216 The ruling Junta, originally
five members, 1 7 changed membership in the first two years of the
new government, emerging as a three-person body in March
1981.218 The FSLN National Directorate, the Sandinista leader-
ship, was dominant in the Junta and the Council of Government, a
consultative "cabinet" to the Junta, and the Sandinista's blend of
Marxist, social democratic, and Christian ideas guided government
policy in the coming years.2 1 9 The Council of State, with forty-
seven members, played a co-legislative role with the Junta, and
was made up largely of representatives from mass organizations,
the so-called poder popular, or popular power, of the revolution.2 20
213. DECRETOs-LYES, vol. 1, Estatuto Fundamental, at 1.
214. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. 1, Decree No. 52, at 66.
215. Id. at 67-72. Individual rights, including those dealing with the conduct of criminal
trials, were contained in 25 articles of Title II of the Statute of Rights and Guarantees.
216. Estatuto Fundamental, supra note 213, art. 9.
217. The original members of the Junta were Daniel Ortega (later elected President in
1984), Moises HassAn (who was to become Mayor of Managua), Sergio Ramirez (later Vice-
President under Ortega), Alfonso Robelo (who later became a leader in the contra opposi-
tion), and Violeta Chamorro (elected President in February, 1990). COUNTRY GUIDE, supra
note 8, at 162.
218. Id. at 161-62.
219. Id. at 147-48, 150, 162.
220. Id. at 163-64. Jules Lobel calls this a "hegemonic position" for the working class
and the peasantry, a key feature of the new government and the new constitution. Jules
Lobel, The Meaning of Democracy: Representative and Participatory Democracy in the
New Nicaraguan Constitution, 49 U. PnT. L. REV. 823, 842, 845-53 (1988).
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From the outset of the new government, the Courts played a
key role. The Fundamental Statute called for the creation of a Su-
preme Court, Courts of Appeal, and a Supreme Labor Tribunal.221
The day after the adoption of The Fundamental Statute, the Junta
named seven Magistrates, or Justices, to the Supreme Court. The
new members of the Court, acting under the still-operative Organic
Law of the Courts of 1894, chose members of the Courts of Appeal,
district and local judges.222 Judicial independence, guaranteed by
The Fundamental Statute, was further advanced by the adoption,
in the same year, of the American Convention of Human Rights,
and, in March of 1980, the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol.
22 3
With such an antiquated criminal justice system, it might be
assumed that the priorities of the revolutionary government would
include the drafting of new codes of criminal law and procedure, as
well as modern versions of codes for the police and the courts.
They did not. Lawyers and institutionalized law were not held in
high esteem by the revolution.24 Revolutionary priorities focused
on more urgent needs, such as the decimated infrastructure and
economy, land reform, health, education, and protection against
the historically real threat of U.S. intervention. The contra war, a
continuous lack of material resources, and fundamental contradic-
tions in the vision of revolutionary justice also conspired to slow
consideration of new codes. Post-revolutionary judges thus strug-
gled with interpretation of existing codes rather than drafting com-
prehensive new legislation. That struggle continues today; no new
codes have been adopted.
221. Estatuto Fundamental, supra note 213, arts. 4, 21.
222. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 16.
223. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. II, Decree No. 174, at 266 (American Convention);
DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. II, Decree No. 255, at 79 (U.N. Covenant and Optional Protocol). A
report of the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights notes that these two in-
struments contain provisions insuring the right to trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal, which differs from the Statute of Nicaraguan Rights, requiring only that courts be
"competent." REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 17-18.
224. Lawyers were called "mercenaries," applying "mechanical rules" to further client
interests at the expense of society. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 140. The same
phenomenon occurred in the early post-revolutionary periods in Russia, China, and Cuba,
with a resurgence of the legal profession in all of these countries after the initial aversion to
legality. Harold J. Berman & Van R. Whiting, Impressions of Cuban Law, 28 Am. J. COMP.
L. 475, 477 (1980). Aversion to law and lawyers also occurred in radical movements in U.S.
history. See Victor Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
310-11 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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A. Conflicting Conceptual Values in the Evolution of the
New Legality: Revolutionary Justice and the Rule of Law
For revolutionary lawyers and intellectuals the central issue
for post-revolutionary justice in Nicaragua was broader than
whether the criminal process would be preventive or remedial,
community-based or court-based. The central issue was the prob-
lem of law and legality itself. The resolution of this dilemma is
embodied in the debates, during the first years of the revolutionary
era, of the concept of "revolutionary interpretation."
The notion of revolutionary interpretation arose from the im-
mediacy of post-revolutionary reality. Vilma Nfifiez, one of the
original Magistrates named to the Nicaraguan Supreme Judicial
Court, framed the question as follows:
How, then, does a judge guarantee revolutionary legality while
applying codes and laws which predate the Revolution, but
which the Revolution has left in effect? Can those laws which in
a multitude of cases were conceived and promulgated during the
infamous and prolonged regime of the Somozas, can these be ap-
plied without invalidating revolutionary legality because of the
nature of their origin?22 5
Post-revolutionary judges, often drafted with no experience, had
no choice but to bring their life experience in revolutionary strug-
gle to the newly formed legal system. The complex code structures,
with formalistic legal rules, differing burdens of proof, and de-
tailed, century-old treatment of subjects such as witnesses and
confessions, were, to judges who not infrequently had been peasant
farmers or soldiers for most of their lives, as intimidating as the
streets of downtown Managua. Attempts at application of old
codes by revolutionary judges were, in short, no more effective
than attempts to fly an airplane solo after reading the mechanic's
manual.
One answer was to reject the entire pre-revolutionary legal or-
der: people, rules, structures, and underlying philosophy. These
precepts could be replaced with a new vision of society and a new,
revolutionary personhood. Another of the most important Nicara-
guan revolutionary theorists, Tombs Borge,22" bluntly proposed the
225. Vilma Nifiez de Escorcia, Justice and the Control of Crime in the Sandinista
Popular Revolution, 23 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 5, 9 (1985).
226. Tomfis Borge was one of the founders of the FSLN. See CHRISTIANITY AND REVOLU-
TION, supra note 191, at 7.
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following solution:
Beccaria's [eighteenth century] dictum that laws are to be ap-
plied, not interpreted, is an obsolete axiom even in erudite and
elegant bourgeois law, not to mention in the legal system in rev-
olutionary Nicaragua. It is to act like the Pharisees of the Bible
to demand progressive laws in order to be in a position to re-
solve problems, and to argue that without such laws we cannot
respond to contradictions. Laws can't be plucked out of a magi-
cian's hat, and so long as we do not have a body of revolutionary
laws we insist that we must interpret every law on the basis of
the politics of the revolution.
22 1
Borge's solution assumed that pre-revolutionary law worked to
protect the rich, male-dominated society of the Somoza era, and
against the interests of the poor and landless.228 His solution was
to interpret pre-revolutionary laws "in exactly the opposite way, so
that in the last analysis these laws, like rifles, become an extension
of the political consciousness of men.9
2 29
But what was "the politics of the revolution"? What was inter-
pretation "in the exact opposite way"? For Borge, the concept of
law itself was moribund.3 ° In the same speech, he rejected as bour-
geois concepts the separation of powers, unitary court jurisdiction,
227. Tomfis Borge, Justice in Nicaragua Is No Longer the Same, in NICARAGUA: THE
SANDINISTA PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION, SPEECHES BY SANDINISTA LEADERS 269 (1985) [hereinafter
SPEECHES].
228. Id. at 267. I have noted some concrete examples of this phenomenon in the text of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussion re-
garding consideration of the defendant's social position in deciding the admissibility of con-
fessions); supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (limitations on the protection of the
criminal law to women of "ood reputation," and reduction of penalties for men who keep
"corrupt" women as mistresses); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (limits on women
and the poor as private criminal complainants); supra note 114 and accompanying text (dis-
qualification of witnesses based on poverty).
229. Id. Quoted, in slightly different translation, in REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note
14, at 22.
230. In this sense, Borge's views are consistent with the Marxist vision of the withering
away of law, legal institutions, and the state itself in idealized communist society. R. W.
MAKEPEACE, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW 24-26 (1980). In Soviet law, al-
though there was sporadic development in the early years after the revolution, the criminal
law began to take on a coherent shape and embody a central policy direction. See W.E.
BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 299 (2d ed. 1988) ("In Soviet criminal law the statement of purpose has
been central to the course of criminal policy."). Professor Michael Tigar notes the same
process in Cuba and asserts that the development of the criminal law there was able to
respond, through the dynamic use of the popular tribunals, with flexible structures which
permitted Cuba to "renew institutional norms with revolutionary experience." Michael E.
Tigar, Socialist Law and Legal Institutions, in LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE 344 (Robert Lef-
court ed., 1971).
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and any positivist, natural, or realist vision of law.2 ' Instead, he
called for a "scientific, dialectical concept" which allowed an un-
derstanding of the class interests which lay beneath legal norms.2 32
Borge's vision of society infused his vision of law. In that view,
influenced heavily by the other founders of the FSLN, Christian
social thought played a central role. Respect for life and human
dignity played important roles, best exemplified in the Sandinista
motto, "[u]ncompromising in battle, generous in victory. ' ' 23 3 The
notion of the prevalence of mercy over vengeance,23 4 of law as an
instrument of education and persuasion rather than punishment or
coercion, was to influence the articulation of post-revolutionary
constitutionalism, criminal law and procedure, and penology.
In the development of new legal institutions, however, another
voice ultimately proved more persuasive than that of Borge. Ale-
jandro Serrano Caldero, a lawyer who has distinguished himself as
a member of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, as Embassador from
Nicaragua to France, UNESCO and the United Nations, and, most
recently, as Rector of the National Autonomous University,
emerged with a call to what he called "the rule of law in the
revolution." 3 5
Serrano's vision called for the application of concepts of judi-
cial independence and supremacy through the power to review for
unconstitutionality, unitary jurisdiction, the separation of powers,
and the need for popular participation in the justice process while
urging control by a professional judiciary, all in the name of the re-
establishment of a revolutionary rule of law.236 To advance these
231. Barge, supra note 227, at 265-66.
232. The exposure of the intrinsic value judgments made in all legal decision-making,
the revelation of the myth of an ostensibly objective law and of the dominance of capitalist
premises in codes and opinions, has been most ardently pursued in the United States by
proponents of the Critical Legal Studies movement, and has followed much the same pro-
gression. First, the attack was widespread and profound, and was articulated as a rejection
or negation of dominant modes of legal reasoning. Then, after'its fuller articulation, it was
viciously attacked by the academy. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34
J. LEGAL EDUc. 222 (1984), and Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest
CLS-Land, 34 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984). And despite repeated attempts, the movement has
proven itself remarkably incapable of articulating a viable alternative vision of law and
lawyering.
233. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 24, at .169.
234. For Borge's views on human rights, and those of the FSLN, see DAN HODGES, IN-
TELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 264-68 (1986).
235. Serrano's writings between 1985 and 1988 have been collected in an excellent com-
pilation and translation. Serrano supra note 36.
236. See Robert W. Benson, Preface to Serrano Caldera, 12 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
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causes, Serrano also called for the re-writing of codes and the insti-
tutionalization of reforms, particularly the code of criminal proce-
dure.237 He supported the Central American peace process23 and
the codification of an autonomy law for the indigenous peoples of
the Atlantic Coast.23 9 His writings, in short, are replete with the
urgency of the task of consolidation of the revolutionary rule of
law.
For Serrano, like Borge, the central problem was structural:
"It consists of reconciling the different nature of the revolution's
socio-political dynamics with the static character of the law."24 0
However, he rejects, at least implicitly, Borge's view that the "dy-
namic, changing reality" of the revolution can be superimposed on
the existing legal order, or that all "old law" must be discarded
and replaced by new.241 To do this, he asserts, is to risk creation of
"a hole into which the great guiding forces of the revolution would
fall."242
L.J. 349-50. These themes began to emerge through a struggle for reform-drafting power
between the Ministry of Justice, closely aligned with the Sandinista Directorate, and the
Supreme Court, during a seminar held in May of 1981 called "Justice in the Revolution."
Two U.S. law professors, Joseph Page of Georgetown, and Dennis Lynch formerly of Miami
and now at Denver, were invited to attend, as did representatives of many of the Eastern
Bloc countries, Cuba, and Latin America. The struggle for definition of revolutionary legal-
ity was joined throughout the conference presentations. See Dennis 0. Lynch, "Justice in
the Revolution," A Conference Sponsored by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court (unpublished
memo and accompanying conference papers, on file with author).
237. Serrano, supra note 36, at 370-71.
238. Id. at 461.
239. Id. at 451-60. Although the great coastal plains of the Atlantic make up about half
of the national territory, the population of the region comprises only about 10% of the all
Nicaraguans. Of that number, something under half make up the five indigenous groups of
the Atlantic Coast: the Misktos, Ramas, and Sumus make up the Indian population, while
Creoles and Garifunas make up the English-speaking Afro-American and Afro-Indian popu-
lations of the coast. COUNTRY GUIDE, supra note 8, at 85.
Traditional geographic and political separation of these groups made the first years of
their relationship to the revolutionary government extremely difficult. Relations between
the government and a mass organization of the region, MISURASATA, formed in 1981,
deteriorated so completely that the two factions fell into total war during the next three
years. Id. at 85-86. Out of the ashes of this early relationship, the warring factions were able
to fashion not only an end to hostilities, but a full legal recognition of the autonomy of the
region while integrating it into the national family. During 1987, the government and the
peoples of the coast were able to negotiate provisions dealing with rights of native people in
both the Constitution and an Autonomy Statute. NICAR. CONST. arts. 180-181;
DECRETOS-LEYES, Vol. XIV, Law No. 28 (Estatuto de la Autonomia de las Regiones de la
Costa Atldzntica de Nicaragua), at 195.
240. Serrano, supra note 36, at 386.
241. Id. at 355.
242. Id.
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Serrano recognizes that revolutionary interpretation may be
called for on a "transitory" basis, but insists upon the develop-
ment, slowly and over time, of "a new codified law, organized on
the basis of emitted and properly decreed laws and the evolved
normative reality." That task could only come about through es-
tablishment of the rule of law, which must be "defined and consoli-
dated in a determined period of time. 24 3 That new law, in turn,
must be capable of interpretation and review by the judiciary.24 '
Serrano's call was for the development of a kind of revolution-
ary positivism. His vision seems to incorporate elements of the So-
viet "rule-of-law state" or "socialist legality," as it has evolved in
recent years, 248 and, ironically, the liberal legalist view which Ser-
rano himself purports to reject.2 ' 6 His greatest departure from lib-
eral thought is his view of how law is to come about, not how it is
to be administered once its exists, his vision of which is not radical
at all, but reflective of the general trends of Western legal thought.
These arguably competing visions of law-one invoking revo-
lutionary interpretation and one calling for a rule of law in the
revolution-would see themselves reflected throughout the next
243. ALEJANDRO SERRANO CALDERA, EL DERECHO EN LA REVOLUCI6N 18 (1986).
244. Serrano, supra note 36, at 355.
245. One of the best articulations of the ongoing struggle for articulation of a Soviet
"rule-of-law state" is W.E. Butler, Towards the Rule of Law? in CHRONICLE, supra note 12,
at 75-76. See also R.W. MAKEPEACE, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW 223-25
(1980)(asserting that it is "commendable" that the Soviets have concluded that "[i]f there is
to be law, and this seems to be both practically the case, and acceptable in theory, then that
law should not be arbitrary and its application badly organized." Id.); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SO-
VIET LAW 706 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge et al. eds., 2d rev. ed. 1985) defining "socialist legality" as
"a strict observance of law by all agencies of the state, social organizations, institutions,
government officials, and citizens," quoted in Simmons, supra note 12, at 921, 923 n.12.
246. Serrano purports to reject liberal legalism: "Nor are we proposing a more genera-
lized version of legal theory that developed into the classical liberal concept of the Rule of
Law." Serrano supra note 36, at 359. His vision, however, seems to replicate much of liberal
instrumental theory of law as a response to social demands, particularly of the functional
needs of society. Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 284-85 (David Kairys ed., 1982). One of the fullest
and most devastating articulations of liberal legalism is found in David M. Trubek & Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Devel-
opment Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1071-72 (1974). Like the
liberal legalists, Serrano seems to believe that the state exercises control over individuals
through law, by which the state itself is also constrained; that courts are the central institu-
tions of the legal order, and that social actors will tend to conform to the rules, while official
enforcement of the law will guarantee conformity. Trubek & Galanter conclude that this
paradigm of law is not only inappropriate as a structure for solution of the legal problems of
the Third World, but that it has been assumed to apply in the United States when, in fact,
it does not. Id. at 1081.
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decade of the revolution, most prominently in the failed calls for
code reform and the articulation of the new constitutional order.
As these legal ideologies clashed, however, the reality of defense of
revolutionary gains and their institutionalization through new or
reformed structures-would consume the time and energy of revolu-
tionary theorists and practitioners.
B. The Devastation of the Contra War and the Need for
States of Emergency
The threat of external armed aggression toward Nicaragua
during the first two years of the new government was real and im-
mediate. History showed that the U.S. government defended its in-
terests in the hemisphere by military action; U.S. military forces
had intervened at least eleven times over the past century in Nica-
ragua alone.4 7 The United States Department of Defense and
State contributed actively to fears of invasion through a "percep-
tion management" program involving the staging of military ma-
neuvers in neighboring Honduras and spy plane overflights of Nic-
araguan territory which created sonic booms.24
The Statute of Rights and Guarantees set up a structure per-
mitting the imposition of states of emergency during periods of in-
ternational or civil war, disaster, or other situations "which put the
life or stability of the Nation into danger."" 9 Saber rattling by the
United States, combined with the 1982 commencement of attacks
by contras on civilian populations in Nicaraguan territory, led to
the imposition of states of emergency lasting almost continuously
from March 1982 through January of 1988.50 The last was im-
247. COUNTRY GUIDE, supra note 8, at 131-32.
248. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 283. These and other illegal military activities were part
of the basis for the World Court judgment against the United States in 1986. See discussion
supra notes 2-3. History also shows that the U.S. carried out threats through overt or covert
military operations in several countries in the hemisphere which attempted to carry out
radical social change since World War II: Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominican
Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973, and Grenada in 1983. These operations, along with wartime
limitations on civil liberties in the U.S., are documented, seemingly for the first time, in
MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR 157-58
(1990). Extensive portions of Linfield's work, which compares the U.S. experience with that
in Nicaragua, were excerpted in a series of articles in the Nicaraguan press. Los Derechos
Humanos en Tiempos de Guerra, BARRICADA, May 4-6, 1988, at 3.
249. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. 1, Decree No. 52, art. 49, at 77. Non-suspendable rights
were enumerated in art. 50, and include the right to life, physical integrity, and other basic
guarantees of international human rights.
250. The first declaration of a national state of emergency actually came three days
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posed after the adoption of the new Constitution, and was lifted as
part of the Central American peace process.2 51 These states of
emergency suspended important individual rights relating to the
criminal justice process, particularly the rights to habeas corpus,
protection from arbitrary arrest and various due process rights.2 52
These suspensions of rights are notable in several respects.
First, the Nicaraguan government never opted for the adoption of
provisions permitting the imposition of states of siege, a more com-
prehensive measure found in many contemporary constitutions,
and regularly invoked in neighboring countries of Latin America.2 5s
Such provisions permit the imposition of martial law and the
supremacy of military jurisdiction over civilian courts. Nicaragua
adopted a system of post-revolutionary military courts, but clearly
delimited their jurisdiction and accountability to the civilian court
system.
Second, the effects of the state of emergency were not visible
nor intrusive in the lives of the average Nicaraguan citizen. There
was no curfew, and although soldiers and police were everywhere,
it did not create a sense of life in a police state. It was the U.S.-
sponsored war, not the state of emergency, which most profoundly
affected the lives of Nicaraguans.254
after the assumption of power by the government, on July 22, 1979. That decree set up
Special Tribunals whose principal duty was the prosecution of former members of the
Somoza National Guard. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. I, Decree No. 9, at 15. For a discussion of
the Special Tribunals, see infra notes 351-57 and accompanying text. The major declara-
tions of states of emergency came in the time period delineated in the text.
DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. VI, Decree No. 996, at 186, to DECRETOS-LEYEs, vol. XIV, Decree
No. 244, at 57. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, NICARAGUA: A HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY,
JULY 1979 TO JULY 1989 6-9 (July 1989) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY]; COUNTRY
GUIDE, supra note 8, at 133-34, for brief chronologies of the nature and extent of the states
of emergency.
251. The new Constitution carried over the emergency powers contained in the Statute
of Rights and Guarantees. NICAR. CONST. arts. 185-186. The peace process began with the
signing by the Presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica
of the Esquipulas II document in October 1987. Guatemalan Agreement for Peace in Cen-
tral America, 87 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 56 (Oct. 1987).
252. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD: 1986-1989, at 11-12 [herein-
after 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT]; Pyle, supra note 14, at 12.
253. In Colombia, for example, a state of siege has existed virtually continuously during
the past decade, vesting the military and the military courts with wide discretion. AMERICAS
WATCH, THE CENTRAL-AMERICANIZATION OF COLOMBIA? HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PEACE PRO-
CESS 17-18, 112-14, 127-34 (Jan. 1986).
254. LINFIELD, supra note 248, at 207. I visited Nicaragua in the Summer of 1986, lived
there for three months during the summer of 1988, and returned three times since that visit.
I was never requested to show documents to any police or military officer in the streets; even
in government office buildings, I was only asked to show a photographic identification. I
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Third, and most important, the need for states of emergency
has disappeared with the settlement of the contra war. None has
been imposed since early 1988, and the new government will
doubtlessly live up to its campaign promises guaranteeing that,
pursuant to the regional peace plan and efforts towards national
reconciliation, such states of emergency will be unnecessary. 55
Then-President Ronald Reagan used the states of emergency
in part to justify his assertions that Nicaragua was a "totalitarian
dungeon. "26 This assertion, in turn, justified his request for in-
creased funding of contra forces. The administration argued that
whatever openness existed on the part of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment occurred because of its desire to win international support
for resistance to the contras. This standard was never applied to
the neighboring governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Pan-
ama, whose regimes brutally suppress dissent, but which are seen
as friendly to United States interests in the region.
The strict standard to which the U.S. held Nicaragua cannot
be said to have been applied at home. A report by Americas
Watch, as well as other sources, notes the long and sorry experi-
ence of the United States own treatment of civil liberties during
time of war. From the Revolutionary War through the Viet-Nam
era, the U.S. government has enacted laws or policies permitting
slavery of African Americans, genocide of Native Americans, press
and other media censorship, limits on free speech through sedi-
tious libel laws, illegal suspension of habeas corpus, the creation of
special tribunals and military courts, restrictions on travel, domes-
tic spying, loyalty oaths, confiscation of property, and internship of
Japanese citizens during World War II, and limitations on labor
organizing which might affect war efforts.15 7 The U.S. government
hypocritically applied a standard against Nicaragua which it could
not meet itself in times of war.
traveled freely throughout the country, including some areas very close to the armed con-
flict. I was never stopped on the road for any purpose.
255. See National Reconciliation of the Nicaraguan Family, Acceptance Statement by
President-Elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, Feb. 27, 1990, reprinted in 9 ENvIo 38
(March/April 1990). The peace accords call for the abolition of states of exception in each of
the participating countries. See 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 252, at 8-10.
256. See Philip Taubman, New Effort to Aid Nicaragua Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1984, at A6.
257. AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA: REAGAN, RHETORIC AND REALITY 8-
9 (July 1985) [hereinafter REAGAN, RHETORIC AND REALITY]. The report concludes that the
Administration's characterizations were "deceptive and harmful." Id. at 2.
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C. Early Structural Changes in Legal Institutions
In the first years of post-revolutionary Nicaragua, the new
government was faced with the fundamental issue of whether and
how to utilize the imposition of state power in the lives of its citi-
zens for violations of the criminal laws. One way to conceive of
that intervention is through the remedial use of law, enforced by
representatives of the government who impose the commensurate
penalties. Another conception, that of participatory democracy and
popular hegemony,"'8 is educative and preventive. In this concep-
tion, government encourages the creation of popular, grassroots,
mass-based organizations to deter and prevent crime through civic
education and the development of civic pride, through local vigi-
lance, and through alternative, informal means of dispute resolu-
tion which avoid courts, lawyers, and law altogether.2 59
The revolutionary movement in Nicaragua was successful, at
least for a time, in the use of mass organizations as a means of
crime prevention and control through participation and direct pop-
ular action. At the same time, institutional reform largely failed to
touch the basic organization of legal education and the law profes-
sion. Moreover, the apparatus of state security police carried out,
in the invidious name of "national security," operations which can-
not be justified under conceptions of universal human rights to
which Nicaragua subscribes. Military courts, however, proved
equal to the task of discipline of police and military personnel for
violations of the criminal laws.
1. Mass Organizations: The Role of the Sandinista Defense Com-
mittees and Women's Organizations in Crime Control
By 1984, Sandinista mass organizations had reached deeply
into the roots of Nicaraguan society. The principal formal struc-
tures of these organizations were the popular militia, local neigh-
borhood groups, labor unions, peasant farmers, women, and young
258. See Lobel, supra note. 220, at 842-44.
259. In Cuba, this was the dominant direction during the first decade of the revolution.
James Brady, The Revolution Comes of Age: Justice and Social Change in Contemporary
Cuba, in CRIME, JUSTICE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 248, 261-67 (Colin Sumner ed., 1982). It
was, however, able to accomplish extensive reform of court structures during the same pe-
riod, unlike Nicaragua. Max Azicri, Change and Institutionalization in the Revolutionary
Process: The Cuban Legal System in the 1970s, 6 REV. SOCIALIST L. 164, 168-70 (1980).
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people.26 °  The Sandinista Defense Committees (Comits de
Defensa Sandinista, or "CDSs") and AMNLAE (Asociaci6n de la
Mujer Nacional "Luisa Amanda Espinosa"), the women's organi-
zation, played the strongest roles in criminal justice.
The CDSs were the largest of the grassroots groups, reaching a
peak membership of nearly 600,000.261 Originally founded during
the insurrection as a support structure for the Sandinista combat-
ants, the organizations became a key factor in mobilizing popular
participation around community needs, delivering essential ser-
vices, and policing neighborhoods for counterrevolutionary activi-
ties and the ever-present possibility of invasion. '
One of the benefits of alert vigilance against counterin-
surgency by the CDSs was a dramatic drop in common crime dur-
ing the years 1981-1984.23 These local bodies provided a kind of
"neighborhood watch" program in local communities, particularly
poor urban barrios, which resulted in dramatically lower crime
rates as a consequence of day-and-night watches against invasion
or other domestic counterrevolutionary activity.14 Post-revolution-
ary pride, fostered by participation in the Committees, led the
260. DENNIS GILBERT, SANDINISTAS: THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTION 64 (1988). I include
the popular militia (Milicias Populares Sandinistas) among the mass organizations both
because of its size and because of the socializing influence of participation in the organiza-
tion, even if it was to be mobilized only in the case of national emergency. See COUNTRY
STUDY, supra note 24, at 148-49. The use of mass organizations, including the use of neigh-
borhood committees and women's organizations, was also a feature of the first decade of the
Cuban Revolution. Brady, supra note 259, at 248, 261.
261. GILBERT, supra note 260, at 64.
262. COUNTRY GUIDE, supra note 8, at 60.
263. The drop in crime over the period mentioned has been noted in a number of
sources. See generally COMISI6N NACIONAL DE PROMocI6N Y PROTECCI6N DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS (CNPPDH), INVESTIGACI6N ACERCA DEL DERECHO A LA DEFENsA EN MATERIA PENAL
EN NICARAGUA 6 (1989) [hereinafter DERECHO A LA DEFENSA]; Nbfiez, supra note 225, at 12-
14; Stephens, Rape in Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 80. But see COUNTRY STUDY, supra note
24, at 224 (indicates that crime rates went up due to general availability of arms to popular
militia).
Tomfis Borge, then Minister of the Interior and thus directly in charge of police opera-
tions, said in a speech in 1984 that crime rates had dropped in the relevant time period due
to increased police efficiency and the flexibility provided by the ability of police judges to
impose short sentences for minor crimes. Borge, supra note 227, at 264, 267-68 (1985); see
also Tomis Borge, The Organized People Are the Backbone of the Sandinista Police, in
SPEECHES, supra note 227, at 375, 377.
Crime rates turned upward in 1984 and continued to rise through 1988. Derecho a la
Defensa, supra at 6.
264. A case study of the CDSs in Matagalpa's Barrio Sandino, notes that crime virtu-
ally disappeared as a by-product of night watches conducted as counterrevolutionary vigi-
lance. GILBERT, supra note 260, at 67.
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populace to believe that better times were at hand; there was no
need to commit crime when all needs would be provided for
through the revolution. 6 5
The CDSs began to lose favor with the populace, however,
when they took on a more formal structure and became a measure
of party loyalty and advancement. When the Committees became a
means for enforcement of the military draft and took on exten-
sively reporting any dissident activities, however innocent, they fell
from popular favor s66 and by 1987, the Sandinista Defense commit-
tees "had virtually ground to a halt in many neighborhoods.
's6 7
The women's movement in Nicaragua has not suffered a simi-
lar fate. Prior to the overthrow of the Somoza government, over
ninety percent of rural women were illiterate, and only twenty per-
cent of teenage girls attended school.2 8 Women took up the chal-
lenge of the revolution, were active in guerrilla fighting during the
insurrections of 1977-79, and actively took up the challenge of full
and equal participation in the new society, challenging traditional
macho values.
Now, women comprise forty-five percent of all people in the
work force,26 9 and, particularly due to the increased burden of the
war during 1983-1985, women stepped into "male" jobs in govern-
ment, political parties, and the countryside.2 70 By 1987, women
held thirty-one percent of all managerial positions in government,
and within the FSLN, women constituted twenty-five percent of
the membership and held twenty-seven percent of the leadership
positions.2 71 Women make up thirty-five percent of the year-round
salaried agricultural work force, about half of the seasonal workers,
and forty-four percent of the cooperative movement.
7 2
Revolutionary women took up the challenge of criminal law
265. Vilma N0fiez de Escorcia, a member of the Supreme Court and later director of
the government's human rights office, attributed the drop in crime rates after the revolution
to economic, ideological, and institutional factors. Nifiez de Escorcia, supra note 225, at 13-
25. Similar views were expressed by Beth Stephens, a U.S. lawyer who worked at the human
rights commission's offices for several years after the revolution. Interview with Beth Ste-
phens, in Managua (July 29, 1988).
266. GILBERT, supra note 260, at 70-71.
267. COUNTRY GUIDE, supra note 8, at 59.
268. Stephens, Rape in Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 70.
269. COUNTRY GUIDE, supra note 8, at 81.
270. Stephens, Rape in Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 73.
271. Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women's Voices and Stories in the 1987
Nicaraguan Constitution, 70 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990).
272. COUNTRY GUIDE, supra note 8, at 81.
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reform immediately after the revolution.2 73 AMNLAE, the Na-
tional Women's Association, grew out of a former organization set
up to oppose the dictatorship and was named for the first woman
to die in opposition to Somoza.274 Shortly after its founding, AM-
NLAE created a Women's Legal Office, which was set up explicitly
to handle women's legal problems; in the criminal area these were
mostly focused on problems of domestic abuse (maltrato), rape
and other sexual crimes against women, as well as abortion, the
performance of which continues to carry heavy penalties for both
the woman who undergoes it and the performing physician.
Through aggressive education campaigns, frequent meetings
and an active role in political life, the Association and other femi-
nist organizations have helped to increase the reporting of rape.
AMNLAE also profoundly affected debate on the 1987 Constitu-
tion on issues of sexual equality, personal violence, prostitution,
use of women's images in the media and reproductive freedom.276
Ironically, the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro itself is
an indication of the continuing impact of women in the Nicara-
guan revolution. The revolutionary involvement of women in the
politics of Nicaragua continues.
2. The Legal Profession and Popular Education in the Law
Schools
In the first years after the revolution, as in revolutionary socie-
273. Positions supporting the role of women in the revolution, sexual equality, and
women's rights, can be found in platforms of the FSLN before the assumption of power in
1979. See Morgan, supra note 271, at 11, 49 n.196.
274. Id. at 12.
275. The provisions on criminalization of abortion are contained in C6D. PEN. arts. 162-
165. No person I interviewed could recall a prosecution for violation of the abortion laws,
and many women told me they "knew someone" on whom an illegal abortion had been
performed. One reason for the lack of prosecution may have been a female national police
chief. Comandante Doris Tijerino, who now serves as Executive Director of AMNLAE, was
quoted in Barricada as proclaiming, "I am for abortion, not only as a woman but also as a
police officer." See Morgan, supra note 271, at 53 n.215.
Since the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the AMNLAE budget allocation
from the government has been severely cut, leaving its focus primarily on the legal office in
Managua. In addition to the AMNLAE legal office, several women's support centers now
operate on an autonomous basis in the larger cities throughout Nicaragua. In addition to
free legal services, the centers offer counseling and gynecological services, as well as training
courses. Interview with Silvia Carrazco, former Staff Member of AMNLAE and Vice-Presi-
dent of the Board of Directors of Casa de la Mujer, in Managua (June 6, 1990).
276. Morgan, supra note 271, at 44-65.
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ties before it, Nicaraguans put little faith in law and legal institu-
tions."" Many judges who had been part of the Somoza regime
were either arrested and tried for their complicity in revolutionary
repression, or fled the country in order to protect property or per-
son."' Many lawyers who were part of the pre-revolutionary bour-
geois, particularly those in law firms, also fled the country, leaving
the new legal profession young, inexperienced, largely a product of
the working class, and almost all sole practitioners.2 9 Lawyers who
continued to practice were not highly regarded by the revolution;
they were criticized as "mercenary," applying rules only "to fur-
ther the interests of their clients at the expense of society."" One
report by an international lawyer's human rights organization
noted that these pressures, combined with attacks by the judiciary
on vigorous representation of unpopular causes, led to the with-
drawal from practice by even more lawyers.
28 1
The organized bar, never a particularly strong institution in
Latin America, quickly divided itself along ideological lines. Those
who supported the Sandinistas joined the Association of Demo-
cratic Jurists (Asociaci6n de Juristas Democrdticas) while those
who aligned themselves with the opposition stayed with the tradi-
277. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
278. One of the most unique experiences I had in all my visits to Nicaragua was at the
Granja Abierta, or open prison farm, known as "Twenty-Three and a Half" (named for its
distance, in kilometers, from Managua). On that occasion, the Dean of the Law School at
the Central American University arranged, during a tour of the facility, for a few of us to
meet Ricardo Vargas, a lawyer and prisoner there. Mr. Vargas, who had been a classmate of
the Dean's in law school, had practiced as a criminal lawyer before the revolution, and had
served as a member of General Somoza's Council of War during the years just prior to the
revolutionary victory. Vargas had been captured and sentenced, at an age over 50, to the
maximum term of 30 years imprisonment. He had served something over five years at the
time of our visit. After engaging us in polite conversation for some time about favorable
conditions in the prison facility, Mr. Vargas closed the interview by turning to the Dean and
saying, "You always taught, in your classes, that lawyers have an obligation to know the
difference between law and justice. You chose justice; I chose the law." To the students who
were part of the group, he advised, "You've memorized the criminal code so that you now
have it imprinted on your minds. Now, hold it next to your hearts and remember to admin-
ister it with conscience." Interview with Ricardo Vargas, prison inmate, Granja Abierta
Veintitres, Nicaragua (Aug. 15, 1986).
279. 1980 ICJ REPORT, supra note 192, at 38-39; Nfifiez, supra note 225, at 6-7.
280. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 140. Borge, in his 1984 speech, asserted
that one of the goals of the revolution was "to do away with those lawyers, fortunately less
numerous each day, who were trained to exploit the unwary and to share the gains of rob-
bers and thieves who were inevitably found not guilty .... " Borge, supra note 227, at 267.
It is not coincidental that there is very little in the post-revolutionary literature, despite
its extensive treatment of the bourgeoisie and popular education, on lawyers or legal educa-
tion. Both were, for the most part, irrelevant to revolutionary change.
281. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 141.
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tional Bar Association (Barra de Abogados).8 2 The state, however,
did not intervene in the organization of the bar through organiza-
tion into colleges, the establishment of fixed fees for certain recipi-
ents of legal services, and the abolition of the private practice of
law, as it has in other socialist regimes.283 The failure of the
Sandinistas to take this action can be seen either as a conscious
decision to ignore a profession already broken by revolution, or as
another of the choices made by default through focus on other rev-
olutionary priorities.
Law schools went through a period of post-revolutionary schiz-
ophrenia. While the revolution made possible broader access to le-
gal education, through a revolutionary philosophy of government
subsidization of tuition for higher education, enrollments declined
from the general loss of interest in legal careers.2 18 Thus, although
law was more available for study by a wider segment of the popula-
tion, fewer students made it their first choice. 85
Nicaragua's two law schools, the Central American University
(UCA) and the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
(UNAN), choose their student bodies based on geographic proxim-
ity to the cities of Managua and Le6n, respectively. '86 Under new
direction, the law schools added new courses to the curriculum
with such titles as "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" and
"History of the Sandinista Popular Revolution." '87 Students in the
law schools, most of whom were women because of the demand for
men in the military, performed mandatory social service of 200
hours per year, beginning in the first year of enrollment. During
the first two years of law school, students performed social service
through physical labor, oftentimes helping with the coffee or cot-
ton harvest, while in the last three years, service was likely to take
the form of internship in a government office. 88
282. Id.
283. Jean C. Love, Comment, The Role of Defense Counsel in Soviet Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 807, 812-20 (1968); Salas, supra note 19, at 52.
284. See generally Deborah Barndt, Popular Education, in NICARAGUA: THE FIRST FIVE
YEARS 317 (1985).
285. The Dean of the UNAN Law School told me that the law school seriously consid-
ered closing its doors when enrollments fell to about 25-30 new students per year during the
first few years after 1979, as opposed to pre-revolutionary applications of nearly 200. Inter-




288. Interview with Elizabeth Manich-Campos, Fourth Year Law Student, UCA Law
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In 1988, the UNAN created a course of study entitled "En-
counters" (Encuentros) in order to attract larger enrollments and
to augment the professional training available to people already
employed in the understaffed and inexperienced justice system.
Students attended classes all day on Saturdays for a period of two
years, and were likely to include high numbers of judges, prosecu-
tors, police, and even political figures. After finishing course re-
quirements, the student wrote a "monograph" in place of the more
rigorous and traditional thesis, and was licensed to practice upon
its successful completion and defense.""
Compared to the profound impact of the revolution in the en-
couragement and underwriting of mass organizations, their support
for popular education produced no fundamental changes in legal
education during the decade after 1979. The courses and structure
of legal education did not change. Law schools followed the classi-
cal Latin American model of a highly structured curriculum based
in a five-year course of study pursued by largely part-time students
and taught by largely part-time faculty in lecture format, without
texts.29 While a mandatory clinical component was included in the
last two years, the content of the program did not differ much
from what had been required before the new government assumed
power, and also reflected the traditional structure of such clinics in
Latin American legal education.29
School, in Managua, Nicaragua (July 29, 1988). In later years, the requirement of physical
labor had been replaced almost totally by office work. Interview with Victor Ord6flez, Vice-
Dean, UCA Law School, in Managua, Nicaragua (June 6, 1990).
289. Interview with Dean Valladares, in Le6n, Nicaragua (Aug. 25, 1988). Many other
lawyers with whom I subsequently spoke were highly critical of this course of study, sug-
gesting that it would lower the level of professionalism of the Bar and lead to lower quality
legal work.
290. Walter Antill6n, a law professor in neighboring Costa Rica, spent several years in
Nicaragua, and was one of the principal draftspersons of the Pilot Project Code of Criminal
Procedure which was "tabled" in 1984. See infra part IV.D. Professor Antill6n asserted that
he and a number of other young Marxist professors had suggested reform efforts for the
curriculum at the UCA Law School, but had been soundly rebuffed by the older, pre-revolu-
tionary faculty there. Interview with Walter Antill6n, Law Professor, in San Jos6, Costa
Rica (Sept. 1, 1988). For a general analysis of legal education in Latin America, see Richard
J. Wilson, The New Legal Education in North and South America, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 375,
379-85 (1989).
291. The curriculum of the UCA can be found in Facultad de Cibncias Juridicas y
Sociales, Universidad Centroamericana (1990). The course of study at the UNAN is found
in Plan de Estudios "87," Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Nicaragua, Facultad de
Citncias Juridicas y Sociales (received from Dean Valladares Aug. 25, 1988). Legal services
to the poor in Nicaragua, just as in all of the neighboring countries of Central America, are
provided almost exclusively by law students working through the law schools' legal clinics
(bufetes populares). In theory, any lawyer can be named as counsel for the accused, if that
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3. State Security and the Military Courts
Under the reorganization of state functions, there were close
relationships between the military and newly formed civilian police
forces, which primarily included the Sandinista Police' (Policia
Sandinista) and the department of State Security (Direccibn Gen-
eral de Seguridad del Estado, or "DGSE"). Functions of the
DGSE included intelligence, counterintelligence, immigration con-
trol, prisons, discipline within the armed services, special forces,
and political direction. '92 Both police forces were under the juris-
diction of the Ministry of the Interior.293 Prosecutions for viola-
tions of military law or by employees of the Ministry of the Inte-
rior are handled by military courts under the direction of the
Military Auditor.294
The national policy toward issues of internal security was
driven by the reality of war, espionage, and subversion by U.S.
agents,i95 as well as by a desire to consolidate the gains from
armed struggle. As in all contemporary societies, counterespionage,
counterintelligence, and other activities on behalf of national se-
curity required secrecy and discretion on the part of the Ministry
of Interior, particularly as the contra war intensified. Secrecy, on
the other hand, prompted international human rights organiza-
tions to question many DGSE policies. Secrecy by police agencies
person makes a request. NICAR. CONST. art. 34(5). In fact, students fill that role almost ex-
clusively, and then only in the geographic areas around the two cities with law schools. The
same is true generally in Latin America. See Fernando Rojas, A Comparison of Change-
Oriented Legal Services in Latin America with Legal Services in North America and Eu-
rope, 16 INT'L J. Soc. L. 203 (1988).
292. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 24, at 226.
293. General organization of the Ministry of the Interior is set forth in the Organic Law
of the Ministry of the Interior, found at DECRETos-LEYES, vol. III, Decree No. 485, at 38.
The more general structure of military and police is set forth in Stephen M. Gorman &
Thomas W. Walker, The Armed Forces, in NICARAGUA: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 91, 96-102
(1985).
Some sources report the existence of a corps of "Auxiliary Police," said to number
about 2,000 in 1981, who assisted the Policia Sandinista in law enforcement activities.
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 24, at 226. Tomis Borge, the former Interior Minister, put the
number at 8,000 in a 1984 speech. Tomks Borge, The Organized People Are the Backbone.
of the Sandinista Police, in NICARAGUA: THE SANDINISTA PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION 375, 377
(1985).
294. Organization of the military courts is extensively set forth in DECRETOS-LEYES,
vol. III, Decree No. 591, at 225.
295. Such activities are well documented in the CIA's manual of operations for Nicara-
gua. CIA's NICARAGUA MANUAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE (1985).
They are also condemned in the decision of the World Court in 1986. See supra note 3.
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had serious impact on the conduct of investigations of criminal ac-
tivity by members of the military, as well as private citizens.
The most serious failures of due process in post-revolutionary
Nicaragua occurred during investigations conducted by the DGSE
during the next decade, all in the name of national security. Inter-
national human rights organizations persistently documented
DGSE arrests followed by prolonged detention in severe conditions
and without charges, as well as harsh interrogation techniques.296
The DGSE consistently refused access of human rights organiza-
tions to some of the detention facilities reputed to be most often
used for these activities.297 From 1987 to 1989, Americas Watch
documented what it described as a "pattern of killings" of contras
and contra supporters in northern Nicaragua by military and
DGSE personnel.9 8
What is most notable about these violations, however, is not
their occurrence; physical aggression against real and perceived po-
litical opponents is, regrettably, common practice not only
throughout Central America, but in the United States.99 What is
most noteworthy is the response by the mechanisms of state power
to abuses by its own forces. The Nicaraguan government, unlike
some of its neighbors, showed a consistent record of prosecutions
and convictions of its own police and military wrongdoers through
296. AMERICAS WATCH, ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 15-16 (May 1982) [hereinafter
1982 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT]; AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 27-29
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT]; REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14,
at 119-23; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NICARAGUA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 19-23 (March
1986) [hereinafter 1986 AMNESTY REPORT]; AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA:
1985-1986 21-45 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT]; 1986-1989 AMNESTY
REPORT, supra note 252, at 34-37 (this report also raised questions as to three deaths of
prisoners in custody, at 39-41); AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA: AUGUST
1987 TO AUGUST 1988 50-56 (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter 1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT].
297. See, e.g., 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 252, at 37-39; 1987-1988 AMERI-
CAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 57-60.
298. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, THE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN NICARAGUA (Oct.
1989). The report also documented and condemned reports of killings by contra forces in
the same region. Id. at 51.
299. During the Viet-Nam era in the United States, student protests resulted in police
or military shootings on the campuses of Kent State University in Ohio and Jackson State
University in Mississippi. In a demonstration on May Day 1971 in Washington, D.C., 12,000
demonstrators were met by 5,000 police and 10,000 soldiers. Over 7,000 people were arrested
in huge sweeps, and detention facilities were crowded and unsanitary. Of the more than
12,000 people ultimately arrested that day, fewer than 100 were convicted of any offense.
The FBI engaged in a covert program, called COINTELPRO, to undermine, harass, and
ultimately assassinate leaders and members of the Black Panther Party. LINFIELD, supra
note 248, at 113-56.
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the Military Auditor's office."'
There have been numerous trials and convictions of military
personnel by the Military Auditor's office in the past several years.
One of the most publicized involved military abuses of suspected
contra sympathizers in the area of Pantasma in 1984. That investi-
gation and prosecution led to the conviction of a regional army
commander for murder and torture, as well as that of twelve sub-
ordinates."0 ' In the case of the 1989 killings in northern Nicaragua,
Americas Watch noted that, although belatedly, the government
had responded "vigorously, launching a number of investigi-
tions."3 °2 As of August 30, 1988, there were 294 ex-military person-
nel and 150 military or police related offenders in Nicaragua's
prisons.30 3
These trials of military and security officers may not seem un-
usual to readers in the United States accustomed to a military jus-
tice system known for its rigor, structure, and discipline. In Cen-
tral America, however, the prosecution of military personnel is
nearly unknown. In El Salvador, for example, there has been only
one successful prosecutions of military officers for criminal offenses
committed in the course of duty. While the suspected involvement
of the armed forces in the murder of four U.S. nuns in 1980 has
remained unpunished, two Salvadoran officers were recently con-
300. Despite the intense, almost microscopic attention given by human rights monitor-
ing groups over the last decade, it is noteworthy that neither the Military Auditor's office
itself nor the procedures established for operation of the military courts have come under
serious criticism by human rights organizations over the last decade. Office organization and
procedures are set forth in DECRETOs-LEYES, vol. III, Decree No. 591, at 225. A study-con-
ducted by three recent graduates of the UCA Law School in Managua examined nearly 200
files of cases handled by the Military Auditor during 1987 for compliance with the due pro-
cess provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The authors conclude, based in empirical data, that
deviations from constitutional norms are "extremely minimal." Gilberto R. Cuadra, Martin
A. Arcia & Jos6 D. Cano, Vigencia de las Guarantias Procesales Constitucionales en el
Proceso Penal Militar 60 (thesis for graduation from the Central American University Law
School, submitted Oct. 28, 1989; on file with the author).
One criticism voiced about the military courts after the February 1990 elections is that
its jurisdiction is too extensive, since it includes jurisdiction over civilians who may be in-
volved in criminal activity where either a co-defendant or the victim is a serviceperson.
Interview with Lino Hern~ndez, Director of the National Commission on Human Rights
(CNDH), in Managua, Nicaragua (June 7, 1990). This is not borne out by statistics. The
study above indicates that in a sample of 178 cases studied during the calendar year 1987,
there were 219 accused, of whom only 24, just over 10%, were civilians. Cuadra, supra at 60.
301. 1986 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 296, at 25.
302. AMERICAS WATCH, THE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN NICARAGUA 2 (Oct. 1989).
303. Comisi6n Nacional para la Protecci6n y Promoci6n de Derechos Humanos
(CNPPDH), Poblaci6n Penal Nacional (Aug. 30, 1988) (copy with author); interview with
Mirna Santiago, Staff Member of CNPPDH, in Managua, Nicaragua (Sept. 9, 1988).
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victed for the execution of six Jesuit priests, their cook, and her
daughter at the Central American University of San Salvador. '0 In
Guatemala, a recent report by the International Human Rights
Law Group concluded that military control of the civilian govern-
ment left open the question of the establishment of the rule of law
and respect for human rights in the civilian criminal justice
system.305
Finally, the actions of the military and state security person-
nel are as notable for the absence of certain abuses as they are for
the reported wrongdoing. In its 1985 report on Nicaragua, Ameri-
cas Watch concluded that:
there is no systematic practice of forced disappearances, extraju-
dicial killings or torture-as has been the case with the
"friendly" armed forces of El Salvador .... Nor has the Gov-
ernment practiced elimination of cultural or ethnic groups, as
the Administration frequently claims; indeed in this respect, as
in most others, Nicaragua's record is by no means as bad as that
of Guatemala, whose government the [U.S.] Administration con-
sistently defends.306
D. An Abandoned Attempt at Comprehensive Reform of
Criminal Procedure: The Region IV Pilot Plan of 1984
In 1984, the government proposed and adopted legislation
which approved the concept of the creation of an experimental Pi-
lot Project in the Fourth Region (Masaya-Granada). s°7 The gene-
sis of this decree was a desire to provide for popular participation
in the administration of justice, and to eliminate old "formalistic
304. Clifford Krauss, Salvadoran Defense Chief Linked to Jesuit Killings by House
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991, sec. 1, pt. 1; Shirley Christian, Colonel Guilty in Jesuit
Deaths in El Salvador, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at Al; Majorie Miller, 2 Salvadoran
Officers Get 30 Years for Slaying Priests, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, at Al. See also AMERI-
CAS WATCH, CARNAGE AGAIN: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY
BOTH SIDES IN THE NOVEMBER 1989 OFFENSIVE IN EL SALVADOR 14-19 (Nov. 24, 1989).
305. KENNETH ANDERSON, MAXIMIZING DENIABILITY: THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA (a report of the International Human Rights Law Group, July 1989);
see also WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INJUSTICE: MILI-
TARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN GUATEMALA (Dec. 1989). As in El Salvador, the U.S. administration
cut off $3.3 million in military aid when the Guatemalan government dragged its feet in the
investigation of the murder of Michael DeVine, a U.S. citizen whose death suggests military
involvement. Clifford Krauss, American's Killing in Guatemala Hurts Drug Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at A7.
306. REAGAN, RHETORIC AND REALITY, supra note 257, at 3-4.
307. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. X, Decree No. 1441, at 149.
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and slow" procedures with a "more agile and flexible justice. ' 308
The principal features of the new system were four: (1) the
creation, in Zone IV, of Zone Courts (Tribunales Zonales) in each
of six cities, composed of one professional judge and two lay
judges, and a Regional Court (Tribunal Regional) in Masaya with
two professional judges and one lay judge to review the decisions of
the Zone Courts, all judicial personnel to be named by the Su-
preme Court; (2) jurisdiction by these new courts to hear all crimi-
nal matters, as well as labor and worker's compensation disputes;
(3) the creation of a Judicial and Legal Coordination Center, whose
functions were to be the recommendation of slates of candidates
for judgeships to the Supreme Court, the recommendation of re-
moval of judges to the Supreme Court, if necessary, and the recom-
mendation to the government of new courts, if necessary; and (4) a
new.code of procedure for the operation of the Pilot Plan.309
The adoption of this legislation was followed, in 1986, with a
completely redrafted code of criminal procedure for the Pilot Pro-
ject.310 This code was to have been the product of a commission
made up of representatives of the National Assembly (the national
legislature after electoral reform in 1984), and the Ministries of
Justice and the Interior, and had been highly touted by Magistrate
Serrano as part of his package of proposed reforms.11
The one international human rights organization to make note
of the proposal was more skeptical." 2 Principal criticisms focused
on the similarity of the mechanisms and procedures of the pro-
posed courts to the Popular Antisomocista Tribunals (TPAs),
which were then under strong criticism.3 1 3 Another line of criticism
came from within the Nicaraguan bar and from foreign observers,
308. Id. pmbl., arts. III, IV.
309. Id. passim.
310. Anteproyecto de C6digo de Procedimientos Penales para el Plan Piloto de Trans-
formaci6n Judicial (undated; received Jan. 1987; on file with author).
311. See Serrano, supra note 36, at 370-71, 387; DERECHO EN LA REVOLUCI6N, supra
note 243, at 63-64.
312. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 87-94.
313. Id. The TPAs, founded in 1983, were still in full swing at the time of the wider
proposed reform. DECRETOS-LEEs, vol. VIII, Decree No. 1233, at 110. See also Steinberg,
supra note 14. Further discussion of the TPAs can be found infra note 359-66 and accompa-
nying text. The Lawyers Committee also seemed to take a very dim view of the fact that the
drafting committee had examined procedures used in Eastern Bloc countries before begin-
ning work on the reformed code. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 87-88. All of my
interviewed sources, and Serrano himself, indicate that the new code's inspirations were
primarily German and Italian procedure. Serrano, supra note 36, at 371.
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such as the Argentine law professor, Julio Maier, whose country
was also drafting reform legislation in this area at the time 4.3 1 The
focus of these criticisms was on technical drafting flaws and diffi-
culties in the operation of the proposed code.
The code was never adopted and the Pilot Plan never came
into operation. By the end of 1987, the plan had been effectively
abandoned without further action. The primary author of the pro-
posed code, Professor Walter Antill6n of the University of Costa
Rica Law School, suggested that the plan died because of the loss
of support from its backers on the Supreme Court, a group of pro-
gressive judges who left for other posts in mid-1984.,15 Others sug-
gested bad drafting, bad timing, bad international image in the
wake of the criticisms of the TPA's, or lack of adequate resources
due to the increased war effort. The latter was the most often men-
tioned, but the cumulative effect of all of these factors no doubt
contributed in some measure.
The defeat of the code also was a defeat for both the Borge
and the Serrano visions of revolutionary justice.31 6 For the Borge
forces, the revised code incorporated a central notion of lay partici-
pation and informal structures, .a strong step away from lawyers
and legalism and toward more informal interpretation of facts and
law. For the followers of Serrano, the move toward codification of
the new revolutionary order was dealt a serious setback.
E. The Constitution of 1987: An Integrated Structure and
Aggravated Conflicts with the Code of Criminal Procedure
If the Pilot Plan was a defeat for Serrano, the judicial articles
of the new Constitution were his most significant (and surely more
lasting) success. Virtually all of the reforms proposed by the Su-
preme Court, under his leadership, were adopted as part of the ju-
314. Interview with Victor Ord6fiez, Vice-Dean of the Central American Law School, in
Managua, Nicaragua (July 27, 1988); Julio Maier, Andlisis del Proyecto de C6digo de
Procedimientos Penales para el Plan Piloto a Llevarse a Cabo en la Cuarta Regi6n de la
Rep blica de Nicaragua (San Jos6, Costa Rica 1986)(unpublished manuscript on file with
ILANUD and the author). Maier's revision to the Argentine code of criminal procedure is
discussed infra note 467 and accompanying text.
315. Interview with Walter Antill6n, Professor at the Law School of the University of
Costa Rica, in San Jos6, Costa Rica (Sept. 1, 1988). This view is shared by Vilma N(ifiez,
who had been on the Supreme Court at the time the draft was written, and had been sup-
portive of the new direction taken in the code, but lost support from some potential allies.
Interview with Vilma N(ifiez, Director of CNPPDH, in Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 8, 1988).
316. See supra notes 226-46 and accompanying text.
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dicial articles in the national charter.1 17 Its adoption in January of
1987 signaled the institutionalization of important norms of state
organization, protection of individual rights in the criminal pro-
cess, and reeducative objectives in penology.
The document divides the structure of government into four
branches: Executive (President), Legislative (a unicameral Na-
tional Assembly), Judicial, and Electoral." ' The document, taken
as a whole, reflects a tendency found in most Latin American con-
stitutions to focus power in the Executive branch.3 19 For the Ser-
rano forces, however, the new charter featured several concepts
said to advance the adoption of the rule of law: judicial supremacy
through review for unconstitutionality;s2° powers of the courts to
issue writs of habeas corpus and amparo;21 the establishment of
317. There are several English translations available of the 1987 Nicaraguan Constitu-
tion. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds.,
1987); Audrey H. Baker, Recent Developments, Political Constitution of the Republic of
Nicaragua, 28 HARV. INT'L L. J. 547 (1987); Serrano, supra note 36, at 469. Extensive aca-
demic analyses of the document were written during and after its adoption. See THE NICA-
RAGUAN CONSTITUTION OF 1987: ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (Kenneth J. Mijeski
ed., 1991); Christopher P. Barton, The Paradox of a Revolutionary Constitution: A Reading
of the Nicaraguan Constitution, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 49 (1988); Jules Lobel,
The Meanihg of Democracy: Representative and Participatory Democracy in the New Nic-
araguan Constitution, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 823 (1988); Morgan, supra note 271, at 1; The
New Constitution-Revolutionary Realism, 6 ENVio 3 (1987); New Nicaraguan Constitu-
tion: Parliamentary Debate Broadens Civil Liberties, 5 UPDATE, No. 39 (Central American
Historical Institute, Oct. 27, 1986); Andrew Reding, "By the People": Constitution Making
in Nicaragua, CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 434 (Dec. 8, 1986); Andrew Reding, Nicaragua's New
Constitution, 4 WORLD POL'Y J. 257 (1987); Towards a New Constitution, 4 ENVIO lb (1985);
Richard J. Wilson, Testing a New Constitution, 16 HUM. RTS. 44 (1989). The reaction of the
U.S. government to adoption of a new Nicaraguan charter was predictably negative. Elliot
Abrams, A Constitution Bows to Repression, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1987, § 2.
318. NICAR. CONST. tit. VIII.
319. Barton, supra note 317, at 66. See generally Scott B. MacDonald, Latin America,
in LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 189-218 (Alan M. Katz
ed., 1986).
320. Judicial supremacy is explicitly provided for in NICAR. CONST. art. 167: "Authori-
ties of the state, organizations and affected legal institutions and individuals must comply
with the verdicts and resolutions of the Courts and Judges." One puzzling aspect of the new
constitution is the potential conflict of this power with that vested in the Assembly to "offi-
cially interpret the law." Id. art. 138(2). Given the penchant of the Constitution toward
concentration of power in the executive branch, the vesting of the Assembly with this power
is somewhat odd.
321. The right of citizens to seek amparo or habeas corpus for violation of constitu-
tional rights, or where such rights are in danger of violation, is found in article 45. The
judicial articles are in NiCAR. CONST. arts. 164(4), 187 (providing for right of any citizen to
challenge unconstitutionality of any law, and providing review for unconstitutionality); id.
art. 189 (habeas corpus); id. art. 188 (recourse of amparo). Each of these remedies is dis-
cussed infra notes 406-16 and accompanying text.
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unitary jurisdiction;322 and the guarantee of popular participation
in the judicial process.323
The crown jewel of the accomplishments of those who favored
the concept of the revolutionary rule of law, however, was the cen-
trality of the doctrine of separation of powers. Serrano invoked the
classical theories of Locke and Montesquieu to mount his argu-
ments that separation of power, with its tendencies to provide
checks and balances between competing branches and to limit the
ability of the majority to impose its will on the minority, should
govern the structure of government in Nicaragua. These theories
have been in existence in the constitutions of most of the Western
world since the French Revolution.2 4
The concept of separation of powers fought with a competing
vision of governmental organization which could have provided a
constitutional model. The socialist vision of the organization of
state power calls for the rejection of the doctrine of separation of
powers exactly because of its tendency to thwart the will of the
majority. Socialism instead opted for the principle of unitary
power, found as a central component in the constitutions of the
socialist sphere.32 5
322. NICAR. CONST. art. 159. One of the transition articles to the charter, however, pro-
vides that special courts may continue to function "until such time as they come under the
jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch." Id. art. 199. All of the existing special courts were abol-
ished before the Sandinistas left office in 1990, and at present, none operate.
323. NICAR. CONST. art. 166. Again, the transition articles permit the courts to operate
in current form, "until a system of popular representation is established." Id. art. 199. At
present, the abolition of jury trials has left Nicaragua with no popular participation. See
infra notes 444-47 and accompanying text.
324. Serrano, supra note 36, at 432-36. The constitutions of Latin America reflect a
pattern of rigid separation of powers. Richard J. Wilson, The Constitution and Crime in the
New Nicaragua, in THE NICARAGUAN CONSTITUTION OF 1987: ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND
COMMENTARY 219, 222-23 (Kenneth J. Mijeski ed., 1991). Jules Lobel notes that these same
theories found their strongest expression in the U.S. Constitution through the views of
Madison. Lobel, supra note 317, at 829. See also JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3.5 (1986). Christopher Barton, on the other hand, notes that the strict separation of
powers in the Nicaraguan Constitution is tempered by the requirement, that the branches
"coordinate harmoniously." NIcAR. CONST. art. 129. He asserts that coordination "strength-
ens the control of the political party in power and inhibits internal government dissent,"
and notes that there is no suggestion as to how coordination is to take place. Barton, supra
note 317, at 65-66.
325. Lobel, supra note 317, at 835. The centrality of communist party power became
the animating focus of popular attack on the constitutional order of the countries of Eastern
Europe and Russia during the past year. A summary of the Gorbachev era in the Soviet
Union recounts "fierce objections of hard-liners" to action by the Central Committee to end
the guaranteed monopoly of power by the Communist Party. The Gorbachev Era up to
Now: Five Explosive Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at A16; see also Gorbachev Explains
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The new Constitution reiterated and expanded many of the
individual rights for the accused criminal which had been con-
tained in the Statute of Rights and Guarantees. All persons are
guaranteed the equal protection of the law, as well as due pro-
cess.32 6 There is protection against double jeopardy,2 7 provision for
speedy trial, 32 8 a right for accused persons to know the nature and
cause of the charges "in a language they understand, "3' 9 and pro-
tection against ex post facto laws.1
3 0
The rights to counsel and against self-incrimination are cen-
tral to the constitutional scheme of protection for the accused. The
charter guarantees a right to counsel "from the outset of the pro-
ceedings," 3 1 and guarantees the right to fully prepare a defense.
32
To achieve this end, it also guarantees free and private communi-
cation between lawyer and client, and the right to the appointment
of counsel upon request, regardless of means, with automatic ap-
pointment if counsel has not been named by the time of the first
hearing.3 3 3 A limited privilege against self-incrimination is pro-
vided for in testimonial contexts, but the same article elevates the
spousal privilege to a constitutional right and extends it to part-
ners "in a stable de facto union," as well as to family members
"within the fourth level of blood relations. '334
The Constitution makes explicit many due process rights in
the criminal process which are not found in the United States Con-
stitution, including the abolition of the death penalty33 and a cu-
mulative limit to incarceration of thirty years maximum. 336 Also
present are: a constitutional presumption of innocence, 337 the right
to present oneself before appropriate authorities within seventy-
two hours of detention, 3 8 the right to a pro se defense,339 the right
Proposed Union Pact to Party, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at All (proposed treaty on the
Soviet Union substitutes the word "sovereign" for the word "socialist" throughout).
326. NICAR. CONST. arts. 27, 33(1).
327. Id. art. 34(9).
328. Id. art. 34(2), (10).
329. Id. art. 33(2.1).
330. Id. art. 34(10).
331. Id. art. 34(4).
332. Id.
333. Id. art. 34(5).
334. Id. art. 34(7).
335. Id. art. 23.
336. Id. art. 37.
337. Id. art. 34(1).
338. Id. art. 33(2.2).
339. Id. art. 34(4).
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to assistance by an interpreter free of charge, 340 the right to appel-
late review of convictions,3 and the right to retroactive applica-
tion of the law when it favors the accused.342
The new Constitution thus provides a viable framework for
the protection of individual and collective rights in the criminal
process by refusing to adhere to a particular political regimen or
system. The document takes the most appropriate concepts from
various legal traditions and blends them into a structure for a
newly emerging society. The systematic elucidation of a new con-
stitution, however, outstripped the ability of antiquated codes,
even as amended, to maintain an integrated and consistent vision
of the goals of criminal justice. The statutory structures of courts
and police, as well as the code of criminal procedure itself, were all
to be affected by post-transition anomalies. This was aggravated
by the urgency of resolution of revolutionary crimes and the need
for national reconciliation and reconstruction, even in the face of
serious external hostility and the increasing tempo of the contra
war.
F. Major Post-Revolutionary Legal Reforms in Criminal
Justice
There have been significant post-revolutionary reforms of
criminal procedure and the judiciary in Nicaragua. These were
designed to remedy some of the greatest shortcomings of pre-revo-
lutionary procedures, and to consolidate revolutionary institutions.
While these reforms have further evolved over the post-revolution-
ary era, this and the following section will first discuss their status
before the national elections of February 1990.""3
1. Reorganization of the Judicial. Branch: Normal and Special
Criminal Courts
Under the 1987 Constitution, Magistrates of the Supreme
340. Id. art. 34(6).
341. Id. art. 34(9).
342. Id. art. 38.
343. All significant reform of criminal justice took place during the Sandinista regime.
There have been only a few reforms of structures for the administration of justice, and no
proposals for code reform in criminal law or procedure, since the election of Violeta Barrios
de Chamorro who took office in April of 1990. The few changes are discussed in the Conclu-
sion, infra note 489 and accompanying text.
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Court are chosen by the National Assembly from slates of three
proposed by the President.""4 The Court is to be composed of at
least seven members.34 5 The President of the Republic selects the
President of the Supreme Court,s34 the Supreme Court, in turn,
names all members of the Courts of Appeals and all trial judges.,
7
Courts of Appeal, with twenty-eight judges, are organized in
six numbered geographic Regions and in the North and South Au-
tonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast.348 Trial courts continue to
be divided into the traditional district courts and the local courts
which existed under the old Organic Law of 1879. The fifty district
judges hear matters for which the sentence is more than three
years and all offenses governed by expedited procedures under De-
cree No. 896. s41 The 150 local judges continue to hear correctional
344. NICAR. CONST. art. 138(7) (selection by the Assembly); id. art. 150(14) (nomination
by the President).
345. Id. art. 163.
346. Id.
347. Id. art. 164(5). There was considerable debate and confusion during my visits as to
the applicability, after the revolution, of the terms of office for all judges in the appellate
and trial courts. I have found no language in post-revolutionary decrees which suggests lim-
its other than the terms provided in the Ley de Tribunales. However, it was repeatedly
asserted to me by opponents of the government that the judges named by the Supreme
Court had exceeded the statutory term without any question as to their renomination or
approval. Decree No. 299 of February 3, 1989 permits the Supreme Court to create, elimi-
nate, or combine trial courts, and to name judges to them. The decree contains no language
as to the term of office for those judges. Decree No. 299, 23 LA GACETA (Feb. 3, 1989).
One appellate court judge in Esteli told me that she recalled receiving a memorandum
from the Supreme Court, shortly before my visit, advising judges that statutory terms were
no longer applicable and that nominations to judgeships were to be considered indefinite
and at pleasure of the Court. Interview with Blanca Sobeida Espinoza, President of the
Appellate Court for Region I, in Esteli, Nicaragua (Aug. 26, 1988).
348. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. VII, Decree No. 1153, at 150. In this decree, the Atlantic
Coast areas were referred to as "Special Zones." That terminology was abandoned with the
adoption of the Autonomy Law of 1987. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. XIV, Law No. 28, art. 6, at
200.
Figures on the number of appellate, district, and local judges come from the Adminis-
trative Secretariat of the Supreme Court, as reported in, Luis G. SOLIS AND RICHARD J. WIL-
SON, POLITICAL TRANSITION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NICARAGUA Table No.2, at
40 (Center for the Administration of Justice, Florida International University, Apr. 1991)
(monograph in the possession of the author).
349. Law No. 37, 79 LA GACETA art. 12 (Apr. 13, 1988). The data provided here on court
operation applies only to criminal jurisdiction. In the district courts, there are sometimes
separate judges for criminal and civil matters, and sometimes both are heard by the same
judge, depending on population in the area. There are also special labor courts in Managua
and Le6n which will not be discussed here.
Procedures under Decree No. 896 call for an expedited time table for disposition of the.
case. This process was used most prominently in prosecutions under the now-abrogated Law
for the Maintenance of Public Order. The law repealing the Public Order Law is Law No. 66
of 1989. Law No. 66, 244 LA GACETA (Dec. 26, 1989).
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offenses of less than three years and criminal faults with a maxi-
mum of six months imprisonment in summary trials, as well as in-
vestigations in district court trials, when delegated to them.
3 50
Under current law, district judges are required to be licensed law-
yers, while local judges may be any citizen, student, or person who
understands the area.
3 51
At present, there are no extraordinary or special courts for
criminal prosecutions in Nicaragua; all crimes are prosecuted
through the court system described above, using procedures under
the Code of Criminal Instruction, as amended. In the early years of
the revolution, however, the government struggled with the issue of
the treatment of prisoners captured during the popular insurrec-
tion, and later with the issue of criminal trials for contras and con-
tra supporters. The primary mechanisms created to deal with these
alleged offenders were the Special Tribunals and the Popular Anti-
Somocista Tribunals. Each was controversial, and their abolition
contributes to international respect for due process and the inde-
pendence and integrity of the Nicaraguan judicial system.
The Special Tribunals operated from December of 1979 until
their dissolution in February of 1981.52 They were created explic-
itly to bring criminal charges against members of the National
Guard and civilian sympathizers of the Somoza regime.353 All
charges were to be brought under the ordinary criminal statutes.35 '
The Tribunals came under almost immediate criticism in the inter-
national human rights community, primarily because their proce-
dures allegedly did not comport with due process by failing to per-
Under Decree No. 896, the process commences by denuncia from the prosecutor, to
which the accused may respond within two days. Proof is taken for the eight following days,
and sentence is passed within the following two days. DECRETOS - LEYES, vol. V, Decreto No.
896, at 248. Law No. 66 leaves in place all offenses prosecuted under these special proce-
dures except the Public Order Law. Law No. 66, supra art. 3. This refers to only a few
remaining offenses, such as extortion, fraud, or graft by a public official (Decree No. 922)
and customs fraud (Decree No. 942). See DECRgros-LEYEs, vol. VI, Decree No. 922 and
Decree No. 942, at 24, 49, respectively.
350. Law No. 37, 79 LA GACETA art. 12 (Apr. 13, 1988).
351. Decree No. 299, 23 LA GACETA (Feb. 3, 1989).
352. The Special Tribunals were created by Decree No. 185. DECRETOs-LEmEs, vol. I,
Decree No. 185, at 281. They were abolished by Decree No. 643. DECRETos-LEYES, vol. IV,
Decree No. 643, at 130.
353. The decree creating the tribunals uses language suggesting a lack of objectivity in
their creation. It calls for swift resolution of offenses committed by the "genocidal and ty-
rannical regime of the Somocista dynasty," all "for the benefit of the best popular inter-
ests." DECRETOs-LEYES, vol. IV, Decree No. 184, prologue, I, II.
354. Id. art. 1.
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mit review in the normal court system. Human rights groups
further voiced their disapproval because of the many untried
abuses committed by citizens after the fall of the Somoza govern-
ment and because trials under provisions of the new Law for the
Maintenance of Public Order, passed on the day after the govern-
ment took power, might lead to conviction for offenses involving
the free expression of ideas. 55
A report by Amnesty International found that the legislation
creating the Special Tribunals "provided the necessary guarantees
for a proper dispensation of justice."'13 " The Tribunals tried 6,310
defendants. Of those, 1,760 had their cases dismissed or were
pardoned. Of the remainder, 229 were acquitted and 4,331 received
prison sentences. By 1988, it was estimated that a special clemency
law enacted by the government had resulted in the release of ap-
proximately 2,500 of those convicted by the Tribunals. As a result
of the SapoA cease-fire agreement with the contras in March of
1988, 1,649 prisoners were released in early 1989, leaving only
thirty-nine particularly heinous offenders in custody as of that
time.35 Those thirty-nine individuals were released as part of a
more general amnesty in early 1990.358
The Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals (TPAs) were created
in April of 1983 and abolished in January 1988 as part of the peace
process. 59 The primary jurisdiction of these courts was the trial of
suspected contras and contra sympathizers. The primary criminal
statute under which they operated was the Law for the Mainte-
nance of Order and Public Security, itself abolished in 1989.310 Its
355. This critique comes from the first and most comprehensive study of the Tribunals,
though certainly not the only criticism. Amnesty International sent three missions to Nica-
ragua shortly after the new government took power. The Special Tribunals were the focus of
the Amnesty missions' report. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF THE AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL MISSIONS TO THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA 13-40 (Aug. 1979, Jan. 1980, and Aug. 1980)
[hereinafter MISSION TO NICARAGUA]. The new -government responded fully to the Amnesty
criticisms, to which Amnesty responded by expressing its appreciation for the cooperation.
Id. at 41-68, 70. See Law for the Maintenance of Public Order, DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. I,
Decree No. 5, at 11.
356. MISsIoN TO NICARAGUA, supra note 355, at 35.
357. 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 252, at 18-20.
358. Anne-Marie O'Connor, Nicaraguan Government Frees Political Prisoners, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 10, 1990, at 1E.
359. The TPAs were established in Decree No. 1233. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. VIII, De-
cree No. 1233, at 110. Their abolition is documented in 1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT,
supra note 296, at 65-68.
360. The Public Order Law is found at DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. VII, Decree No. 1074, at
11. It was abolished by Law No. 66 of 1989, 244 LA GACETA (Dec. 26, 1989).
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procedural mechanism was the expedited process adopted in 1981
under Decree No. 896.1e The TPAs came under intense scrutiny
when they became the venue for the trial of U.S. flyer Eugene
Hasenfus, who was captured and pardoned almost immediately af-
ter conviction. 62 Documents and other information from his cap-
ture led to revelations of extensive clandestine involvement in con-
tra funding and the Iran-Contra Congressional hearings and trials.
Criticism of the TPAs focused on their convocation under the
Public Order Law, which, because of vaguely defined provisions,
lent itself to conviction for vocal political opposition. This, com-
bined with the accelerated procedures of Decree No. 896, suggested
a risk to due process and to the ability to effectively defend against
charges.36 3 They also operated outside of the normal judicial sys-
tem, with no right to appeal to the normal courts. Of some concern
to later proposed reforms, these courts were also criticized for their
use of lay judges and for their adoption of the sana critica eviden-
tiary standard. 64 The use of lay judges was a key component of the
doomed Region III Pilot Program, and may have contributed to its
demise.36 The sana critica standard, despite its criticism, has now
been adopted for general use in criminal trials. 66
All prisoners tried under the Public Order Law have now been
released. In November of 1987, the government released 985 pris-
oners or persons awaiting trial as part of the Central American
peace process. 67 More than 1,500 additional prisoners were re-
leased in March of 1990, under a general law of amnesty adopted
in the name of national reconciliation.
36 8
In all, prosecutions under special tribunals constituted about
four percent of the average reported criminal activity between 1980
and 1988.369 The constitutional provision which permitted the con-
361. See supra note 349 (description of Decree No. 896).
362. Richard Halloran, American Is Captured After Plane Is Downed in Nicaraguan
Territory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1986, at Al; Stephan Kinzer, Nicaraguan Court Convicts
American Over Aid to Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1986, at Al; Stephan Kinzer, Hasenfus
Is Freed by Nicaraguans and Heads Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1986, at Al.
363. 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 252, at 20-24.
364. Id.
365. See supra Part IV.D.
366. See infra notes 389-97 and accompanying text (discussing the critique of the sana
critica standard).
367. 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 252, at 24.
368. Law No. 81, 53 LA GACETA (Mar. 15, 1990).
369. This figure is based on an average rate of 18,795 reported offenses during the pe-
riod from 1980 to 1988. See DERECHO A LA DEFENSA, supra note 263, at 6.
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tinuation of special courts strongly suggests that having been abol-
ished, no new special courts may be created constitutionally.
37 ° It
must therefore be assumed that these courts, arguably a product of
the necessities of war-time conditions, are a minor historical foot-
note in the administration of criminal justice in Nicaragua.
2. Initial Screening by Instructing Police Chiefs of Cases Involv-
ing Detained Defendants
Under current law, the initial determinations of charges in-
volving detained defendants are made by the Instructing Police
Chief, not the Instructing Judge, as called for in the original
scheme of the code of criminal procedure. '71 The office of In-
structing Police Chief has evolved, through several amendments,
from the pre-existing Police Regulations of 1880.372 During the
Sandinista government, Instructing Police Judges were selected by
the Minister of the Interior, and need not have been lawyers to
hold their positions, although there was a preference for lawyers or
law students.7 3
In all cases where the defendant is in custody, the Instructing
Police Chief is required to take action within six days.3 " The ac-
cused is entitled to representation by counsel during this time pe-
riod, but counsel may not seek any judicial remedy, nor "tend to
hinder the investigations. ' 375 At the close of this time period, the
370. NIcAR. CONST. art. 199 states, in part, "The Special Courts shall continue to func-
tion when this Constitution is put into effect, until such time as they come under the juris-
diction of the Judicial Branch." (emphasis added).
371. Law No. 65, 244 LA GACETA art. 3 (Dec. 26, 1989).
372. Id. Law No. 65 significantly amended the provisions for police judges passed dur-
ing the second year of the revolutionary government, which specifically acknowledged that
the police judges were to sentence under the provisions of the Police Regulations.
DECRETOs-LEYES, vol. IIIi Decree No. 559, art. 10(2), at 146.
373. The lines of review and qualifications for police judges are taken from
DECRETOs-LEYEs, vol. III, Decree No. 559, arts. 4-5.
374. Critics argue that this time period, which actually can be extended by two days
when additional review of charges is undertaken by the prosecutor, violates the constitu-
tional requirement that the defendant be brought before a judge within 72 hours of deten-
tion. NICAR. CONST. art. 33(2.2). Interview with Lino Hernhndez, Director of the Permanent
Commission on Human Rights, in Managua (June 7, 1990).
Law No. 65, 244 LA GACETA art. 8 (Dec. 26, 1989) specifically requires that the detained
defendant be brought before the Instructing Police Chief within the required 72 hour pe-
riod. That provision seems to meet the constitutional requirement of presentment, which
does not explicitly call for appearance before a judge, but only "an authority expressly au-
thorized by law." NiCAR. CONST. art. 33(2.2).
375. Law No. 65, LA GACETA art. 8 (Dec. 26, 1989).
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judge has a number of alternatives, depending on what the evi-
dence shows.
If the evidence shows a sufficiently serious offense, the police
must remit the case to the prosecutor, if that office has exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter. If not, the case is referred to the ap-
propriate local or district judge for prosecution, depending on the
seriousness of the offense. 76 If the evidence shows no offense, the
judge must free the detainee. Until late 1989, if the offense was one
of the police misdemeanors (faltas policiales) traditionally falling
within the scope of powers of the police judges, the judge could
sentence the defendant to up to 180 days in jail. The offenses over
which the police maintained sentencing jurisdiction were very lim-
ited: disturbing the peace (alteraci6n del orden pablico), habitual
vagrancy (vagancia habitual), and habitual drunkenness (ebriedad
consuetudinaria).71 Appeals from adverse rulings of the In-
structing Police Judge were to the Regional Delegate of the Minis-
try of the Interior or, in Managua, to the National Chief of the
Sandinista Police, and rulings on appeal were final. 7s
The sentencing powers of Instructing Police Judges came
under strong criticism by international human rights groups, due
to their alleged unconstitutionality, their selection by the Interior
Ministry, abbreviated proceedings, and the denial of the right to
appeal directly to the ordinary appellate courts s.37  Partly in re-
376. Id. arts. 12 and 13; Law No. 37, 79 LA GACETA art. 3.
377. 1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 19. This source is the most
reliable available, since the code itself did not originally contain the offenses to which police
judges' jurisdiction extended, and subsequent legislative amendment is difficult to ascertain.
See 1976 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 43, at 19. A 1978 OAS investigation in Nicaragua
also refers to the offenses of gambling and "bearing of prohibited arms" as falling within the
traditional police court jurisdiction. Other powers of the police courts included the discovery
of "plots against the internal and external security of the State" as well as the duty to
inform superiors of such plots and to capture the alleged offenders. 1978 OAS REPORT,
supra note 41, at 61 n.10.
A January 14, 1987 "Communique," entered into between the Supreme Court, the Min-
istry of Justice, and the Ministry of Interior, states that post-revolutionary provisions of law
which permitted police judges to sentence for the offenses of drug trafficking, cattle rustling,
and violations of consumer protection laws were void, being in "evident contradiction" with
several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, COMUNICADO (Jan. 14,
1987)(unpublished Communique in the possession of the author).
378. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. III, Decree No. 559, art. 6, at 147.
379. NiCAR. CONST. art. 159 provides that all courts "form a unitary system, whose supe-
rior organ is the Supreme Court of Justice." The Police Courts were criticized as falling
outside of that process of orderly judicial review, and for their failure to comply with a
series of procedural guarantees enumerated in article 34 of the new Constitution. 1987-1988
AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 19-20. This criticism was at its peak following
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sponse to this pressure, and as part of an August, 1989 political
agreement with opposition political parties, the government agreed
to introduce legislation in the National Assembly which would re-
move sentencing jurisdiction from the police. Police sentencing
power was eliminated by Law No. 65, adopted on Dec. 26, 1989,
and all police judges became the local chiefs of police.380
3. Consolidation of Prosecutorial Screening and Investigation
Powers in the Procurator General's Office
After review by the police, some cases are referred to the pub-
lic prosecutor, or Procurator General. Law No. 37 of 1988 provides
that the Procurator shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination to prosecute many of the most serious public of-
fenses."8 1 The most important of these are certain types of murder,
rape, robbery, theft, and fraud. Under the new law, rape is the only
one of the offenses traditionally considered to be "private" which
is included among those offenses in which exclusive jurisdiction is
the use of the Police Courts to sentence opposition demonstrators arrested in Nandaime in
July of 1988, an event which provoked strong adverse response in the international commu-
nity. The decision of the police judge in the Nandaime cases was overturned on appeal to
the National Police Chief as inappropriate, and the cases were remanded for prosecution in
the criminal courts. See, e.g., Clash Between Demonstrators and Police in Nandaime, 7
UPDATE No. 24 (Aug. 6, 1988); 1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 14-
15. Despite heavy pressure, many of the Nandaime defendants were eventually convicted,
although many of their convictions were overturned on appeal, or the defendants were am-
nestied. A case study of the Nandaime case is provided in Richard J. Wilson, The Constitu-
tion and Crime in the New Nicaragua, in THE NICARAGUAN CONSTITUTION OF 1987: ENGLISH
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 219, 237-241 (Kenneth J. Mijeski ed., 1991).
The police courts were defended by the previous government both on the basis that
they were an inherited tradition which had a long history in Latin America and elsewhere,
and as administrative bodies whose structure and functions fall outside the Judicial branch,
and within the Executive. Interview with Omar Corthz, Procurator General of Nicaragua, in
Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 13, 1988). This defense comports with my own review of the use
of police courts in Latin America and Europe. See supra note 39.
380. Political Agreement (Aug. 4, 1989) (unofficial translation in the possession of the
author). Law No. 65, 244 LA GACETA arts. 12, 17.
381. Law No. 37, 79 LA GACETA art. 1 (Apr. 13, 1988). In its original conception in 1982,
the Procurator's office had exclusive jurisdiction to proceed in all public and private crimi-
nal complaints except those begun by querella. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. VII, Decree No.
1130, art. 1, at 93. The shift from judicial screening to exclusive jurisdiction in the prosecu-
tor's office was justified at the time on several bases: the new system would give order to
citizen's complaints, it would remove motives of passion in the filing of private charges, it
would remove possibilities of extortion, bribery or blackmail involving judges or attorneys,
and it would render the judge more impartial in the review of proofs. Eduardo Ruiz, Co-
mentarios a la Ley de Reforma Procesal Penal, in 2 MoNtxlco: REVISTA DEL CONSEJO DE
ESTADO 36 (Apr. 1983).
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vested in the prosecutor. The amendment also includes provision
for expedited medical examination of the alleged victim, once a
complaint is made, in order to "establish the fact [of the offense]
with certainty." After this examination, the Procurator is given
discretion in the disposition of the action.s82 All offenses not han-
dled by the prosecutor are handled by the courts, if public, or by
private parties, all according to the traditional structure of the
code.
Once within the Procurator's jurisdiction, the office has three
days to make a decision as to whether to prosecute the offense. A
decision not to proceed is appealable to the Court of Appeals by
those adversely affected by the decision. That appeal is final.3 83
Additionally, the Procurator's office is empowered to participate as
a party in all proceedings in the trial courts, from the moment of
the commencement of police investigation, and regardless of exclu-
sive jurisdiction. 84 Finally, the prosecutor's timely request for ex-
tension of the terms, as permitted by law, is automatic, not discre-
tionary with the trial judge as provided by prior law. 8 The civil
party, or victim, is permitted to assist the procurator in prosecu-
tions, but the principal parties are the accused and the Procurator
when exclusive jurisdiction lies.386 These powers represent signifi-
cant departures from prior law, under which the judge maintained
exclusive jurisdiction over the commencement of charges. The
prosecutor is now vested with virtually total control over the direc-
tion and continuation of a wide range of the most serious offenses.
382. Law No. 37, 79 LA GACETA art. 6 (Apr. 13, 1988). For a discussion of the public-
private distinction, see supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. Manuel Cano, legislative
counsel, said that the legislative intent was that the medical examination be dispositive as
to the existence of a rape, and that a negative test should result in non-filing of charges. He
acknowledged that a rape could occur without dispositive medical evidence to that effect,
but asserted that the new statute was designed to protect against the woman who complains
of rape as a means of revenge when thwarted in the relationship. Interview with Manuel
Cano, attorney and counsel to the National Assembly for criminal justice matters, Managua,
Nicaragua (Jan. 5, 1989). In her recent examination of the rape laws of Nicaragua, Beth
Stephens concludes, based on interviews with prosecutors as to current practice, that rape
is, in effect, both a private and a public offense, in that either the victim or the prosecutor
may commence proceedings, but the victim still has the right to pardon and dismiss, as
under the private offense categories. Stephens, Rape in Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 76
n.84.
383. Law No. 37, 79 LA GACETA arts. 7, 9 (Apr. 13, 1988).
384. Id. arts. 2(2), 3.
385. Id. art. 20.
386. Id. art. 5.
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4. Abolition of the Jury Trial
The availability of jury trials gradually diminished over the
decade, and in 1988 they were totally abolished.38 7 The reasons
given for abolition were the time and cost involved in the required
use of juries, the lack of sufficient training and understanding on
the part of laypersons, and the tendency of juries to acquit, under
the intima convicci6n standard. s
5. The Sana Critica Evidentiary Standard and New Burdens of
Proof
Current law adopts the use of the sana critica evidentiary
standard in all criminal trials. The new standard replaces the
highly rigid legal or measured proof system f6r the evaluation and
admission of evidence, as well as the standard which governed the
jury's deliberations, the intima convicci6n, or innermost belief.
The sana critica standard, literally a "sound criticism" of the of-
fered proof by the judge, is often translated in the civil law context
as the "free evaluation of evidence" standard." 9 Under current
law, all reference to "complete proof," "partial proof," and other
terms used in the measured proof system is abolished.390
The new standard is statutorily defined as "the discretionary
appraisal of proofs without limits as to type, but respecting the
irrevocable rules of scientific, technical, or artistic character, or of
common experience; and observing the elemental principles of jus-
387. Law No. 37 of 1988, 79 LA GACETA art. 16. Under Decree No. 1130 of 1982, juries
had been abolished for all but five serious offenses: parricide, infanticide, aggravated murder
(asesinato atroz), rape, and exposure of persons to danger. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. VII, De-
cree No. 1130, art. 8, at 94. One early decree had reformed the composition, qualifications,
and oath for potential jurors. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. I, Decree No. 129, at 197.
388. The tendency to acquit was one of the reasons offered for reform of the legislation.
Ruiz, supra note 381, at 37. One lawyer whom I interviewed asserted that the amendments
limiting the use of juries were influenced, in no small part, by his successful defense, before
a jury, of four young men from a poor neighborhood in Managua who were charged with the
brutal murder of two married women of some wealth. Interview with William Frech, Private
Attorney, in Managua, Nicaragua (Aug. 8, 1988). The case was known popularly as the
"Panzyma" case, for a commercial building near the location of the alleged homicide, and
received a good deal of public attention through newspaper accounts at the time. Id. The
dates correspond; the group was acquitted on Sept. 25, 1982 and Decree 1130 was passed by
the government on Oct. 5, 1982.
389. The standard is given several different names, all roughly synonymous. MER-
RYMAN, supra note 15, at 119 ("free evaluation of the evidence"); Fraser, supra note 25, at
873 ("a free objective search for rules").
390. Law No. 37 of 1988, 79 LA GACETA art. 19 (Apr. 13, 1988).
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tice and sound logic. '39 1 Thus, under current law, the factfinder,
who is always the judge, is given wide discretion in the evaluation
of evidence, a standard which would be somewhat akin, in the
common law, to making admission of all evidence subject only to a
judicial determination of relevancy and reliability." The adoption
of this new standard brings Nicaragua into conformity with many
other civil law jurisdictions.39 3 It nevertheless has been much criti-
cized in its application by both Nicaraguan lawyers and human
rights organizations, who unjustifiably see it as an invalid invita-
tion to abuse in criminal trials.39'
391. Id. referring to Decree No. 644 of 1981. LEYES-DECRETOS, vol. IV, Decree No. 644,
art. 4, at 132-33.
392. Even within the civil law system, this concept is not entirely understood. It has
been pointed out that the free proof standard does not have to do with the admission of
evidence, but only with the evaluation of its probative weight. Evaluation, logically, comes
into play only when the evidence is produced. Karl H. Kunert, Some Observations on the
Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules Under the Common Law System and the Civil
Law System of 'Free Proof' in the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BUFF. L. REV.
122, 155 (1967). Thus, if the standard is correctly applied, no evidence is inadmissible by
supposedly neutral application of strict rules, as it frequently is in the common law through
hearsay rules, opinion rules, best evidence rules, character rules, privilege rules, as well as
the now-criticized exclusionary rules for physical evidence. Id. at 155. See, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 397 (1984) (applying a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule for physical evidence seized by police under judicially issued warrants ultimately found
to be defective).
393. By the turn of the twentieth century, the system of legal or measured proof had
been abandoned almost everywhere on the Continent. ESMEIN, supra note 36, at 630.
Guatemala, for example, has adopted the sana critica standard. C6DIGO PROCESAL PE-
NAL art. 638 (Guatemala, 1973). However, it still retains the concepts of full and "semi-
proof," permitting the latter to reach full proportions when "several semi-proofs ... con-
cur, in a coordinated manner, against the same person." Id. arts. 641, 642. But see CARRI6,
supra note 18, at 57-58 n.54 ("[Miany Argentine procedural rules still reflect a strict adher-
ence to the system of legal proof.").
394. The primary critic of the use of this standard was the Lawyer's Committee for
Human Rights, which asserted, in a 1985 report criticizing the use of the Popular Anti-
Somocista Tribunals for their use of sana critica, that the standard "in practice ... places
virtually no rigid constraints on the [one judge and two lay person] panels' ability to infer
guilt from the facts." REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 77. This assertion was reit-
erated less strongly in a more recent report which called the standard "less vigorous" than
the measured proof standard then used in the regular criminal courts. LAWYERS COMMITTEE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA: 1987, at II (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter 1987
LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT]. This criticism was also leveled by an early Amnesty Interna-
tional mission to Nicaragua, where, during its use as part of Decree No. 896 proceedings, the
measure was characterized as one of the "personal conviction" of the judge, which leaves
"judges completely free to reach a decision based upon any item of evidence, without having
to ensure its authenticity or reliability." Cited in Steinberg, supra note 14, at 375 n.78.
Americas Watch, although critical of the use of the TPAs on several other grounds, not only
did not attack the sana critica standard used there, but backhandedly defended it. 1984
AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 31; 1986 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note
296, at 44-45; but see 1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 54 (standard
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Burdens of proof are appropriately changed under the new ev-
identiary standard. The corpus delicti must be proven "with cer-
tainty," and the act of imprisonment may occur only when there
are "at least rational indications of the delinquency of the pris-
oner."395 In order to convict, the court must conclude that "there is
proof of the existence of a punishable act and of the culpability of
the accused." '96 While these burdens do not rise to the level of the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required at common law,
they comply with the requirements of human rights conventions. 97
6. Protection of the Accused: Procedural Rights and the Reme-
dies of Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and Unconstitutionality
Post-revolutionary law concerned itself with procedural rights
and procedural remedies for the defendant in the criminal process.
The new Constitution contains a number of explicit procedural
guarantees for the defense, including the requirement of a judicial
order for the search of a private home of any person and an exclu-
sionary rule as to letters, documents, and other personal papers
illegally obtained.9 8 Detention is permitted only on order of a
judge, by authorities under express legal mandate, or when an ac-
cused is captured in flagrante3 9  and the accused must be
presented before an authority within seventy-two hours of deten-
tion. 0  Officials who illegally detain a person are subject to crimi-
is "more liberal"). A Sandinista Procurator General acknowledged problems with the new
evidentiary standard, but suggested practical shortcomings rather than any intrinsic flaw in
the concept. He suggested that the standard would be more evenly applied when the corps
of new judges was better trained and equipped to use more scientific means of evidence.
Interview with Omar Cortez, Procurator General of Nicaragua, in Managua, Nicaragua (Aug.
9, 1988).
These editorial characterizations of the standard of evidence now used in all of Nicara-
gua's trial courts are deeply troubling because they attack, without acknowledgment of its
widespread use, a standard of evidence respected in most of Latin America and Europe
since before the turn of the century. The comments demonstrate much about the risks of
criticism out of cultural or historical context.
395. Law No. 37 of 1988, 79 LA GACETA art. 21 (Apr. 13, 1988).
396. Id. art. 23.
397. The only requirements of human rights instruments, as relates to this aspect of
due process in a criminal trial, are those of the impartiality of the judge and the presump-
tion of innocence. See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra
note 151, art. XXVI, at 545, 551. There is nothing to suggest that the use of the sana critica
standard, on its face, violates these concepts, and a good deal of evidence to suggest that it
complies with the requirements in practice.
398. NICAR. CONST. art. 26.
399. Id. art. 33 (1).
400. Id. art. 33 (2.2). This provision has caused problems with police judges, who have
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nal or civil responsibility.0 l
Procedural rights are protected through a number of proce-
dural mechanisms. Prominent among these are the provision of
counsel at trial and the appellate remedies discussed above. 02
Most significant, however, is a comprehensive package of legisla-
tion adopted in late 1988 which gives efficacy to a collection of con-
stitutional guarantees to protect the individual citizen.
The constitutional remedies are three: the recourse of uncon-
stitutionality, the traditional writ of habeas corpus, referred to in
the Constitution as personal exhibition (exhibici6n personal), and
the writ of administrative amparo.0 3 While the latter two reme-
dies were embodied in earlier post-revolutionary decrees,40 ' the
remedy of unconstitutionality is much more comprehensive, inno-
vative, and far-reaching in its potential impact. In habeas corpus,
any person may file, on behalf of any other person or herself, an
original writ with the appropriate Court of Appeals, and may al-
lege illegal detention or threat of same by any state official, im-
proper restrictions of freedom by any person, or illegal imprison-
ment by a trial judge. 05 The Court then appoints an Executory
Judge (Ju~z Ejecutor), preferably but not necessarily a lawyer, to
investigate the petitioner's claims. The Executor is given broad
powers to produce and examine the defendant, wherever that per-
son may be held, and may order immediate relief, including release
statutory powers to detain for up to 10 days before presentation to a magistrate, thereby
subjecting themselves to strong criticism from international human rights organizations.
1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 296, at 55-56; 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT,
supra note 252, at 14-16.
401. NICAR. CONST. art. 33 (4). For the procedural rights of the accused which are unaf-
fected by the adoption of the Constitution, see supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 63, 144-53 and accompanying text.
403. NICAR. CONST. art. 187 (unconstitutionality); id. arts. 188 (amparo) and 189 (per-
sonal exhibition). Article 45 guarantees protection of these rights. Id. art. 45. Law No. 49 of
1988 was a comprehensive legislative package of implementing legislation. Law No. 49 of
1988 (unpublished copy in possession of the author).
404. The right to amparo was recognized in art. 50 of the Statute of Rights and Guar-
antees of the Nicaraguan People. DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. I, Decree No. 52, art. 50, at 77. The
laws of amparo were detailed and amplified in Decrees No. 232 (personal exhibition, or
habeas corpus) and Decree No. 417 (administrative amparo). DECRETOS-LEYES, vol. II, De-
crees No. 232 and 417, at 27, 391, respectively.
405. Law No. 49, supra note 403, tit. IV. The principal amendments to the writ of
habeas corpus were designed to eliminate the possibility of its technical application in situa-
tions which would result in the "abuse" of the writ by applicants who could achieve free-
dom, however temporary, through application of the strict time limits applied in the crimi-
nal process. Interview with Manuel Cano, Attorney and Legal Advisor to the National
Assembly, in Managua, Nicaragua (Jan. 5, 1989).
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of the defendant under bail or without restrictions, removal of in-
communicado restrictions, or liquidation of monetary penalties.40 6
Failure to comply with the order of the Executor or with that of
the Court of Appeals can result in a heavy fine, potential loss of
employment, and potential criminal or civil prosecution, although
the official under order from the Executor may petition for a hear-
ing before the Court through the Procurator's office. 40 7 Failure of a
member of the executive branch to comply with an order is more
problematic. Such failure ultimately results in publication by the
Supreme Court of that fact with notice to the National Assembly
and referral of the delinquent individual to the Procurator for ap-
propriate prosecution; the Court itself has no enforcement powers
in this instance. 08 Practical problems also occur frequently. The
Executor is required to perform his or her required duties "imme-
diately," which is understandable from a legal standpoint, but im-
practical given the large numbers of such filings and the unpaid
nature of the Executor's job. 0 9
Administrative amparo is a civil remedy which can be filed
only by the aggrieved individual in the civil chamber of the appro-
priate Court of Appeal. 10 It would seem to have less relevance in
the criminal area, but has been utilized extensively by citizens to
protect procedural rights in criminal matters through allegations of
failure by an administrative official, such as a jail official, to honor
a specific court order.
The remedy of unconstitutionality was new with legislation
adopted in 1988, and gives legal effect to aspirational provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. 11 The remedy allows any citizen to chal-
406. Law No. 49, supra note 403, art. 61(1) to (5).
407. Id. arts. 66-67.
408. Id. art. 68.
409. The numbers of petitions were daunting. A study by the National Commission for
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights found that, in Region III (Managua) alone,
almost 2,500 petitions were filed between July 1, 1987 and June 30, 1988. CoMIsI6N NA-
CIONAL DE PROMOCI6N Y PROTECC16N DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, INVESTIGACI6N PRELIMINAR
SOBRE: LA EFECTIVIDAD DEL HABEAS CORPUS EN LA REGI6N III - MANAGUA 4 (Nov. 4, 1988).
The new law is more lenient than the old, which required that the Executor perform his
or her functions within three days when the person affected was in prison or under restric-
tion. DECRETOs-LEYES, vol. II, Decree No. 232, art. 15, at 31.
410. See generally Law No. 49, supra note 403, tit. III.
411. Id. tit. II. Relevant provisions of the Constitution are articles 164(4) and 187. I use
the term "aspirational" because, unlike under the U.S. Constitution, constitutional guaran-
tees were not self-executing until the mechanism permitting attack on constitutionality was
created. This is true in general in the development of modern concepts of judicial
supremacy, which have come about more through constitutional concession than through
1991-921
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lenge, by original writ to the Supreme Court, a law, decree, or reg-
ulation which "directly or indirectly prejudices" his or her consti-
tutional rights."12 The action may be filed within sixty days after
the effective date of the new law, or may be filed by any person
against whom a law is unconstitutionally applied, after its allegedly
unconstitutional application. '" Once admitted as properly filed,
the Supreme Court must declare the inapplicability of the law or
other disposition, if the declaration is partial.""' The potential im-
pact of this law cannot be underestimated, especially since, al-
though limitations were suggested, the law has retroactive effect
when laws are unconstitutionally applied.
4 5
7. Reeducation and Forgiveness: Prisons, Amnesties, and Pardons
The final area of post-revolutionary reform lies in the intersti-
ces of criminal process and penological theory. This area plays as
significant a role in the theoretical design of criminal justice re-
form in revolutionary Nicaragua as it has in conservative reform of
criminal justice in the last decade in the United States.
The 1987 Constitution contains a number of explicit articles
on criminal punishments and imprisonment. Most important, the
death penalty is abolished, prison sentences are limited to a maxi-
mum of thirty years, and torture, inhumane, cruel, or degrading
punishments are prohibited."6
The prison system and penological theory are the areas in
which socialist models of justice, tempered by the moral values of
the liberation church, were to have the greatest influence in the
development of post-revolutionary criminal justice. In keeping
with socialist models of justice, the Constitution emphasizes the
"reeducational" nature of incarceration by providing for "humane"
conditions with "a fundamental objective [of] the transformation
the assertion of the right by the judiciary itself, as occurred in the United States in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 Cranch 137 (1803). MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 12-16 (1979).
412. Law No. 49, supra note 403, art. 6.
413. Id. arts. 10, 20.
414. Id. art. 18.
415. Id. art. 2. The draft law contained a provision which would have limited the rem-
edy to laws or decrees promulgated after the effective date of the newly created remedy. Ley
de Aml~aro: Exposici6n de Motivos, art. 16 (undated draft law received July, 1988, on file
with the author).
416. NICAR. CONST. arts. 23, 36, 37.
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of the inmate in order to reintegrate him or her into society.94 17
The penitentiary system is to provide rehabilitation in pro-
gressive stages, and must "promote family unity, health care, edu-
cational and cultural advancement and productive occupation with
financial compensation" for inmates.'1 s
The correctional system met with mixed success. The Ministry
of Interior's Security Force (DGSE) was the most consistent focus
of international criticism for its use of prolonged detention without
charges, improper interrogation in detention facilities, and even
some reports of torture.419 Even at their worst, however, the abuses
of the DGSE in security crime investigations and detention com-
pare favorably to the repressive tactics used in neighboring Central
American countries.20
At its best, the Nicaraguan penal system provided a model for
rehabilitative use of prisons. Prisoners convicted of serious crimes
pass through five stages of imprisonment, from maximum security
to an "open" stage, at which they are permitted to go home for a
full week's leave every six months. 21 Inmates in the lesser security
institutions are housed in a series of granjas abiertas, or open
prison farms, making possible a level of comfort, education, and
useful labor for prisoners that is virtually unknown in other Latin
American countries. These minimum security institutions use no
fences at all, a minimum number of unarmed guards, and work
417. Soviet penology emphasizes the principle of "socialist humanism" in activities of
reform, re-education, and re-socialization into society. BUTLER, supra note 16, at 88; John
Quigley, The Function of the Criminal Sanction in Socialist Law: Implications for the
United States, 12 LEGAL STUD. F. 175, 177 (1988). While based on the idea of reform, even
the most recent drafts of Soviet criminal law retain the death penalty in some circum-
stances, while abolishing the penalties of exile and banishment. See Leonard Orland, Soviet
Justice in the Gorbachev Era: The 1988 Draft Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legis-
lation, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 513, 519-23 (1989).
Cuban theory, in the early years of the revolution, also presupposed the perfectibility of
human beings and the use of penal system which combined repression of dissent with ser-
vice and re-education. Luis SALAS, SOCIAL CONTROL AND DEVIANCE IN CUBA 127 (1979);
Brady, supra note 259, at 248, 277.
418. Id. art. 39. On socialist correctional theory, see BUTLER, supra note 16, at 279-81.
419. Even late in the decade, after numerous reforms, criticism of the DGSE tactics
continued. See 1986-1989 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 252, at 34-44; HUMAN RIGHTS CHRO-
NOLOGY, supra note 250, at 10.
420. Comparative data was made available in measuring compliance with the Central
American Peace Accords. AMERICAS WATCH, COMPLIANCE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVI-
SIONS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PLAN 13-14, 27-31, 40 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter AMER-
ICAS WATCH PEACE PLAN REPORT].
421. Jails and Justice in Nicaragua, 5 ENvto 14, 16-17 (1986); 1986-1989 AMNESTY RE-
PORT, supra note 252, at 42.
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incentives which permit inmates to earn wages, conjugal visits, and
home leave.422
Frequent amnesties of war prisoners helped to keep down the
prison population, particularly after the adoption of the Central
American Peace Plan, which contained explicit provisions on
amnesties.423 At the close of the decade, before the national elec-
tions, Nicaragua had an average prison population of between
4,500 and 5,000 prisoners, thus maintaining incarceration rates
about four times lower than those of the United States during the
same period of time.4""
The question of forgiveness through amnesties or pardons for
criminal conduct has two important and distinct dimensions in
Nicaragua. First, there were a series of amnesties of convicted con-
tras and National Guardsmen from the Somoza era during the fi-
nal years of the Sandinista government. These releases, all part of
the Central American Peace Plan, totaled about 3,000 individuals,
and far surpassed the generosity of neighboring countries in the
treatment and release of real or supposed enemies of the
government. 25
The more controversial amnesty issue was an amnesty law
passed after the defeat of the Sandinistas at the polls in February
of 1990, and before the government was handed over to the opposi-
tion. The text of this "self-amnesty" law grants amnesty for of-
fenses committed between July 19, 1979 (the date of the
Sandinista revolutionary victory) through March 13, 1990.42 s Am-
nesty is granted to three groups of citizens: all Nicaraguans con-
victed of security and public order offenses, civilian and military
422. Jails and Justice in Nicaragua, supra note 421, at 16. See also Rosa del Olmo,
Remaking Justice and Rehabilitation in Revolutionary Nicaragua, 18 CRIME & SOC. JUST.
99 (1982).
423. The favored reading of the amnesty provisions of the Peace Plan suggested that
they were "intended to apply to members of the political opposition as a means of achieving
national reconciliation." See AMERICAS WATCH PEACE PLAN REPORT, supra note 420, at 5.
424. At the rates given, Nicaragua's incarceration rate is approximately 125 per 100,000
citizens. The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world: 426 per 100,000
persons. MARC MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES OF
INCARCERATION 4-5 (The Sentencing Project, Washington, D.C., Jan. 1991).
425. The first pardon occurred in March of 1989, when 1894 ex-National Guardsmen
were released. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989 155-156 (July 1990). The
second release, on the eve of national elections, resulted in the pardon of 1,190 people
charged as contra rebels or under national security laws. O'Connor, supra note 358, at 1E.
426. Ley de Amnistia General y Reconciliaci6n Nacional, Law No. 81, 53 LA GACETA
(Mar. 15, 1990).
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personnel who may have committed offenses in the investigation of
security and public order crimes, and public employees who may
have committed any of a number of criminal offenses involving
embezzlement, fraud, or other state-related misconduct.
4 2 7
Similar self-amnesties were passed in the neighboring coun-
tries of Guatemala and El Salvador, the former by the military
government in 1986, and the latter as part of the Central American
Peace Plan.4 '  Both were strongly criticized by human rights
monitors who believed that the intent of the Plan was subverted to
avoid culpability by government officials and the military.
In South America, amnesties of military governments for gross
human rights violations have occurred in Uruguay and Argen-
tina.43 0 Delicate amnesty discussions are underway in Chile follow-
ing the recent issuance of the report of the National Commission
on Truth and Reconciliation. 43' These governmental acts take on
427. Id. art. 1.
428. For a comparison.of the Nicaraguan experience with that of El Salvador, see John
J. Moore, Jr., Problems with Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty Under the Arias Plan in Nic-
aragua and El Salvador, 43 STAN. L. REV. 733 (1991). See also AMERICAS WATCH PEACE PLAN
REPORT, supra note 420, at 17-19, 24-25; Hillary Richard, The Salvadoran Amnesty Bill, 12
HUM. RTS. INTERNET REP. 7 (1988).
429. AMERICAS WATCH PEACE PLAN REPORT, supra note 420, at 4-6; Richard, supra note
428, at 7-9; AMERICAS WATCH, A YEAR OF RECKONING: EL SALVADOR A DECADE AFTER THE
ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO 135-141 (1990); WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN
AMERICA, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INJUSTICE: MILITARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN GUATEMALA 2-4
(1989).
430. In Uruguay, the passage of an amnesty law was followed by a national referendum
on its validity. AMERICAS WATCH, CHALLENGING IMPUNITY: THE LEY DE CADUCIDAD AND THE
REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IN URUGUAY (1989). In Argentina, the ruling junta passed a "Law of
National Pacification" in 1983. The then newly elected civilian president, Raul Alfonsin,
ordered the trial of military personnel, including the ruling generals, for human rights viola-
tions. Many were convicted. The historic occasion gave rise to a substantial literature.
Emilio Fermia Mignone et al., Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Viola-
tions in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118 (1984); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ARGENTINA, THE
MILITARY JUNTAS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS
(1987); AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA (1987); Paula K. Speck,
The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 491 (1987); Anne Marie Latchman, Comment, Duty to Punish: International Law and
the Human Rights Policy of Argentina, 7 B.U. INT'L L. J. 355 (1989); Kathryn Lee Craw-
ford, Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims: Argentina's Transition to Democracy, 12
HUM. RTS. Q. 17 (1990). All of the convicted generals have since been amnestied by the
government of President Carlos Menem. Shirley Christian, Argentina Frees Ex-Junta
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, at A9. Popular opinion on the amnesty was deeply di-
vided. Shirley Christian, In Echo of the "Dirty War," Argentines Fight Pardons, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1990, at A3; Argentine Defends Release of "Dirty War" Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at A4.
431. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile: Most Want the Past to Sleep, A Few Still Live in
Nightmares, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at E2. See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsi-
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importance because of the implications, in those countries, of tran-
sition from military to civilian governments, and because they raise
important questions of social policy. The argument for amnesty
suggests forgiveness for prior human rights offenses, however horri-
ble, in the name of national reconciliation and healing. The argu-
ment against suggests that, at the very least, the full truth about
prior offenses be made public, thus allowing the victims of human
rights crimes to achieve some measure of public vindication and
justice." 2
The Nicaraguan amnesty is distinguishable from the other
amnesties described above on several grounds. First, unlike the
Salvadoran amnesty, the Nicaraguan law was passed after the re-
lease of all political prisoners, and was not a means to subvert the
intent of the Central American Peace Plan. Second, the amnesty
was targeted to a small group of public employees and military
personnel, unlike the other laws, which gave total impunity to all
military personnel. Third, and most important, the Nicaraguan law
does not amnesty those people involved in the most serious of
human rights abuses-disappearance, torture, and assassina-
tion-as did the amnesty laws in Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Uruguay. While the law may be justifiably criticized, as may any
self-amnesty, the hysteria which the law provoked in the United
States was vastly disproportionate to the impact of the law as
enacted. 4
33
V. THE CLASH OF THE CLASSIC AND THE MODERN
The provisions of the old codes conflict in several significant
respects with the new Constitution and post-revolutionary laws
and decrees. More importantly, the premises of the old codes fre-
quently clash with modern concepts of criminal justice. The elec-
tion of a new government which promises to shift direction from
bility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law,
78 CAL. L. REV. 449, 460-62 (1990).
432. See generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 431; Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional
Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals? 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1990); Jose
Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Ap-
plicable Principles and Political Constraints, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 623 (1990); Robert K.
Goldman, International Law & Amnesty Laws, 12 HUM. RTS. INTERNET REP. (1988); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SPECIAL ISSUE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (1989).
433. The law was misreported in the U.S. press, where it was said to grant "blanket"
immunity for all past offenses of any government or military personnel. See, e.g., Mark A.
Uhlig, Sandinistas Move to Claim Property and Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, at Al.
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the highly heterodox prior regime suggests possibilities for greater
clarity in the unification of theory; yet it also threatens to reverse
in the name of "democratization," any modernization of criminal
justice which might have been accomplished by the Sandinistas.
This section will explore some of these theoretical and practical
clashes.
A. Pre-Trial Detention of the Defendant
The new Constitution contains a general right to individual
liberty,43 4 a presumption of innocence,435 a guarantee of speedy
trial,436 and a remedy for illegal detention against the responsible
official.4 37 As noted earlier in the review of code provisions, how-
ever, the right to bail and its practical availability are extremely
narrow.4 3 8 Increasingly long periods of detention have coincided
with rising crime and arrest rates and stagnant or declining judicial
resources. High levels of detention without any criminal charges
have been the subject of repeated criticism by human rights orga-
nizations. All of these phenomena have lent force to the argument
that there was no serious effort to honor the presumption of inno-
cence in revolutionary Nicaragua.43
High rates of pretrial incarceration are a widespread phenome-
non throughout Latin America, and reflect similar practices in Eu-
rope.440 While this does not excuse its use in Nicaragua, it does
provoke some questions as to why the practice has enjoyed such
widespread practice for so long in such wide areas of the world.
434. NICAR. CONST. art. 25(1).
435. Id. art. 34(1).
436. Id. art. 34(2).
437. Id. art. 33(4).
438. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., 1987 LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 394, at 15; 1987-1988
AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 291, at 55, 79.
440. A recent study sponsored by ILANUD, for example, shows that the pretrial incar-
ceration rate in 18 civil law countries in this hemisphere averages about 69% of all prison-
ers, while the rate for 11 countries adhering to the "Anglo-Saxon" model averages about
23% of the total population. ELIAS CARRANZA ET AL., EL PRESO SIN CONDENA EN AM9iRICA
LATINA Y EL CARIBE 26-27 (ILANUD: San Jos6, Costa Rica, 1983). This is apparently not the
case on the Continent, where the highest pre-trial incarceration rate in a 1961 study was
France, with 44% pending trial. GERHARD OW. MUELLER & FRit LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COM-
PARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 102 (1969). But the practice of preventive detention was
common and much-criticized in France 30 years ago. George W. Pugh, Administration of
Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1, 21 (1961). It ap-
pears likely that continental practice may have had an influence on the adoption of preven-
tive detention here. See MUELLER & LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, supra, at 85-111.
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The explanation may lie in the tenacity of historical inertia.4 4 1 The
long practice is consistent with premises of nineteenth century
criminal procedure in which the auto de prisi6n was tantamount to
a determination of guilt. Moreover, the entire process from arrest
to adjudication, as originally contemplated, was only about two
months long, meaning that the eventually acquitted defendant
would not be incarcerated for long periods of time.
Whatever may be the reasons for the practice, data show in-
carceration of inmates without sentence in South American coun-
tries at more than twice the rate of those in North American coun-
tries following the common law tradition. 2 These rates of
incarceration provoke reflection as to whether a presumption of in-
nocence has efficacy if large numbers of persons are jailed over
many months before their guilt or innocence has been formally de-
termined in a court of law. Heavy use of pretrial detention is not
likely to change with the election of the Chamorro government,
since the tradition of pretrial detention is deeply rooted in the en-
tire civil law system.
B. Popular Participation in the Criminal Process
The new Constitution explicitly calls for both organization and
function of the judiciary "with popular participation," ' 3 while it
reserves the right of the current system to operate until popular
representation can be established.4 4 Even with the transitional ca-
veat, the absence of popular participation in the selection of judges
or in the administration of the criminal justice system creates seri-
ous theoretical and practical problems.
No suggestion is offered as to how to accomplish the constitu-
tional requirement of "organization" of the administration of jus-
tice through popular participation, since all judicial selection is
now controlled by the Constitution and is by appointment rather
than by popular election. Because of the abolition of jury trials and
the failure of the Pilot Program proposal to adopt a system of lay
judges, there is currently no popular participation at all.
Nicaraguan lawyers and judges are quick to admit that the
current system fails to meet the constitutional requirement of pop-
441. CARRANZA, supra note 440, at 29-36.
442. Id. at 48.
443. NICAR. CONST. art. 166.
444. Id. art. 199.
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ular participation. Speculation about directions during the
Sandinista government tended to focus on the adoption of a lay
judge model similar to that which was abandoned with the TPAs,
but which is widely used in both European and socialist law coun-
tries."' While these models seem unlikely in the Chamorro govern-
ment, no other alternatives have been proposed.
A serious practical problem also arises from the abolition of
juries. Their elimination leaves the district judge as the finder of
both fact and law at the close of the plenary stage of the trial,
applying the same evidentiary standard to all phases of the pro-
ceedings, as will be discussed in the next section. This has two ma-
jor effects. It undoes the symmetry of evidentiary rules and bur-
dens of proof which could be found previously in the balance of
strict legal standards of formal proof before trial with the common
sense standard of "inner conviction" applied by the jury. More-
over, it makes the second phase of trials largely superfluous, since
the facts known to the judge at the close of the plenary stage are
largely the same as those known at the close of the investigation
stage, and the legal test for their consideration is virtually the
same at both points.4 "
C. Reliance on Confessions and the Role of the Defendant
in the Criminal Process
An issue closely related to that of the provision of defense
counsel is the heavy reliance in the criminal process on the use of
confessions from the defendant and lack of protection for the ac-
cused through notice of either the right to remain silent or the con-
sequences of making an extrajudicial statement.447 Interrogation in
445. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 61-62 (1977);
Tomlinson, supra note 36, at 142-45 (France); SALAS, supra note 417, at 232-35 (Cuba);
Berman & Spindler, supra note 19 (Soviet Union).
446. While petit juries generally have been abolished on the Continent, some judicial
official other than the examining judge reviews the record of proceedings and exercises inde-
pendent judgment at trial. MERRYMAN & CLARK, supra note 15, at 701-07. In the U.S., this is
true in the normal process of a serious criminal charge, where preliminary matters are nor-
mally heard by a lower court judge, a determination of probable cause is made, -and the
matter is passed on for trial before a second judge in a court of general jurisdiction. WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23-26 (2d ed. 1992).
447. Such warnings are, of course, required in the United States. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Invocation of the right to counsel requires that the police desist until
the opportunity to consult counsel has occurred. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
This does not mean that the problem of police abuse has been cured. The debate on the
efficacy of Miranda as a deterrent to police misconduct rages on. See Office of Legal Policy,
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the absence of counsel is the norm, and has been the focus of criti-
cism from human rights groups, particularly in light of new consti-
tutional protection guaranteeing that no defendant is "obligated to
declare against oneself . . . nor to confess oneself culpable."""'
As noted above, the confession has been and continues to be,
in a practical sense, the "queen of proofs." Despite the relaxation
of evidentiary standards, the confession is still the most pragmatic
source of information about the offense in question. Modern meth-
ods of crime detection and apprehension are virtually unknown in
Nicaragua or the rest of the Third World, not only in the use of
sophisticated techniques known to the United States, such as the
newly developing field of DNA "fingerprinting," but even well-ac-
cepted and common techniques such as blood or drug testing.
Nicaragua, like most of its neighbors, lacks technology beyond
even the most rudimentary systems for fingerprinting and
photographing, and the systems for maintenance of central, accu-
rate records of prior criminal conduct are marginally functional.
This is neither to encourage or condone the use of these crime de-
tection techniques, which create their own set of problems in U.S.
society,44 9 nor to encourage or condemn the use of confessions as a
valid means of crime-solving, but only to recognize the force of
custom and practice and the realities imposed by the absence of
resources on developing countries everywhere.
Those traditional premises suggest that the defendant's con-
fession is not only a valid source of information, but logically, the
most appropriate of all. The U.S. concern with the voluntariness of
confessions, which are screened by the court before their presenta-
tion as evidence of guilt to the jury to protect against their prejudi-
cial impact,15° is made a matter of weight, not admissibility, in the
civil law tradition. Thus, the psychologically or even physically co-
erced confession is not per se inadmissible in the Nicaraguan court.
The circumstances surrounding the taking of the evidence are to
be carefully weighed by the investigating judge in determining the
credibility to be afforded to the extrajudicial confession. This con-
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pretrial Interrogation,
22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 437 (1989); Kamisar, supra note 185, at 584-89.
448. NICAR. CONST. art. 34(7). For a discussion of allegedly improper interrogations by
Nicaraguan security police, see supra note 296 and accompanying text.
449. See, e.g., DIANA GORDON, THE JUSTICE JUGGERNAUT: FIGHTING STREET CRIME, CON-
TROLLING CITIZENS (1990).
450. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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fession must, in any case, be freely and openly adopted by the de-
fendant in court before it is permitted to be used as the sole proof
of guilt.
D. The Role of Defense Counsel
One of the best examples of the clash of old and new values is
found in the code's traditional limit on the participation of defense
counsel in the investigative stage of the proceedings. "51 The new
Constitution guarantees that the defendant will have the assis-
tance of counsel "from the commencement of the process."452
Human rights organizations have criticized the Nicaraguan courts
for failure to fully comply with this constitutional mandate."' 3
Principal among these criticisms is the practice of late appearance
of defense counsel in the proceedings, the interrogation of the ac-
cused without the assistance of counsel and the provision of an in-
effectual defensor de oficio when the accused cannot afford pri-
vately retained counsel. 54
The right to defense counsel has developed slowly based pri-
marily on the differences between the role of the process of adjudi-
cation in the non-adversarial context of the civil law, versus the
"rights-based" adversarial process of the U.S. common law, which
is in theory the most sensitive of any modern society to the rights
of the accused. Moreover, in the U.S., at all critical stages of a
prosecution, counsel is provided at state expense if the accused is
legally indigent. 55
451. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
452. NICAR. CONST. art. 34(4).
453. The most recent example of this was in 1987-1988 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra
note 296, at 19-20, which criticizes the operation of the Police Courts.
454. Lawyers in Nicaragua frequently complained to me of the continued practice of
denial of counsel until the plenary stage. In the legal clinics, because of resources and histor-
ical practice, the student appointed as defensor de oficio frequently does not appear until
the investigation is over. Interview with Nora P6rez, Assistant Director of the Legal Clinic
[Bufete Popular] of the Law School of Central American University, in Managua, Nicaragua
(Aug. 4, 1988).
A 1989 study of the provision of defense services, conducted by the government's Na-
tional Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, found that retained
lawyers filed six times as many pleadings as defensores de oficio, and that the defensor
makes no written allegations in the case other than the general allegation of innocence and a
request for sentencing. DERECHO A LA DEFENSA, supra note 263, at 14. The study, nonethe-
less, does not recommend the adoption of a paid appointed counsel system, or of public
defenders, but only more rigor and enforcement of the current system of defensores de
oficio. Id. at 24-26.
455. Every defendant, regardless of poverty, is entitled to counsel at state expense in all
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Traditionally, in the civil law, the accused was not presumed
to need the protection of counsel in the early procedural stages, as
the investigating judge, an avowedly neutral power, takes on the
role of accurately ascertaining the salient facts of the offense from
all sources, including the accused. If rights were to be protected,
the judge would do the protecting. The injection of defense counsel
(and counsel for the state, through the ministerio publico, and
later, the procurator) into the early stages of the proceedings
change not only the dynamics of the proceedings, but the entire
premise of trust in judicial authority upon which the former sys-
tem was based. It is not unusual, then, that a legal system which
puts strong emphasis on the integrity and formal power of the ju-
diciary is ambivalent and slow in relinquishing that concentration
of power.
As to the role of the appointed defense attorney provided by
the state, there is little doubt that the promise of a lawyer for all
accused, regardless of economic means, and guaranteed in human
rights accords, is as hollow in Nicaragua as it is in the rest of Cen-
tral and South America, with the sole exception of Costa Rica.
'
15
but the least serious offenses. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Counsel must be reasonably effective. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). The right to counsel extends to all critical stages of a criminal prosecu-
tion, including the earliest stages of charging through appeal. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Upon arrest, the defendant must be
informed of the right to counsel and the potentially adverse implications of making state-
ments to state authorities. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Theoretically scrupu-
lous adherence to the right to counsel is counterbalanced, however, by complete abandon-
ment of the adversary system through disposition of the overwhelming majority of even the
most serious charges by negotiated pleas of guilt, a practice which is unknown to the civil
law. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The
Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C.L. REV. 531, 547
n.113 (1988) (noting that in the New York City Criminal Court in 1985, only .5% of a total
of 266,500 cases filed resulted in a trial verdict).
456. Systems of publicly financed defense counsel in criminal cases are very rare in
Latin America. The most comprehensively funded and organized services are found in Costa
Rica, where a nationwide staff of over 80 attorneys serves anyone who requests their ser-
vices. Outside of Costa Rica, state funding provides defense services only in Uruguay, Peru,
and Argentina. ILANUD, Curso Regional: Defensa Pblica (San Jos6, Costa Rica, Aug.-
Sept. 1988) (course materials on file with the author); CARIU6, supra note 18, at 151-54. In
Cuba, all criminal defense attorneys (indeed, all attorneys) must be members of lawyers'
collectives, whose membership and salary are controlled by statute and party leadership.
Adele Van der Plas, Cuban Criminal Procedure: An Overview, 6 REV. Soc. L. 31, 36 (1980).
In Colombia, the office of the public defender exists statutorily, but is still in the planning
stages. C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL, art. 131, Decreto 1153 de 1987 (Medellin: Editora
Juridica de Colombia 1987). The provision of defense counsel throughout the remainder of
Latin America is by means of the unpaid defensor de oficio. See generally Rojas, supra note
291, at 206-11.
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The system of defensores de oficio has not functioned, and will not
until the government is willing and able to invest in the resources
necessary to provide counsel to all accused at state expense as a
right, and not as part of the profession's obligation to provide such
services on a pro bono basis.6 7
E. Judicial Powers and the Emerging Authority of Police
and Prosecution
The traditional powers vested by the Code of Criminal In-
struction in the investigating judge are eroded, since the locus of
all initial referrals and screenings is in the police. Likewise, review
of some of the most serious charges are made by the prosecution.
Both the police and the prosecution are part of the executive
branch by virtue of their control by the Ministry of Government.
The reasons for this change and its implications are difficult to
assess. One explanation is purely historical. Because the operative
code of criminal procedure was adopted in the last century, it is
possible that the change was effected for modernization; the effi-
cient processing of increasing numbers of cases can best be accom-
plished outside of the judicial machinery. This view is consistent
with changes made in the European civil law countries,458 within
the common law tradition, 59 and in other Latin American nations
' 457. The right to defense counsel in the United States, despite significant state sup-
port, is not without significant criticism. See, e.g., GREGG BARAK, IN DEFENSE OF WHOM?
(1980); Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32
UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The
Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986). Standards promulgated by the American Bar Association, as well as
a growing body of cases in the U.S., conclude that the state cannot constitutionally impose
upon lawyers the obligation to assume the uncompensated defense of the legally indigent
defendant without risking a violation of the client or the lawyer's constitutional rights.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Stan-
dard 5-1.6 (3d ed. 1990) ("Government has the responsibility to fund the full cost of quality
legal representation for all eligible persons .. "). For a summary of the states which have
reached the question and held that free indigent defense services are not an enforceable
duty of the private bar, now a majority of court which have reached the issue, see State ex
rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 835 (Kan. 1988).
458. Tomlinson, supra note 36, at 150 (France); LANGREIN, supra note 445, at 87
(Germany).
459. Prosecutors in the United States are probably vested with more discretion than
their counterparts in either of the other dominant traditions. For a discussion and compari-
son of prosecutorial powers see, Vera Langer, Public Interest in Civil Law, Socialist Law,
and Common Law Systems: The Role of the Public Prosecutor, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 279
(1988). Powers in the U.S. are "usually quite broad." Id. at 296.
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which have adopted or proposed reforms.46
However, the socialist law countries, principally Cuba and
Russia, have also adopted reforms which put the locus of screen-
ing, charging, and investigative power in criminal trials in the
procuracy, and hence closer to central party machinery located in
the executive branch.461 This could be seen as either a move to-
ward greater administrative efficiency or as a means of more direct
control over judicial independence, particularly in criminal cases
involving politically sensitive charges.
Lest there be some suggestion that greater prosecutorial dis-
cretion brings the Nicaraguan criminal process closer to the social-
ist model, it must also be recalled that the U.S. model of criminal
justice also reposes virtually unlimited discretion within the
prosecutorial branch. In the federal system, prosecutorial positions
are filled by the leader of the party in power, the President, and
closely monitored by that President's Department of Justice,
which is part of the executive branch. Here too, the investigative
machinery of crime is largely vested in the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and carried out by U.S. marshals, all of which is con-
trolled within the executive and not the judicial branch, as is in-
creasingly the case in civil law reforms. Similar systems exist at the
level of the individual states.
It appears most likely that the shift in powers away from the
judiciary in criminal cases was a pragmatic, modernizing action
and was not motivated primarily out of ideological concerns. First,
the shift has not been so dramatic as to repose the kind and extent
of control vested in the Russian and Cuban procuracies, which re-
tain wide investigatory and extensive arrest powers throughout a
criminal case.462 In Nicaragua, the procuracy in fact reviews the
case and hands it over to the judiciary once the initial screening
and charging decisions are made. The judiciary also has the power
to review and amend decisions made by the police in charging. Sec-
ond, the complete loss of judicial personnel after the revolution
and the utilization of untrained laypersons in many criminal courts
460. See infra notes 464-69.
461. In the Soviet Union, the Procuracy directs investigation of criminal complaints
through various independent agencies. Quigley, Soviet Lock-Up, supra note 12, at 125-26;
Simmons, supra note 12, at 927-28; BARTON L. INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE: LAWS AND PRACTICE OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES
52-53, 63-64 (1987). The same is true in Cuba. SALAS, supra note 417, at 245-48.
462. INGRAHAM, supra note 461.
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has made it necessary to grant discretion within the more exper-
ienced and better trained offices of the police and prosecution.
Third, the amendment of prosecutorial powers in 1988, which re-
moved the procuracy's exclusive jurisdiction in a wide range of
cases, is a practical recognition that the rising rates of crime and
the limited resources of the procuracy itself did not permit the
careful and thorough review of cases by that office.
VI. THE IDEOLOGY OF "MIXED" PROCESS: INTIMATIONS OF THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL IN CIVIL AND SOCIALIST LAW
Changes in Nicaragua, then, suggest that it has moved, over
time, to what is often referred to in the civil law as a "mixed"
model of criminal process. The judge controls the early stages of
the proof-production and screening, in classic inquisitorial style,
while party control occurs at the decisional stage with more adver-
sarial characteristics.6 3
Increased police and prosecution participation in initial inves-
tigation, the potential, if not the actuality, of increased party con-
trol of proof production, the greater sharing of files, and earlier
intervention of defense counsel in the process all suggest that Nic-
aragua continues to strengthen its commitment to a "mixed" sys-
tem and has enthusiastically embraced many of the essential com-
ponents of adversarial process. If there is a trend, it is toward the
use of the adversarial model at both the pre-trial and trial stages.
This transition to a "mixed" but increasingly adversarial sys-
tem parallels changes which have occurred recently in criminal
process in Latin America and Western Europe and, even more
spectacularly, in socialist law countries throughout the Soviet bloc
during the last two years. This trend toward more adversarial
processes has implications for the administration of criminal jus-
tice throughout the Western world.
A. Changes in Latin America: Mexico, Colombia, Argentina,
and Guatemala
The typology of the adversarial model is most represented in
the concept of party control of fact-gathering -and fact-offering,
463. The term "mixed" is used throughout Latin America and Europe. See supra note
36 and accompanying text.
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rather than a reliance on judges (or any other entity of state
power, such as an independent investigative branch of the judici-
ary) for that function. By this measure, the trend in Latin America
toward adversarial process seems well-advanced, particularly in the
most industrialized countries.
New codes have recently been adopted in Mexico (1987),""
and Colombia (1987),'"1 while significant code reforms have been
proposed in Argentina 6S and Guatemala.46 7 In each of these revi-
sions, the investigating judge is relegated to a lesser role. The po-
lice and prosecutor are given greater roles in independent fact-
gathering during the initial stages of the case, and the defense law-
yer is given both a right to early entry into the criminal process
and open access to the files of the case. In each, the code's ideology
adheres strongly to the presumption of innocence and the privilege
against self-incrimination.
This is not to say that these governments have in fact im-
proved the administration of criminal justice through more adver-
sarial and accusatorial systems. Each of these countries has, in the
last decade, been racked with the reality of brutally oppressive and
often corrupt military or police forces which themselves have been
implicated in the commission of serious and gross human rights
violations.46 This movement toward a more adversarial model,
however, is accompanied by stronger and more agile mechanisms
for the protection of both judicial independence and judicial re-
view throughout Latin America and the Western world. These are
further indications of the trend toward distrust in concentrated
state power and toward a more individual and adversarial
464. C6DIGO PENAL Y DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES PARA EL ESTADO DE MeXICO,
REFORMADO (1987); F. GARCIA CORDERO, LA REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL: 1983-1987 (1987).
465. C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL, CONCORDADO (1987)(Colom.); P. VARGAS, CUATRO
TEMAS FUNDAMENTALES DEL NUEVO CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL (1987); H. G6MEZ
ARISTIZABAL, NORMAS BASICAS DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL (5th ed. 1987).
466. JULIO MAIER, EL PROYECTO DE C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACION (1987).
467. PROYECTO DE C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, REPOBLICA DE GUATEMALA (1990)(unpub-
lished draft in possession of author).
468. See, e.g., MINNESOTA LAWYERS INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, PAPER
PROTECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE MEXICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (July
1990); John Burstein, U.S., Mexican Free Trade Pact? Not at Expense of Human Rights,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 1991, at All; AMERICAS WATCH, THE KILLINGS IN COLOMBIA (Apr.
1989); MINNESOTA LAWYERS INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, JUSTICE SUSPENDED:
THE FAILURE OF THE HABEAS CORPUS SYSTEM IN GUATEMALA (Oct. 1990). For other reports on
Guatemala, see supra note 305, and for a discussion of the conviction of the Argentine mili-




B. Changes in Europe: Italy and Spain
Significant steps toward an adversarial process have occurred
in Italy and Spain. The most recent and significant criminal proce-
dure revision, the Italian code of 1988,470 is seen to take on the
"soul" of the adversarial system, defined there as "the parties' ini-
tiative in collecting and producing evidence and the corresponding
role the judge has to play as the referee in a dispute in which the
public prosecutor is fully responsible for the burden of defending
society by suppressing criminal behavior."'' 71 In the new code, both
the state and the accused are permitted to produce evidence, call
witnesses, and examine them. 72 The new code introduces a limited
notion of plea bargaining.
473
In Spain, amendments to criminal procedure since the 1987
post-Franco Constitution provide for the involvement -of defense
counsel within the first seventy-two hours of detention. Further-
more, the accused is to be advised of the facts leading to arrest, the
right to remain silent, the right to designate a lawyer and to ask
for the lawyer's presence, the right to notify family or friends of
one's detention, and the right to be examined by a medical doctor
upon detention.' 7 ' On the Continent, then, there is movement to-
ward a strongly adversarial system-arguably exclusively adver-
469. In Nicaragua, this topic is addressed in INDEPENDENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL (Vilma
Ndfiez de Escorcia ed., 1990). See also U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON
CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE INDE-
PENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, U.N. DOC. E/AC.57/1988/4 (1988); SHIMON SHETREET & JULES
DESCHENES, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (1985); Centre for the In-
dependence of Judges and Lawyers, Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice,
12 CIJL BULL. 27 (1983); Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in
Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1987); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of
Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301
(1989).
470. Ennio Amodio & Euginio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Coun-
try: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1211 (1989); Lawrence
J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal
Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245 (1991).
471. Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 470, at 1213.
472. Id. at 1220.
473. Id. at 1219; Jeffrey J. Miller, Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues Under the New
Italian Criminal Procedure Code and in the United States: Towards a New Understanding
of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 215 (1990).
474. Henry W. McGee, Jr., Counsel for the Accused: Metamorphosis in Spanish Con-
stitutional Rights, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 253, 268-70 (1987).
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sarial in Italy.
C. Changes After Perestroika in Eastern Europe and Russia
Similar changes have occurred in Russia under perestroika,
where reform proposals reflect a belief in the efficacy of the adver-
sarial model and propose to take Soviet procedure toward adver-
sarial styles of dispute resolution. Former General Secretary
Gorbachev explicitly called for the adoption of an adversary pro-
cess and a strong presumption of innocence in 1988.115
The Soviets are proposing to move toward a more adversarial
system through the adoption of significant elements of the adver-
sarial model, such as the early involvement and greater indepen-
dence of defense counsel,7 6 greater discretion and independence
for the procuracy and criminal investigators," and a general
strengthening of the presumption of innocence. 48 Likewise, in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the courts themselves are given
more independence and power of review, bringing them ever closer
to the civil and common law models.47
D. The Emerging Dominance of the Adversarial Process
Why, it must be asked, do civil and socialist law reformers
seem to regard the adversarial procedural model as a more effec-
tive means to achieve truth or justice 80 than the inquisitorial
methods of the past? Why, indeed, is there an inclination for more
475. Simmons, supra note 12, at 941.
476. Eugene Huskey, The Politics of the Soviet Criminal Process: Expanding the
Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings, 34 AM. J. CoMP. L. 93 (1986); Peter H. Solomon,
The Role of Defence Counsel in the USSR: The Politics of Judicial Reform Under
Gorbachev, 31 CRIM. L. Q. 76 (1988-89). For an excellent account of the traditional role of
defense counsel in Soviet criminal proceedings, see Jean C. Love, Comment, The Role of
Defense Counsel in Soviet Criminal Proceedings, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 806.
477. John Quigley, Soviet Courts Undergoing Major Reforms, 22 INT'L LAW. 459, 467-68
(1988); Quigley, Soviet Lock-Up, supra note 12, at 126-29; Simmons, supra note 12, at 934-
38.
478. John Quigley, The Soviet Conception of the Presumption of Innocence, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 301 (1989).
479. See Markovits, supra note 11, at 402-03 (Poland, Hungary and East Germany);
Quigley, supra note 477, at 460-62; Simmons, supra note 12, at 930-31, 947-48.
480. Whether justice or truth should be the objective of process, and the different
structures needed to accomplish either goal, are the subject of John Thibaut & Laurens
Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978). See also Wilfried Botke, Rule of
Law or "Due Process" as a Common Feature of Criminal Process in Western Democratic
Societies, 51 U. PiTT. L. REV. 419 (1990).
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adversarial processes, a key feature of the U.S. system, when
throughout the last two decades, common law scholars turned to
Continental and even socialist systems for potential solutions to
what was perceived as an unstable, weakened, or even bankrupt
U.S. adversarial system?' 1 The inquiry seems even more compel-
ling because recent U.S. attempts to export variations of the adver-
sary system to the region have been almost unmitigated failures.8"
The U.S. Agency for International Development's Administration
of Justice program, inaugurated in the early 1980s, initiated pro-
grams in most of Central America other than Nicaragua, as well as
some South American and Caribbean countries.'8 3 Total cost of the
program approached $100 million by the end of the decade.
48
While failure can be attributed in part to the lack of political will
in these countries, and not to the flaws of adversarial process itself,
resistance to the adoption of more adversarial styles cannot be
481. The literature is large and growing despite the contrary trend in the law. See
MUELLER & LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1969)(suggestions for
reform of U.S. criminal procedure, using European models); LLOYD WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUS-
TICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977)(presenting alternative mechanisms
based on the continental model); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform: How the French Do It, How We Find Out, and Why
Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542 (1990); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two
Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009
(1974)(pointing out the salutary aspects of assumption of "inquisitorial" aspects by the U.S.
adversarial and accusatory system); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining:
How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and
Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 195; Rudolph B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for
Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361 (1976); Thomas Weigend, Continental
Cures for American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law Reform,
in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 381 (Norval Morris & Michael
Tonry eds., 1980).
Another line of criticism of adversarial criminal process emerges from the Critical Legal
Studies movement. David 0. Friedrichs, Critical Legal Studies and the Critique of Crimi-
nal Justice, 11 CRIM. JUST. REV. 15 (1986); David Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System
and the Role of the Police, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 314 (2nd rev.
ed. 1990); Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaffe, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure,
35 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (1986).
482. The programs have been the target for unrelenting criticism from human rights
groups, both because of their failed attempts at reform of criminal process and because they
miss the central question in the regimes in which they work: the impunity of the military
and police themselves for repeated human rights crimes of the most violent and repressive
nature. ANDERSON, supra note 305, at 60; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNDER-
WRITING INJUSTICE: AID AND EL SALVADOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM (Apr. 1989); WASH-
INGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, ELUSIVE JUSTICE: THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
PROGRAM IN LATIN AMERICA (May 1990)[hereinafter ELUSIVE JUSTICE].
483. ELUSIVE JUSTICE, supra note 482, at 14.
484. Id. at 17.
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denied.
Moreover, the adversarial process has given rise to ever-in-
creasing calls for reform on grounds that the criminal practitioner
is unable to ethically balance the issues of client loyalty with the
competing interests of candor to the tribunal and protection of the
public.48 This debate continues in a system which has a vigorously
debated and strongly enforced set of codes of professional conduct.
In Nicaragua, there is no code of ethics, and disciplinary proceed-
ings are virtually unheard of. The same is true with many other
countries in the civil law tradition, where the lawyer and judge are
seen as mere instruments of the law and legislature. '86 Without
self-conscious attention to the ethical dilemmas of adversarial pro-
cess, and the means to enforce lapses in ethical responsibilities, the
risks to systemic integrity are high, and the invitation to overt cor-
ruption is open.
Many critics have justifiably charged that the U.S. adversarial
"model," is nothing more in practice than an assembly line for the
private bargaining of justice.487 Why, then, do foreign systems seek
to emulate its mechanisms? The inquiry into the integrity of prem-
ises thus implicates not only Nicaragua's justice system but the
foundations of the entire civil and socialist law in criminal process.
There are a number of potential explanations for the historical
and ongoing progression toward a more adversarial -criminal pro-
cess. One arrogant and ethnocentric but obvious explanation is
that adversarial process is, in fact, intrinsically better. This seems
highly unlikely, given the thrashing which the adversary system
regularly takes at the hands of its own participants, observers, and
analysts. If anything, the modern civil law systems seem to func-
tion better than the mechanisms of the adversarial model. The
simple fact is that plea bargaining, not criminal trials, is the norm
in the U.S. adversary system; a shift toward private bargaining of
criminal justice can hardly be called a step up the evolutionary
ladder to justice.
485. Freedman, supra note 71; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 Wis.
L. REv. 29; Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301 (1989); David Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing?
David Luban on the Morality of Adversary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392 (1990).
486. See, e.g., Olga M. Pina, Systems of Ethical Regulation: An International Compar-
ison, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 797 (1988) (comparing U.S. ethical codes and disciplinary ma-
chinery with those of Spain and France).
487. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 74; Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the
Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. Sys. J. 338 (1982).
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It seems more likely that the adversarial model carries sway
because of its pervasive image of efficacy, an imagery purveyed by
the television model of articulate combat between equally armed
adversaries, of the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, of the defendant's protection by the presumption of in-
nocence, of popular participation through trials by jury, and of the
many procedural safeguards which balance the individual interests
of the accused against those of a powerful state. That these images
prevail despite the reality of adversarial process is testimony to the
power of the popular media and of fictional accounts which project
that image through focus on the occasional drama of the jury trial
rather than the sordid reality of bargained-for justice.
Another possible explanation lies in the growth of power in
the nation-state and the commensurate growth in distrust on the
part of its citizens in the ability of the judge, as representative of
the state, to exercise state authority, the most essential component
in the non-adversarial equation, in a balanced and neutral manner.
If this is true, however, one must wonder why the shift is toward
the vesting of enormous and largely unreviewable discretion in the
police and prosecution for the effective resolution of cases. Unless
it is possible that we have not calculated the consequences of this
shift in the locus of state power, this explanation loses its persua-
sive power.
The most likely explanation may lie with the exigencies of
numbers and the growth of administrative bureaucracies. As the
rates of reported crime and arrests have risen consistently
throughout the industrialized world in the late twentieth century,
no system which relies heavily on the slow, methodic, neutral use
of state bureaucratic machinery provides for efficient resolution of
the case. The processing of enormous numbers simply has proven
unequal to the task of fairness. Perhaps the numbing frequency of
criminality forces systems away from prolonged fact-gathering and
fact presentation, at the conclusion of which a neutral judicial of-
ficer will determine guilt or innocence. Instead, police and
prosecutorial bureaucracies become the locus of unfettered discre-
tion in screening for the existence of a crime and resolution of guilt
through private negotiation.""
488. This assumes, of course, that the greater political system will continue to allocate
resources to the police and courts in their current proportions. The former garner the vast
majority while the latter receive only a pittance, even when combined with the resources
allocated to the most common representatives of the parties in judicial proceedings, the
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VII. CONCLUSION: No NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE CHAMORRO
ADMINISTRATION
These, then, are the changes in law and the conflicts in struc-
tural integrity which faced the newly elected government in Nica-
ragua in 1990. That government purports to offer not only national
reconciliation and an end to U.S.-sponsored intervention but also a
distinct philosophical shift from the heterodox Marxism of the
prior administration to "democratization and reconciliation." It
aims at a society more open to public debate and decision-making,
with a concomitant commitment to a more privatized, free-market-
controlled economy. Thus far, the actions of the Chamorro govern-
ment have focused much more on private markets than on free
debate. s9
The contra war continued through the 1990 elections; interna-
tional attention was focused again on Nicaragua when religious
workers from the United States were attacked by contra forces in
December 1990 and two nuns were killed.4 90 The most important
accomplishments of the new administration were the termination
of the contra war, the demobilization of the contras, and a reduc-
tion by two-thirds of the Sandinista army.4 91 The human rights cli-
mate has improved markedly for free speech and the right of as-
sembly. On the other hand, the Sandinistas, while cooperative in
the electoral process and the subsequent transition of power, have
prosecutor and the public defender. In 1990, the total budget of the judicial branch in Nica-
ragua, for example, was reportedly only .45% of the national budget, while neighboring
Costa Rica's judiciary is constitutionally required to receive 6% of the national budget.
SOLIS & WILSON, supra note 348, at 44 n.164. If those proportions were to change, the prem-
ises of the text would no longer hold.
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tors, 9 ENViO 14, 19 (Aug.-Sept. 1990).
490. Some opposition members initially suggested that the attack on the U.S. nuns was
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managed to keep a firm hold on control of both the army and the
police. Troubling reports also have emerged of Sandinista army in-
volvement in previously undisclosed wrongdoing.492 Crime is at its
highest level since 1980.493 However, despite U.S. economic assis-
tance, the new administration still fights to avoid total collapse of
the economy.'94
Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe profoundly
affected the economic relationship between that region and Nicara-
gua,'95 as well as the political theory of the Sandinista leader-
ship.496 The FSLN still controls forty-two percent of the seats in
the National Assembly until the next national elections in 1996,
97
and holds a narrow majority of the Supreme Court through at least
1993.498 A Sandinista-controlled Supreme Court will play a strong
role in any attempts at a criminal justice reform because all such
proposals are subject to review for constitutionality. Because con-
trol of the Supreme Court also means the ability to name all judi-
cial appointees in the lower court, the Chamorro government has
choked off the court by reducing the judiciary's budget to about
one-half of one percent of the entire national budget.
49 9
Pre-election promises of the UNO coalition in the area of
criminal justice reform were few. They focused on the protection of
human rights and full implementation of the Constitutional guar-
antees for individual protection in criminal procedure, including
the adoption of the jury trial.5 00 This hardly meant that the Con-
492. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1990, at 175-79 (1990);
U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1990, at 701 (1991); Paul Berman, Neckties and Mass Graves, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 5,
1991, at 33; Mark A. Uhlig, Sandinistas Accused As Burial Sites Are Unearthed, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, at A22.
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HERALD, Nov. 4, 1991, at A12.
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POST, Aug. 7, 1990, at 8A; Shirley Christian, Nicaragua Devalues Money to Stem Economic
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tas Are Dug In, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at A14.
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Uniting the Germanys, in a Latin American Setting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1990, at A2. "
496. FSLN Discussion Papers, 9 ENvlo 48 (Aug.-Sept. 1990); Mark A. Uhlig,
Sandinista Leadership Rethinking Its Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at A4.
497. SOLIS & WILSON, supra note 348, at 26.
498. UNO's Court-Packing Plan, 10 ENVfO 15 (Jan.-Feb. 1991).
499. After 100 Days: Still Three Roads Ahead, 9 ENVIo 3, 5 (Aug.-Sept. 1990).
500. UNI6N NACIONAL OPOSITORA (UNO), PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO 5-7 (Aug. 1989).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
stitution was sacred; a fourteen-point reform program was pro-
posed which included proposals to guarantee judicial indepen-
dence, to create a national Procurator for Human Rights, and to
adopt a separate high court limited to review of constitutional
questions. e
The UNO coalition has yet to mount any serious effort to
amend the 1987 Constitution, largely because the Sandinistas still
control forty-two percent of the Assembly, and processes by which
the Constitution can be amended require a two-thirds majority of
that body.5 0 2 Mrs. Chamorro, however, has taken a few small steps
to revise the structure of her administration's treatment of crime
and criminal process. Most significantly, consistent with campaign
promises, she has dismantled the Ministry of the Interior and with
it the structures of the DGSE, the state security police. In addi-
tion, she has created a powerful new Ministry of Government,
which controls all criminal justice functions of the executive
branch with the exception of the office of the Procurator General,
which continues to operate independently.503  Finally, Mrs.
Chamorro has renamed the Sandinista Police the National Police
and has agreed, in her successful efforts to disarm the contras, to
the creation of a "Rural Police" made up of former members of the
contras who are permitted to guard the land areas given to the
contras for resettlement.504
One struggle within the government ironically lies between the
executive and the judiciary and focuses on judicial independence,
an issue part of the opposition critique in the pre-election reforms
of the UNO opponents to the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme
Court, Sandinista-controlled and in office until 1993 because
elected to six-year terms in 1987, holds enormous sway over gov-
ernmental policy-making through the existence of the newly-cre-
ated power to review laws for constitutionality..50 5 The power takes
on even more significance when it is noted that the Chamorro ad-
501. Id. at 7-8. The basis for constitutional reforms by the opposition is found in the
work of Managua attorney R6GER MIRANDA G6MEZ, FAZ Y ANTIFAZ: ESTUDIO DE LA CONSTITU-
c1ON SANDINISTA 179-87 (1988).
502. SOLlS & WILSON, supra note 348, at 24, 26.
503. Decree No. 1-90 of April 25, 1990 both abolished the old ministry and created the
new Government Ministry. Decreto de Ley Creadora de Ministerios de Estado, No. 1-90,
arts. 3, 15, Apr. 25, 1990 (unofficial version in the files of the author). The new law, however,
also creates, within the Government Ministry, a "Civil Intelligence Service," whose duties
are otherwise unarticulated. Id. art. 3(7).
504. Crece Incertidumbre por Policia Contra, BARRICADA, June 7, 1990, at 1.
505. See supra notes 411-15 and accompanying text.
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ministration has acted frequently through the use of executive and
administrative orders which permit bypass of the National
Assembly.
During the summer of 1990, the government proposed to aug-
ment the number of magistrates on the Court from the constitu-
tional minimum of seven to fifteen, which would give the UNO
forces a clear voting majority on the high court. This proposal is
similar to efforts in the United States, during the administration of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, to "pack" the Supreme Court with Justices
who would more likely be sympathetic with his radical reforms of
government which focused on the greater assumption of executive
power.506
The Nicaraguan Supreme Court responded with its own inter-
nal restructuring. It divided itself into three chambers-criminal,
constitutional, and labor/agriculture-each composed of three
members, and asked the legislature to begin the process for adding
two new members to its number. 7 After extensive infighting, the
Sandinista majority stands.
These institutional changes are the only steps taken in crimi-
nal justice by the new administration. There are no proposals for
new codes and none planned in the immediate future. This fact,
perhaps more than any other, indicates that the changes made by
the Sandinistas to criminal procedure for common crimes were
part of a general modernization of an essentially civil law justice
system like that of its Central American neighbors, not one marked
by strong indicia of socialist law structures or theory, as those to
which Cuba struggles to adhere.
Challenges for the new government are awesome and perhaps
insurmountable. Two major strikes by public workers within the
first few months of the new government's assumption of power do
not bode well for the promised reconciliation. 0 8 The biggest factor
in its favor is the simple fact that the U.S. now aligns itself in
favor of the government rather than unalterably opposed to it.
Only time will tell whether the Nicaraguan people will accept or
reject the agenda for change with which they are now faced.
506. UNO's Court-Packing Plan, supra note 498, at 11-12.
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